Vol. 14, no. 1: Full Issue by International Law & Policy, Denver Journal
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 14 
Number 1 Spring/Summer Article 11 
May 2020 
Vol. 14, no. 1: Full Issue 
Denver Journal International Law & Policy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
14 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y (1985). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at 
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-
commons@du.edu. 






of International Law and Policy
VOLUME 14 NUMBER 1 SPRING/SUMMER 1985
ARTICLES
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESOLUTION THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
Allied Bank Decision ................... Ettore A. Santucci
This article offers the mechanism necessary for a uniform response to de-
faults on international debts caused by nation states. The equivocal re-
sponse by the Second Circuit, to the case brought by a conglomerate of
banks, represented by Allied Bank, against the state-owned Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, reveals the depth of the problem faced by creditors
and debtors alike, when the outcome of the litigation is quite arbitrary. Mr.
Santucci offers the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as the crucial actor
in this situation, in order to bring about uniformity and certainty to inter-
national monetary markets through the centralization of decision-making.
The IMF has a system of conditionality in place that bases access to addi-
tional funds upon the implementation of austerity measures. The proposed
solution would extend this conditionality to Article VIII, Section 2 of the
IMF Agreement, in order to control actions that cause defaults on debts.
The country seeking restrictions would be given protection against foreign
creditors, so long as exchange controls are "maintained and imposed con-
sistently with the [Fund] Agreement." The privilege will be granted to
those countries which formulate controls designed to encourage the normal
flow of exchange funds as soon as possible. The present piecemeal reaction
to defaults will not be adequate once the stakes get higher. The mechanism
involving the IMF is the systemic and institutional change necessary to
counter the escalating debt crisis.
REDEFINING TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES:
THE UNITARY CONTROVERSY (A CONSTITUTIONAL
APPROACH) ................................. Mark B. Baker 35
Professor Baker addresses unitary taxation as it has been practiced by state
taxing authorities in their efforts to tax the full income of corporations do-
ing business both inside and outside their boundaries. The author notes
that as states have shifted from taxation only of the income of the corpora-
tion's subsidiaries located in the state to taxation of the income of the for-
eign parent companies of domiciled subsidiaries, three constitutional issues
have been raised. These issues arise from the fourteenth amendment due
process clause, the interstata commerce clause and the foreign commerce
clause. Professor Baker analyzes these issues, as they have been addressed
by the United States Supreme Court, and suggests that the Court has
shown an unwillingness to "limit the scope of the states' taxing power." The
author points out that the Supreme Court's decision in Japan Line, where
international commerce was involved, "mandated" two additional factors
beyond the normal commerce clause factors: the enhanced risk of multiple
taxation and the possibility that a state tax might impair federal uniform-
ity. However, the Court's subsequent decision in Container Corporation
has "left open the question of whether the worldwide unitary method may
be applied to tax the worldwide income of a foreign corporation that has a
U.S. domestic subsidiary." The author closes with the observation that the
use of unitary method in the international arena may have serious ramifica-
tions and calls for a more "affirmative position" by the Executive branch in
resolving the problems involved with the use of unitary taxation by the
states.
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL COURTS OVER
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL
LONG-ARM STATUTE ........................ Barry E. Cohen 59
This article examines the current status of federal long-arm jurisdiction,
the practical problems associated with its use, and the constitutional limita-
tions on federal in personam jurisdiction. Since current law creates a signif-
icant loophole through which alien corporations can avoid personal jurisdic-
tion in any federal court, the conclusion reached by this author is that a
generally applicable federal standard for long-arm jurisdiction presents the
possibility of a more rational assertion of in personam jurisdiction by fed-
eral courts over distant parties - especially alien corporations. Such a
standard should be authorized either by statute or as an amendment to
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
CRITICAL ESSAYS
AN EXCHANGE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN
CENTRAL AMERICA
IGNORING INTERNATIONAL LAW: U.S. POLICY ON
INSURGENCY AND INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA .............................. Louis Ren6 Beres 75
The article considers U.S. actions towards Nicaragua as being totally
void of justification in international law. Beres notes that the Reagan
administration no longer feels the need to justify their position, and that
the rationale has been reduced to pure Realpolitik considerations. There
are proper grounds for intervention into a foreign state, such as for hu-
manitarian concerns, but according to Beres, none are present in this
case. The article goes beyond the single situation presented by Nicara-
gua. The whole process of foreign policy, based on Realpolitik consider-
ations, breeds contradictions. For instance, the concept of independence,
would be applied to groups fighting against a regime hostile to the U.S.,
but those fighting against an ally are not accorded the same honor, no
matter how repressive the regime.
CONFUSING VICTIMS AND VICTIMIZERS: NICARAGUA AND THE
REINTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW .............................. Robert A. Friedlander 87
Initially, the article considers the present state of international law.
Friedlander concludes that this body of law has been nothing more than
an attempt to thwart the Darwinian progression of global power. The
only reliable source of compliance is nothing more than the concept of
good faith obligations to carry out the terms of agreements. By depicting
the United Nations within a North-South dichotomy, the power to for-
mulate rules rests with the non-Western majority without a correspond-
ing power in reality. The rules formed within the past few decades are
not entirely clear in application. This claim applies to the concept of
humanitarian intervention with equal force. With the void in enforce-
ment capabilities, the United States must fend for itself in regard to the
division of global power. The Reagan administration has decided not to
rely upon recent formulations of international law that inherently pos-
sess a non-Western bias. Since no one else will help to prevent Soviet
intervention in this hemisphere, the U.S. must take the initiative and
act on its own.
THE NUCLEAR COLLISION COURSE: CAN INTERNATIONAL LAW
BE OF HELP? .......................... John H.E. Fried 97
It is the thesis of this article that international law prohibits nuclear
war. The thesis is based on the premise that, since no specific norms
concerning nuclear warfare exist, the rules generally applicable to all
weapons must apply. The author enumerates many of the rules that cur-
rently govern warfare, and concludes that the use of nuclear weapons
must inevitably and intolerably break those rules. In addition, the au-
thor analyzes the U.S. Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative and
considers its impact on the arm's race. The author concludes with a rec-
ommendation that the U.S. reciprocate the Soviet Union's no first-use
pledge.
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MONETARY FUND: AN ALTERNATIVE
TO THE ALLIED BANK DECISION
ETTORE A. SANTUCCI*
INTRODUCTION
On April 23, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit rendered its first decision in the case of Allied Bank Interna-
tional v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago (Allied Bank I).1 In Allied
Bank I, the court held that exchange restrictions imposed by Costa Rica,
which prevented certain Costa Rican banks from making payments to
foreign creditors in United States dollars when due, would be given effect
in United States courts on grounds of comity, because they were consis-
tent with the policy and law of the United States.2 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of an action for breach of payment
brought by a syndicate of foreign creditor banks against the Costa Rican
debtors.3 On July 3, 1984, the Second Circuit granted the plaintiff's peti-
* B.A., Manhattanville College,J.D., Universita di Bologna, Faculty of Jurisprudence,
J.D., Boston College of Law School. Associate with the law firm of White & Case, New York.
The author would like to thank Sir Joseph Gold, Senior Consultant, International Monetary
Fund, Professor Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Boston College Law School, and Owen C. Pell,
Esq., White & Case, for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article. The
author also gratefully acknowledges the assistance provided by Margaret F. O'Conner in the
preparation of this article.
1. 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984). Although the decision was subsequently withdrawn by the
court, see infra note 4 and accompanying text, it will be necessary to cite to the opinion
repeatedly in the course of this article, as several important aspects of the case were dis-
cussed by the Second Circuit in its first decision (Allied Bank 1), but not in its second
decision (Allied Bank II, see infra note 5 and accompanying text).
2. 733 F.2d at 24.
3. Id. at 27. The banking industry reacted in shock to this holding. The New York
Clearing House Association (the Clearing House), an association of twelve leading commer-
cial banks in New York City, which had already filed an amicus curiae brief on the initial
hearing on appeal, filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of plaintiffs petition for rehear-
ing. The United States government who had not participated in any prior proceedings in the
case, also filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the petition.
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tion for rehearing.4 On March 18, 1985, the Second Circuit reversed and
vacated its Allied Bank I decision. Therefore, the lower court's dismissal
of the action was reversed and remanded to the district court for entry of
summary judgment for the only plaintiff creditor bank left on appeal. 5 In
Allied Bank II, the court held that in Allied Bank I it had mistakenly
found the Costa Rican restrictions consistent with United States policy
and therefore, such restrictions were not entitled to recognition on
grounds of comity.' The court also held that the act of state doctrine did
not prevent the United States courts from rendering a judgment in the
case, because the situs of the debt was in the United States and not in
Costa Rica.
7
The Allied Bank litigation sent shock waves through the money cen-
ters of the globe and the capitals of overburdened debtor countries. This
paper is not, however, a case comment on Allied Bank. The purpose of
this paper is to suggest ways to prevent litigation in situations analogous
to the one involved in Allied Bank. This kind of litigation, regardless of
the outcome and the reasoning offered to justify it, has a devastating im-
pact on the precarious equilibrium laboriously achieved day after day in
the international debt arena. It is too dangerous and disruptive for all
parties involved-winners and losers alike-to surrender their fate to the
hands of tribunals, who are forced to decide complex issues in a piece-
meal, case-by-case fashion.Therefore, a systemic and institutional alter-
native to litigation must be developed to avoid such consequences.
This thesis is true regardless of the ultimate outcome in Allied Bank,
because the case lacks any credible effort to analyze the systemic and
institutional concern raised by the situation at issue. The Allied Bank II
court confined itself to a recitation of the language used by the United
States government, as amicus curiae, to support a vaguely defined and
superficially analyzed "debt resolution procedure that operates through
the auspices of the IMF."' The court, however, refused to discuss and
construe the actual provisions of the International Monetary Fund Arti-
cles of Agreement (the Bretton Woods Agreement). In fact, any reference
to the Agreement, or the "charter" of the international monetary order,
was omitted from the Allied Bank decisions. 9 Therefore, in a way Allied
4. The Second Circuit granted a rehearing before the same panel that had heard the
case in the first instance. Both the Clearing House and the United States government filed
amicus curiae briefs in support of plaintiff on rehearings. For a discussion of some of the
arguments raised by amici on rehearing, see infra notes 135-145 and accompanying text.
5. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d
Cir. 1985). This second decision of the Second Circuit will hereinafter be referred to as
Allied Bank I.
6. Id. at 519-20.
7. Id. at 523.
8. Id. at 519. See infra notes 39-42, 135-138 and accompanying text.
9. The IMF Agreement was only mentioned briefly in the Brief for Defendants-Appel-
lees on Rehearing at 40-41, Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago,
757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Brief], where defendants sug-
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Bank epitomizes the inability, or the unwillingness, of the judicial process
to accommodate any systemic and institutional consideration for the pur-
poses of resolving the international debt crisis.
Institutional and systemic considerations are, however, the most im-
portant issues for the future and will be the exclusive focus of this essay.
Looking ahead to possible future instances where debtor countries resort
to exchange controls to handle their external debt crisis, a number of les-
sons must be drawn from Allied Bank. This paper submits that the Bret-
ton Woods Agreement contains the means and authority for the Fund to
play a central role in a situation similar to the one at issue in Allied Bank
and to offer a viable alternative to future litigation.
I. THE ALLIED BANK LITIGATION
Allied Bank International (Allied) brought an action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of
thirty-nine United States and foreign creditor banks, against three Costa
Rican banks, which are owned by the Republic of Costa Rica. The action
was brought for breach of payment of certain notes issued by the Costa
Rican banks in 1976.10 Payments on the notes were to be made in New
York with United States dollars." The loan agreements provided for con-
current jurisdiction in the New York and Costa Rican courts.' 2 The dol-
lars were to be supplied by the Costa Rican Central Bank." The loan
agreements also provided that a failure to make a payment due solely to
the omission or refusal of the Central Bank to provide the necessary U.S.
dollars would not constitute an event of default for a ten day grace pe-
gested a possible analogy between the situation covered by Article VIII, section 2(b) of the
Fund Agreement and the facts of Allied Bank:
The precise scope of the Bretton Woods Agreement and its applicability to
loan agreements such as that in question [in Allied Bank] has never been ad-
dressed by a federal appellate court, and other authorities are in conflict. How-
ever, regardless of how various clauses of Bretton Woods ultimately are inter-
preted, its thrust is clear: the United States recognizes, and has agreed to
respect, exchange control by foreign nations for legitimate purposes.
Id. at 41.
The Clearing House responded to this argument, Reply Brief of the New York Clearing
House Association as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing at 9-13, Allied Bank International v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Clearing
House Reply Brief]. Amicus argued that the loans at issue in Allied Bank were not "ex-
change contracts" within the meaning of Article VIII, section 2(b). Id. at 10. Amicus also
claimed that "even assuming that an international loan agreement were an exchange con-
tract, there is no U.S. authority holding that such a loan agreement, enforceable when made,
may be rendered unenforceable by an intervening exchange regulation." Id. at 12. Finally,
amicus argued that in any event the Costa Rican exchange controls were not "maintained or
imposed consistently with [the Bretton Woods] Agreement." Id. at 13.
10. Allied Bank II, 757 F.2d at 518.
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riod. 4 After such period, however, the creditors could demand full pay-
ment of the promissory notes."6
Payments were regularly made until August 1981, when the govern-
ment of Costa Rica, in response to a severe economic crisis, unilaterally
halted the release of any currency for the payment of debts.'6 In Novem-
ber 1981, the government of Costa Rica in effect utilized controls over
foreign exchange to establish a temporary suspension of payments on ex-
ternal debts, unless the prior approval of the Central Bank was ob-
tained.1 7 The Central Bank did not authorize payments of principal and
interest on the promissory notes at issue.' 8 The Costa Rican government's
decree, deferring payments on the foreign debt, stated that "presently the
government of Costa Rica is renegotiating its external debt and for this
purpose there should be harmony of decisions and centralization in the
decision-making process."'" All the foreign creditor banks brought an ac-
tion in the New York District Court for breach of payment on the notes.
2 0
While this action was pending, the banks began negotiations for the
rescheduling of the debt.2 1 In July 1983, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the action on the ground that
the act of state doctrine applied to the acts of the Costa Rican govern-
ment.2 12 In September 1983, an agreement rescheduling the Costa Rican
debt was signed by all the creditor banks except one, Fidelity Union
Trust company of New Jersey (Fidelity).2 3 On appeal from the District
Court's dismissal, Allied represented the lone bank which continued to
refuse to accept the rescheduling.
24
Costa Rica's deferment of payments on foreign debts also caused it to
default on its intergovernmental obligations. 2 Such default triggered sec-
tion 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act,26 which prohibits governmental
aid to any country in default on loan payments to the United States, un-




18. Id. at 25.
19. Id. at 24-25. Throughout the litigation defendants argued that this reason for the
deferment indicated that Costa Rica never intended to repudiate its external debt. Defen-
dants saw this good faith defense as the central aspect of the case and argued that "nothing
in the [Allied Bank] decision, or the arguments of the Costa Rican banks, may be read to
permit a foreign country unilaterally to abrogate its debts to U.S. citizens." Defendants'
Brief on Rehearing at 2. The defendants thus tried to limit the holding to the specified facts
of the case and reprimanded the plaintiff and amici for their "desire to foreclose an unde-
sired result in a different case in another court at a future time." Id.
20. Allied Bank I, 733 F.2d at 25.
21. Id.
22. 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
23. Allied Bank I, 733 F.2d at 25.
24. Id.
25. Id.




less the President advises Congress that "assistance to such country is in
the national interest. '27 Both President Reagan and the House of Repre-
sentatives expressed full support for Costa Rica. 8 In January 1983, the
United States joined several other nations in the signing of the Paris Club




The court in Allied Bank I held that the actions of the Costa Rican
government causing default on the notes were "consistent with the policy
and law of the United States" and that comity required that such actions
be given effect in the United States courts."0 The court did not rule on
the act of state defense relied upon by the District Court below.3' The
Court of Appeals also stated that the result it reached was not dependent
on the choice of the controlling law as determined by the situs of the
debt. 2
In its finding that the Costa Rican decree was consistent with the
policy and the law of the United States, the court in Allied Bank I relied
in part on the support for Costa Rica manifested by both the legislative
and the executive branches of the United States government.3 3 More im-
portantly, however, the court drew an analogy between Costa Rica's pro-
hibition of payment of its external debt and the reorganization of a busi-
ness pursuant to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.3" The court
reasoned that Costa Rica's actions were not a repudiation of the debt, but
rather a mere "deferral of payments while it attempted in good faith to
renegotiate its obligations."3 6 Giving effect in the United States courts to
the Costa Rican exchange restrictions, the court concluded, would achieve
the same result as an automatic stay of all collection actions against a
business filing an application for reorganization under Chapter 11.36
The same court, however, changed its conclusions and held in Allied
Bank II that, in light of the U.S. government's "elucidation of its posi-
tion," the court was no longer convinced that the Costa Rican decree was
consistent with the policy of the United States." The Allied Bank II
court made no mention of its prior analogy of a debtor country reschedul-
ing its debt and a domestic debtor filing for reorganization under Chapter
27. 22 U.S.C. section 2370 (g)(1982).
28. Allied Bank 1, 733 F.2d at 25.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id.
32. Id.




37. Allied Bank 11, 757 F.2d at 520. The court concluded that the Costa Rican govern-
ment's unilateral attempt to repudiate private commercial, obligations was inconsistent with
the orderly resolution of international debt problems and with the interests of the United
States as a major source of private international credit. Id. at 522.
1985
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11.38 The court changed its opinion on the Allied Bank situation because
it was fully persuaded by the U.S. Justice Department's claimed support
for "the debt resolution procedure that operates through the auspices of
the IMF," since "guided by the IMF, this long established approach en-
courages the cooperative adjustment of international debt problems."' 9
The Allied Bank II court reasoned that such a procedure required that
the underlying obligations to pay remained valid and enforceable.4 0
Therefore, the court concluded, Costa Rica's attempted unilateral re-
structuring of private obligations threatened the system of international
cooperation and negotiation supported by the United States, and thus
was inconsistent with United States policy."' The court did not question
the United States government's explanation of its apparently inconsistent
position, which on the one hand opposed Costa Rica's conduct insofar as
private international debts were concerned, while at the same time, offi-
cially supported that same conduct insofar as intergovernmental obliga-
tions are concerned.
4 2
According to the Allied Bank II court, Costa Rica's exchange restric-
tions could not be respected in the United States courts on grounds of
comity. Consequently, the court had to rule on the act of state defense
raised by the defendant debtors below.43 The court noted that if, as the
court below had held, the act of state doctrine was applicable, judicial
examination of the Costa Rican decree would be precluded. The court,
however, concluded that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable to the
facts of Allied Bank.44
The Allied Bank II court reasoned that the act of state doctrine did
not bar inquiry by the courts into the validity of extraterritorial takings.
45
According to the court, the act of state defense would have been available
if the situs of the property, the debt, was in Costa Rica at the time of the
38. The court simply said, rather cryptically, that "the appellees' ability to pay United
States dollars relates only to the potential enforceability of the judgment; it does not deter-
mine whether judgment should enter." Id. at 522.
39. Id. at 519.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The court explained that its holding in Allied Bank I was premised on the
United States' willingness to restructure Costa Rica's intergovernmental loans and to con-
tinue providing aid to Costa Rica. Id. at 520.
43. Id. at 520.
44. Id. The court explained that the act of state doctrine operates to confer presump-
tive validity to certain acts of foreign sovereigns by rendering nonjusticiable claims that
challenge such acts. Id. Quoting from the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), the court said that "every sovereign State is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."
Id.
45. Id. at 520. Quoting from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427
(1964), the court stated that the act of state doctrine protects only the validity of a taking of
property by a foreign government within its own territory. Allied Bank 11, 757 F.2d at 520.
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purported taking.46 However under ordinary situs analysis, the court
found that the loan agreement's nexus with New York,47 as well as the
United States' "interest in maintaining New York's status as one of the
foremost commercial centers in the world,"'48 made New York the situs of
the debt.4 9 Accordingly, the court concluded the Costa Rican decree was
an extraterritorial taking of property and as such, was unprotected by the
act of state doctrine.
5 0
II. APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2(B) To THE ALLIED BANK
DISPUTE
The application of the Bretton Woods Agreement to the dispute was
never before the Allied Bank court. It is, however, appropriate to address
this issue because both Costa Rica and the United States are members of
the IMF. The situation at issue in Allied Bank is at least arguably cov-
ered by Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement 51 , which pro-
vides, in part, that "exchange contracts which involve the currency of any
member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member maintained or imposed consistently with [the Fund] Agree-
ment shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member." In its in-
terpretation of this provision,5" the Fund stated that the purpose of Arti-
cle VIII, section 2(b) is to withdraw from private parties, who violate the
legitimate exchange regulations of a member, "the assistance of the judi-
cial or administrative authorities of other members in obtaining the per-
formance of such contracts. 5 3 In the same decision, the Fund made it
clear that "by accepting the Fund Agreement members have undertaken
to make the principle mentioned above effectively part of their national
law.""
The United States has accepted the Fund Agreement, and therefore,
46. Id.
47. Id. The court noted that: the debtors conceded jurisdiction in New York; payments
were to be made in New York; Allied, the syndicate agent, is located in New York; and some
of the negotiations between the parties took place in the United States. Id.
48. Id. The court noted that the viability of New York as an international clearing
center for United States dollars and the source of billions of dollars of international loans
each year depends on creditors' confidence in the judicial enforceability of contracts subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States courts. Id. at 521-22.
49. Id. at 522.
50. The court offered a secondary reason for its conclusion, namely that the purported
taking had not "come to complete fruition within the dominion of the foreign government"
since Costa Rica could not wholly extinguish the debtor banks' obligations to pay United
States dollars to Allied in New York. Id. at 521.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 60-69.
52. Pursuant to Article XXIX(a) (formerly Article XVIII) of the Fund Agreement, the
Executive Board of the Fund has the authority to settle with finality any question of inter-
pretation of the Articles that arises between a member and the IMF or between members.
53. IMF DECISION No. 446-4, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMETrs 233 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED DECISIONS].
54. Id. at 233-34.
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has given Article VIII the force of law in the United States." If it can be
demonstrated that Article VIII, section 2(b) does indeed apply to loan
agreements of the kind at issue in Allied Bank, the courts of the United
States have a duty to apply the positive law of the IMF Agreement in the
same manner as a treaty.
Assuming that Article VIII, section 2(b) applies to such loan agree-
ments," the crucial inquiry in Allied Bank should have been whether the
Costa Rican exchange restrictions were maintained or imposed consistent
with the law and policy of the United States. The Second Circuit should
have denied recognition to the Costa Rican decree, unless sufficient evi-
dence had been introduced to satisfy the court that the promissory notes
at issue were unenforceable since the requirements for claiming the Arti-
cle VIII, section 2(b) defense were satisfied. If the Secound Circuit had
given or denied effect to the Costa Rican decree based solely on the uni-
lateral interest of the United States, it would have violated the spirit and
the letter of the Fund Agreement, which is an integral part of the law of
the United States.
A future role of the Fund in similar circumstances surpasses the ef-
fect that an application of Article VIII, section 2(b) would have had in
Allied Bank. Even if the Second Circuit had considered Article VIII, sec-
tion 2(b) as the governing rule of the case, the outcome would have sim-
ply been determined by considering which party had the burden of prov-
ing that the requirements of such provision were satisfied and whether
sufficient evidence could have been offered to meet the burden. In such
circumstances, the Fund's role would have been a reactive one, albeit a
crucial one in the litigation. Pursuant to the Fund's undertaking "to lend
its assistance in connection with any problem which may arise in relation
to the. . .interpretation of. . .Article VIII, section 2(b),' 5 7 the Fund
would have had jurisdiction to make a conclusive determination that the
exchange control regulations were, or were not, maintained or imposed
consistently with the Articles."
A more crucial lesson to be learned from Allied Bank, however, is
that Article VIII, section 2(b) may present the Fund with the opportunity
to play an active role in future situations where a debtor country facing a
liquidity crisis chooses to impose restrictive exchange controls, which
make it impossible for domestic borrowers to honor their obligations to
foreign lenders when due. The Fund's active role should ideally prevent
litigation, rather than determine its outcome. The remainder of this pa-
per will explore exactly what such role should be and how it can be recon-
ciled with the Bretton Woods Agreement, from which the Fund derives
its authority.
55. 22 U.S.C. section 286 (1982).
56. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.




III. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2 CONDITIONALITY
The question whether international loan agreements"9 are included in
the definition of "exchange contracts" for purposes of Article VIII, sec-
tion 2(b) has not yet been resolved. In the last four decades two different
definitions of exchange contracts have been proposed: a narrow one, re-
stricted to contracts for the exchange of currency of one country for that
of another or at the most, to contracts which are "monetary transactions
in disguise,"60 and a broad one, encompassing all contracts that in any
way affect a country's exchange resources.6 The narrow definition, con-
trary to the broad one, excludes a promise between residents of different
countries to lend or deposit an amount in foreign currency against a
promise by the debtor to pay interest on and to repay or return such
59. Such loans normally involve the extension of credit in a particular currency in ex-
change for a promissory note obligating the debtor to pay interest and, in accordance with a
maturity schedule, to repay the principal of the loan in the same currency. See generally, R.
W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY COLLABORATION 129-32 (publication
forthcoming).
60. This definition was originally proposed by Professor Arthur Nussbaum, Exchange
Control and the International Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421, 426-26 (1949). Such defi-
nition was approved by the House of Lords in Wilson, Smithett & Cope, LTD. v. Terruzzi,
[1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 709 (C.A.) (Kerr J.), 709 (CA), and in United Merchants (Investments)
Ltd. et al. v. Royal Bank of Canada et al., [1982] 2 W.L.R. 1039. The New York Courts have
also followed this definition in Banco de Brasil v. Israel Commodity Co., Inc., 12 NY.2d 371,
239 N.Y.S.2d 872, 190 N.E.2d 235 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964); J. Zeevi & Sons,
Ltd. v. Grinlays Bank (Uganda) Lts., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 333 N.E.2d 168
(1975). See generally, Gold, "Exchange Contracts," Exchange Control, and the IMF Arti-
cles of Agreement: Some Animadversions on Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 33
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 777 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Gold, Exchange Contracts]; F.A. MANN,
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY 385-91 (4th ed., 1982) [hereinafter cited as MANN, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF MONEY].
61. This definition has received the vigorous support of Sir Joseph Gold, Gold, Ex-
change Contracts, supra note 60, at 787-89; of Dr. Mann, MANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY,
supra note 60, at 387-88; of Elias Krispis, Krispis, Money in Private International Law,
120 RECUEIL DES COURS 191, 286-90 (1967); of John Williams, Williams, Extraterritorial
Enforcement of Exchange Control Regulations Under the International Monetary Fund
Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 319, 332-44 (1975); and of Prof. Francois Gianviti, Gianviti, Le
Controle des Changes Etrangers Devant le Juge National, 69 R.C.D.I.P. 667, 674 (1980).
The broad view of exchange contracts has been adopted by courts in a number of countries,
including Germany and France. For a detailed discussion of such cases see MANN, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF MONEY, supra note 60, at 386-87. See generally J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT
IN THE COURTS (1962) [hereinafter cited as GOLD, FAIC] and J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT
IN THE COURTS: VOLUME 11 (1982) [hereinafter cited as GOLD, FAIC II]. See also Gold, The
Fund Agreement in the Courts, in IMF STAFF PAPERS 199 (1983). A review of scholarly
comments and court decisions in all IMF members led Dr. Mann to conclude that the ma-
jority of learned writers would seem to support the broad view. MANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
MONEY, supra note 60, at 389. Sir Joseph Gold also stated that most of the cases cited by
the Terruzzi court in support of the narrow view were lower court decisions, contrary to the
decisions supporting the broad view rendered by the highest German and French courts.
Gold, Exchange Contracts, supra note 60, at 798. Considering the relative reputation and
status of the courts that have confronted the issue, Sir Joseph Gold concluded that "the tilt
would be towards the broad interpretation." Id.
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principal amount, either in the same currency or in the debtor's own
currency. 2
In a recent article, Sir Joseph Gold convincingly criticized the narrow
view of exchange contracts."3 He also delivered a very compelling argu-
ment in favor of the broad view, stating that "good sense, the purposes of
the Articles, and the history of Article VIII, section 2(b)" support such a
view.6 4 If Gold's analysis is sound, the definition of exchange contracts in
Article VIII, section 2(b) includes loan agreements between borrowers in
the country imposing exchange control regulations and foreign lenders,
regardless of the currency in which payments of interest and principal are
to be made and regardless of whether the borrower already has the for-
eign currency needed to make such payments or has to contract to
purchase it.
Assuming that Article VIII, section 2(b) is applicable to international
loan agreements, the concept of Fund conditionality should be extended
to the availability of a Bretton Woods defense. This proposal is premised
62. Sir Joseph Gold noted some apparently odd consequences that this conclusion
would have in the international lending situation and relied on such oddities to criticize the
narrow view of exchange contracts. Gold, Exchange Contracts, supra note 60, at 786, 791. In
particular, Gold noted that while such definition would exclude loans to be repaid in the
same currency, it would not exclude the same loans if they had to be repaid in a different
currency. Id. at 786. He concluded that the drafters of Article VIII, section 2(b) could not
possibly have intended to make such a distinction. Id. Sir Joseph Gold also noted that, even
if a particular loan agreement were covered by the narrow definition of exchange contracts,
the operation of Article VIII, section 2(b) would be frustrated if the debtor already had the
foreign currency necessary to pay interest or principal to foreign creditors and thus did not
have to contract to purchase the foreign exchange. Id. at 791. Gold concluded that "no eco-
nomic justification exists for distinguishing between a payor who already has the necessary
exchange to make prohibited payments and a payor who must buy it." Id.
63. Gold, Exchange Contracts, supra note 60, at 787, 793-94, 799-800, 801-02. The au-
thor criticized the logic underlying Professor Nussbaum's proposal for a narrow view of ex-
change contracts, which was adopted by the Terruzzi court. Id. at 787. Gold also criticized
the Terruzzi court's interpretation of the text of Article VIII, section 2(b) and of the expres-
sion "exchange contracts" in relation to Article VIII, section 2(a) and Article VI, section 3.
Id. at 793-94, 799-800. Finally, Gold criticized the policy considerations offered by the Ter-
ruzzi court to support its narrow view of exchange contracts. Id. at 801-02.
64. Sir Joseph Gold stated that the narrow view of exchange contracts would "reduce
Article VIII, section 2(b) to triviality . . . not only because the category of exchange con-
tracts defined in this way would be so small a proportion of total contracts under which
international payments and transfers or capital transfers are made, but also because cases
within the limited category would be unlikely to come into the courts." Id. at 789. Gold also
offered an interpretation of the text of Article VIII, section 2(b) whereby the alleged redun-
dancies in the expressions "exchange contracts" and "involve the currency of any member,"
as well as in the expressions "exchange contracts" and "exchange control regulations" would
be eliminated. Id. at 793-94. Such supposed redundancies had become an argument in favor
of the narrow view adopted by the Terruzzi court, following a comment made by Dr. Mann,
MANN, LEGAL AsPECTS oF MoNEY, supra note 60, at 385. See Terruzzi, [19761 1 Q.B. 709,
712. Finally, Gold demonstrated that a correct understanding of the interests and purposes
of the IMF supports a broad definition of exchange contracts especially after the second
amendment of the Articles. Gold, Exchange Contracts, supra note 64, at 788, 802-05, 808-
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on the unenforceability of exchange contracts contrary to a member's ex-
change control regulations, via the "imposed or maintained consistently
with [the Fund] Agreement" clause of Article VIII, section 2(b). 5 While
conditionality has so far been restricted to the receipt by a member of
money from the Fund, there is no reason in law or policy why it should be
so limited. This article will suggest that conditionality can reasonably be
viewed as a general concept, inherent to the Fund's authority to approve,
or disapprove, certain actions by members based on various provisions of
the Articles. Therefore, the Fund can invoke conditionality whenever a
member seeks to enjoy a privilege consistent with the IMF Agreement.
The unenforceability of exchange contracts which violate the legiti-
mate exchange controls of a member is such a privilege. The Article VIII,
section 2(b) privilege can be subjected to Fund conditionality through the
authority given to the Fund by various provisions of the Articles. The
recognition of exchange control regulations outside the country imposing
them is a privilege available to Fund members because of their member-
ship in the IMF."s The traditional view of courts in most countries has
been that exchange controls, like tax and penal laws, are enforceable only
in the territory of the sovereign that issued them. 7 It is a widely accepted
principle of international private law that the enforcement of foreign ex-
change controls outside the country imposing them would be against the
public policy of the forum where such enforcement is sought."8 The view
taken by the Second Circuit in Allied Bank II is consistent with this ma-
65. Article VIII, section 2(b) is normally claimed as a defense by a private, and occa-
sionally by a public party to a contract in an action for breach brought by another party
before the courts or administrative tribunals of an IMF member country. If the Article VIII,
section 2(b) defense is available to the party claiming it, the action for breach of contract
must be dismissed, because the underlying contract is "unenforceable in the territories of
any member." Whether the defense is in fact available in a given action depends on whether
the three requirements of Article VIII, section 2(b) are satisfied. These requirements are: (1)
the contract must be an "exchange contract which involves the currency of (a) member;" (2)
it must be "contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member;" and, (3) such
exchange control regulations must be "maintained or imposed consistently with (the Fund)
Agreement." These requirements are cumulative.
It should be apparent that, contrary to the first two requirements, the third require-
ment has nothing to do with the contract itself or with the conduct of any private parties,
but rather concerns the official acts of a member country vis-a-vis the Fund and the Articles
of Agreement. The Fund made it clear that the third requirement is subject to its regulatory
authority: "the Fund is prepared to advise whether particular exchange control regulations
are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement." IMF DECISION No. 446-
4, SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 234. Through the third prong of the test, therefore,
the Fund can determine the availability of the Article VIII, section 2(b) defense to private
parties, who are not, as such, directly subject to the Fund's regulatory authority.
66. MANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY, supra note 60, at 372.
67. A.F. LOWENPELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 323 (2nd ed. 1984).
68. MANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY, supra note 60, at 402, 428. For pre-Bretton
Woods surveys, see Domke, Foreign Exchange Restrictions (A Comparative Survey), 21 J.
Comp. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 54 (1939); Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders, and the
Conflict of Laws, 56 HARV. L. REv. 30 (1942).
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jority position.69
The Article VIII, section 2(b) privilege is particularly valuable for a
debtor country facing a deteriorating external debt ratio and the risk of
default, since it prevents foreign lenders from enforcing their contract
rights in the courts of any other member of the Fund. The concept of
conditionality is already available in Article V, section 3, with stand-by
arrangements." A stand-by makes available to the debtor sufficient for-
eign currency to pay debt service and avoid default, at least tempora-
rily. 7 The availability of the Article VIII, section 2(b) defense in enforce-
ment actions brought against borrowers in the debtor country would have
the same effect as an automatic stay of all collection actions against a
business filing an application for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code.72 Since the benefit for a defaulting debtor country
is the same under both provisions of the Articles, the costs should also be
the same. If a member must subject itself to the burden of Fund condi-
tionality to obtain a stand-by arrangement, it is not unreasonable to sug-
gest that it should face the same burden to enjoy the privilege of Article
VIII, section 2(b) protection from external creditors. It is submitted that
conditionality should be extended from Article V, section 3 to Article
VIII, section 2(b).
73
69. This issue was extensively belabored in the briefs submitted on rehearing in the
Allied Bank litigation. It should be noted that the traditional rule against extraterritorial
recognition of exchange controls is supported by ample authority in the United States. See
generally Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesellshaft, 15
F.Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 84 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 585 (1936),
and its progeny. There is, however, authority to the contrary, both in the United States and
in England. See, e.g., Perutz v. Bohemian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 110 N.Y.S.2d 446,
304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6 (1952); Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank (London Of-
fice)[1948] 1 All E.R. 337; Frankman v. Anglo-Prague Credit Bank [1948] 2 All E.R. 1025;
Zivnostenska Banka National Corporation v. Frankman [19491 2 All E.R. 671; Kahler v.
Midland Bank, Ltd. [1948] 1 All E.R. 811; 2 All E.R. 621. All these cases are discussed in
detail in GOLD, FAIC, supra note 61, at 28-30, 50-55, 75-76, 78-79, 134-39; 16-17; 18-19,
respectively.
70. For a complete discussion of Articles V (3) and VIII (2)(b) of the Fund Agreement
see generally A.F. LOWENFELD, supra note 67, at 32-42, 323-349, 366-376. In the same book,
Lowenfeld presents several illustrations of how the Fund Agreement and the IMF operate in
an international monetary crisis.
71. It has been said that a member "buys a reasonable amount of time as well as for-
eign exchange" when it resorts to a stand-by arrangement. Id.
72. 11 U.S.C. Sections 103(a), 362, 901(a) (1982). This was the core of the now with-
drawn decision of the Second Circuit in Allied Bank I, 733 F.2d at 26.
73. Throughout this paper it will be assumed that the operation of Article VIII, section
2(b) is unaffected by the time when exchange controls are imposed, relative to the time
when an exchange contract is made. The most important consequence of this assumption is
that exchange contracts which at the date of their conclusions are consistent with, but dur-
ing their lives become contrary to, the exchange regulations of a member maintained or
imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement are covered by Article VIII, section 2(b).
This is not, indeed, a settled proposition. Authoritative commentators and courts hold con-
flicting opinions on the issue. See e.g. MANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MONEY, supra note 60, at
377-79; Gold, The Fund Agreement in the Courts, in IMF STAFF PAPERS 199, 202, 202 n.60;
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Traditional conditionality establishes a link between the Fund's fi-
nancial assistance to a member with balance of payment difficulties and
the adoption by such member of economic adjustment policies (so called
"austerity measures"), with the double purpose of correcting the balance
of payments disequilibrium and assuring that the revolving nature of the
Fund's resources is maintained."' The notion of conditionality arose out
of the question, left open at Bretton Woods, of whether the resources of
the Fund would be made available to members as of right or under condi-
tions set by the Fund.75 Since the text of the original Agreement was
vague enough to support both positions,"6 conditionality developed en-
tirely out of the Fund's practice. 77 Although "Fund conditionality re-
quirements" are now expressly provided for in Article V, section 3, condi-
tionality, as a general category it is capable of further expansion in
connection with other aspects of the Fund's activity. As Sir Joseph Gold
GOLD, FAIC, supra note 61, at 62-66, 77-78; GOLD, FAIC II, supra note 61, at 16-17, 88, 140-
43, 150-53, 160, 262, 276-77, 298, 355. The issue of subsequent exchange restrictions under
Article VIII, section 2(b) is clearly raised in the circumstances of the Allied Bank litigation.
The author of this article concedes without hesitation that this assumption is vital to
the thesis of this paper. See infra note 120. The author, however, believes that nothing
could be accomplished by an extended discussion of the issue here. The issue of subsequent
exchange controls is not likely to be resolved once and for all, but must rather be faced by
each individual court in each individual case based on precedent in each individual
jurisdiction.
74. In general, IMF-sponsored adjustment programs embody monetary and budgetary
policies that are consistent with reasonable price stability; exchange rate, interest rate, trade
and other policies, aimed at improving efficiency and strengthening the productive base of
the economy; and a prudent external debt management policy. Remarks by J. de Larosiere,
Managing Director of the IMF, before the Institute of Foreign Bankers in New York (May
2, 1984), reprinted in IMF SuRv., May 21, 1984. Fund supported programs emphasize a
number of major economic variables, such as domestic credit, the financing of the public
sector, and external debt, as well as some key elements of the price system, including the
exchange rate, the interest rate, and, in some cases, the prices of commodities that bear
significantly upon the public finances and foreign trade. Conditionality, IMF SURV., Sep-
tember 1984, at 2. The implementation of IMF-sponsored austerity measures is monitored
with the help of performance criteria, the choice of which is dictated by the particular con-
ditions of the member country involved. Id. The impact of Fund-supported programs on
income distribution, employment, and social services, depends on the policies chosen to im-
plement the program. Id. at 3. Such choices are left entirely to the government of the mem-
ber involved. Id. Typically, the necessary adjustment efforts are highly unpopular, as they
cause a severe restriction in the member's economy. Such unpopularity accounts for most of
the problems encountered by the Fund in forcing a member with balance of payments diffi-
culties to commit itself to strong adjustment efforts. The approach of the Fund to economic
adjustment and the "mix" of policies typically emphasized by the IMF are the subject of
continuous debate among economists. The Fund's continued focus on the control of domes-
tic demand as the primary variable has been the target of much criticism as it may
"threaten to be destructive of national prosperity in terms of output, employment, and de-
velopment. The IMF's Role in Developing Countries, FIN. & DEv., September 1984.
75. Lowenfeld, Is There Law After Bretton Woods?, 50 U. C. L. REv. 380, 385 (1983).
76. Id.
77. Sir Joseph Gold wrote that "no part of the development relied on the language in
the original Articles that could be deemed to be explicit or beyond controversy." J. GOLD,
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE IMF: SELECTED ESSAYs 54 (1979).
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stated in 1978, conditionality is implicit in a number of provisions and
the development in the past "illustrates an evolution of fundamental im-
portance that is possible when sufficient leeway is made available by the
drafters of the text." 8 Article VIII, section 2(b) indeed affords "sufficient
leeway" for the development of a new kind of conditionality.
The legal character of conditionality, as it applies to the Fund's fi-
nancial assistance, reinforces the conclusion that it need not be restricted
to a member's access to the Fund's general resources. Fund conditionality
is not the equivalent of a borrower's undertakings in connection with a
loan; rather it is a member's "pledge" to use the resources of the Fund in
accordance with the obligations under the Agreement and the policies of
the Fund. 79 The Articles use terminology appropriate to an exchange
transaction in connection with conditionality and never use the language
of loans and credits.80 In other words, the purpose of conditionality is not
to ensure the prompt repayment of the upper credit tranches, but rather
to ensure that the Fund's resources are used to promote the stability of
the international financial system and the prompt correction of dise-
quilibria and distortions."
The extension of conditionality from Article V, section 3, governing
access to the general resources of the Fund, to Article VIII, section 2(b),
governing the availability of an affirmative defense to collection actions,
finds support in the non-contractual character of conditionality, which
makes it an appropriate legal instrument in both contexts. A decision of
the Fund in 1979,82 makes clear that "stand-by arrangements are not in-
ternational agreements and therefore language having a contractual con-
notation will be avoided in stand-by arrangements and letters of in-
tent."8 3 Article XXX(b) defines stand-by arrangements as decisions made
by the Fund in response to requests by members to approve a stand-by
arrangement.8 ' The request is normally accompanied by a letter of intent,
setting forth the terms and conditions upon which the member is willing
to gain access to the Fund's general resources. The cited decision of the
Fund rejected the interpretation of stand-by arrangements as the Fund's
acceptance of a member's offer to implement the austerity measures con-
tained in the letter of intent.8 5
If a member's letter of intent and the Fund's decision to approve a
stand-by were in the same relationship as offer and acceptance in the law
of contracts, it could be argued that conditionality simply means a mem-
78. Id.
79. Article V, section 3(b)(i).
80. J. GOLD, CONDrriONAirrY 3 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 31, 1979).
81. J. GOLD, THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE FUND'S STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS AND WHY
IT MATTERS 7 (IMF Pamphlet 1970) [hereinafter cited as GOLD, LEGAL CHARACTER].
82. IMF DECISION No. 6056 (79/38), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 23.
83. Id.
84. Article XXX(b).
85. GOLD, LEGAL CHARACTER, supra note 81, at 2.
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ber's undertaking to implement an adjustment program given in consider-
ation for the Fund's financial support.8 6 Stand-by arrangements would
then be mere loan agreements. The non-contractual nature of stand-by
arrangements, however, signifies that conditionality is an aspect of the
unilateral power of the Fund to approve certain transactions or acts of a
member as consistent with the Articles of Agreement and the Fund's pol-
icy and purposes. As a special kind of "qualified approval," conditionality
need not be connected solely with IMF money. Instead, it can be invoked
by the Fund whenever a member seeks to enjoy a privilege, the availabil-
ity of which depends upon such member's actions being consistent with
the Fund Agreement.1
7
IV. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2 CONDITIONALITY AND THE USE OF
EXCHANGE CONTROLS BY DEBTOR COUNTRIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT
CRISIS
A. The "Maintained or Imposed Consistency With [The Fund] Agree-
ment" Requirementof Article VIII, Section 2(b)
The privilege of Article VIII, section 2(b) protection from foreign
creditors is expressly made conditional upon the actions of a debtor coun-
try in resorting to exchange controls that are "maintained or imposed
consistently with [the Fund] Agreement." These words refer to provisions
of the Articles other than Article VIII, section 2(b).88 The Articles recog-
nize exchange controls in three main" provisions. Article VIII, section
2(a) provides that a member may not "impose restrictions on the making
of payments and transfers for current international transactions" unless
they are approved by the Fund or are authorized by other provisions of
the Articles. Article XIV, section 2 establishes a limited immunity from
Article VIII, section 2(a) for those members who wish to avail themselves
of transitional arrangements before undertaking to perform certain obli-
gations, including the obligation to avoid restrictions forbidden by Article
VIII, section 2(a). Such members may "maintain and adapt to changing
86. Id.
87. Such is the case for both Article V, section 3 and Article VIII, section 2(b). Article
V, section 3 provides that "the Fund shall examine a request for a purchase to determine
whether the proposed purchase would be consistent with the provisions of (the Fund)
Agreement .. " Article VIII, section 2(b) provides that "exchange contracts that involve
the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of
that member maintained or imposed consistently with (the Fund) Agreement shall be unen-
forceable in the territories of any member."
88. Gold, Exchange Contracts, supra note 60, at 800.
89. Two other, less significant, provisions refer to exchange controls: Article VII, section
3(b), which allows any member, after consultation with the Fund, "temporarily to impose
limitations on the freedom of exchange operations in (scarce currencies);" and Article XI,
section 2, which allows any member complete freedom to "impose restrictions on exchange
transactions with non-members or with persons in their territories unless the Fund finds
that such restrictions prejudice the interests of members and are contrary to the purpose of
the Fund."
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circumstances the restrictions on payments and transfers for current in-
ternational transactions that were in effect on the date on which [they]
became member[s]." 90 Finally, Article VI, section 3 allows any member to
"exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international capital
movements," provided that such controls will not "unduly delay transfers
of funds in settlement of commitments."
For purposes of this paper, the transitional arrangements of Article
XIV, section 2 can be disregarded, because that derogation from the pro-
hibition of Article VIII, section 2(a) is limited to the exchange controls
"in effect at the date on which [a country] became a member." 91 Article
VIII, section 2(a) applies fully to any new exchange control regulations
introduced by those Fund members still under the transitional regime of
Article XIV.92 Therefore, most situations of the kind at issue in Allied
Bank, where exchange control regulations were resorted to as a response
to an external payments crisis, would be outside the scope of Article XIV,
regardless of whether the country imposing the exchange controls had ac-
cepted the obligations of Article VIII. For purposes of this paper, there-
fore, Article VIII, section 2(b) is triggered by two different kinds of ex-
change controls: those affecting current international transactions,
provided that the prior approval of the Fund is obtained pursuant to Ar-
ticle VIII, section 2(a), and those affecting capital movements, provided
that they are authorized by Article VI, section 3. The only difference be-
tween the two situations is that the former requires the positive approval
of the Fund, while the latter does not. This distinction has important
implications for the proposed concept of "Article VIII, section 2 condi-
tionality," which is premised upon a need for Fund approval of a particu-
lar transaction.
B. The Nature of International Debt Payments Under the Fund
Agreement
Since the concept of Article VIII, section 2 conditionality only oper-
90. Article XIV, section 2. This provision, however, mandates that such members shall
"as soon as conditions permit" lessen or withdraw restrictions maintained under the transi-
tional regime. Article XIV, section 3 gives the Fund authority to put pressure on members
under the transitional regime if it believes that "conditions are favorable for the withdrawal
of any particular restriction, or for the general abandonment of restrictions, inconsistent
with the provisions of any other articles of (the Fund) Agreement."
91. Article XIV, section 2. Once a member has given the IMF notice that it is no longer
availing itself of the transitional arrangements, such member may not return to them. Arti-
cle XIV, section 1. Furthermore, if a member withdraws a restriction, or abandons all re-
strictions, it may not reintroduce them under the transitional arrangements exception to
Article VIII, section 2(a), but must instead obtain the Fund's approval. Gold, Exchange
Contracts, supra note 60, at 780.
92. Such members must obtain the Fund's approval under Article VIII, section 2(a)
even though they are still imposing other restrictions under the transitional regime, whether
in the original or in an adapted form, that were in force when the member entered the IMF.
Id. See, e.g., J.K. HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965: TwENTY
YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION, VOL. I: CHRONICLE 248-50 (1969). -
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ates when exchange restrictions affect current international payments, it
is necessary to ascertain whether typical international loans involve cur-
rent or capital transactions under the Articles. At first glance, both kinds
of transactions would appear to be present, since an international debt
requires interest and fee payments as well as repayment of principal.
Debt service payments regularly due to foreign lenders typically in-
volve, for the greater portion, interest and fees for services performed in
connection with the loans.9 3 Interest and fees constitute "payments and
transfers for current international transactions." 4 Article XXX(d) of the
Fund Agreement contains a definition of current transactions:
Payments for current transactions means payments which are not for
the purpose of transferring capital and includes, without limitation:
(1) all payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current
business, including services, and normal short term banking and
credit facilities;
(2) payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other
investments;
(3) payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans and for
depreciation of direct investment; and
(4) moderate remittances for family living expenses.99
Paragraph (2) of the definition expressly covers interest payments and
paragraph (1) includes fees for banking and credit services.
The repayment of the principal component of debt service also falls
within the definition of current international transactions.9 6 The expres-
sions "amortization" and "moderate amount" in paragraph (3) of Article
XXX(d) clearly refer to normal repayment schedules of long-term loans.97
The question of what is meant by "moderate amount" cannot be an-
swered precisely. Local experience and commercial practice must be the
controlling standards.9 s A commentator, however, has said that "amorti-
zation payments which, for example, equal one-twentieth of the amount
of a 20-year loan would certainly appear to qualify everywhere" as cur-
rent transactions.9 9 Another commentator suggested that the treatment of
principal components of debt service as current payments for purposes of
93. The actual composition of debt service payments depends, of course, on the terms
of the loan.
94. Article VIII, section 2(a).
95. Article XXX(d).
96. EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 396. This author noted that, while exchange regulations
relating to capital movements in the country of the borrower or in that of the lender could
prohibit the loan from being made without triggering Article VIII, section 2(a), if the loan is
lawfully made the exchange control regulations of the borrower's country must allow him to
pay interest on the loan and reasonable amounts for amortization of the principal, as these
payments become due, because they are treated as current payments by the Fund. Id.
97. Id. at 395 n.55.
98. Evans, Current and Capital Transactions and How the Fund Defines Them, 5 FIN.
& Dav. 30, 34 (Sept. 1968).
99. Id.
1985
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
exchange restrictions is justified by the regularity of such payments and
by the disruption caused by their interruption, even if economists and
accountants treat all repayments of principal as capital items.'
The question whether the full repayment of the principal of a loan in
one lump sum, as opposed to payments of regular debt service, is a cur-
rent or capital transaction is not so clear. The characterization of full re-
payment under the Articles is particularly important in a situation like
the one at issue in Allied Bank, because of the acceleration clauses typi-
cally inserted in loan agreements. An acceleration clause makes the full
amount of a loan due upon the happening of an event of default. If other
loans to the same debtor contain cross-default clauses, default on a single
loan can trigger a chain reaction whereby staggering amounts become im-
mediately due to foreign creditors.
Common sense would seem to dictate that full repayment of a loan,
just like the original making of the loan, be classified as a capital transfer.
Article XXX(d)(1), however, characterizes as current "all payments due
in connection with. . .normal short-term banking or credit facilities."
Three questions must be answered in order to decide whether a particular
loan falls within the definition of such facilities: what are "banking and
credit facilities?;" what is "normal?;" and what is "short-term?" A com-
mentator from within the Fund wrote that the facilities at issue are,
[tihose banking and credit facilities which are necessary to keep trade
moving and to sustain current business operations. This is in contrast
to those capital transactions referred to in Article VI, section 1(b)(i)
which are needed to promote or expand operations above the present
level by direct investment and transfers of working capital and which
therefore can be regarded as being more than the "facilities" needed
for current operations."'
The same commentator stated that "normal" facilities are those consis-
tent with the customary practice in the particular trade or business for
which the facility is made available.'0 2 This variable definition also ap-
plies to "short-term," therefore, no concrete rule can be fashioned.'
A plausible argument can be made that most of the recent commer-
cial bank lending to developing countries for general balance of payments
100. EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 395 n.55. That the legal definition of current payments
under the Articles of Agreement differs from the definition subscribed to by economists is a
calculated effect, rather than an anomaly. A commentator noted that "the divergencies were
adopted by the Drafters of the Articles to attain certain policy objectives." Evans, supra
note 98, at 30.
101. Evans, supra note 98, at 35.
102. Id.
103. Id. Evans noted that at the time when the original Articles were drafted, a one-
year limit was normally placed on obligations incurred for current purposes and concluded
that "a period of more than one year would probably not generally be considered 'short-
term.' " Id. It should be kept in mind, however, that such a limit is not explicitly set forth in
any provision of the Fund Agreement and that the Fund practice does not support any rigid
test of the meaning of "short-term."
VOL. 14:1
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESOLUTION
purposes fits the definition of the Article XXX(d)(1) facilities and there-
fore gives rise to current transfers. Other types of bank financing and in-
ventory financing may or may not fall within the definition of such facili-
ties, depending on their terms. It should be noted that the same loan may
originally be a capital transfer and later become a current one pursuant
to Article XXX(d)(1). This is particularly true for rescheduled loans and
new credits extended in connection with the rescheduling, because of the
"maintenance of trade" versus "expansion of trade" test under Article
XXX (d)(1). 10 4 In any event, each loan must be examined in light of its
origin, purpose, terms, and history to conclude whether it falls within the
scope of the Article XXX(d)(1) facilities.
C. The Allied Bank Scenario: Exchange Controls Affecting Regular
Debt Service Payments
Given the current nature of regular debt service payments (and pos-
sibly full repayment of principal) under the Articles, when a member
seeks to impose exchange control regulations that might affect the ability
of borrowers in such a country to make payments to foreign lenders when
due, the Article VIII, section 2(a) prohibition against restrictions on cur-
rent international transactions may be triggered. In that case, the pro-
posed exchange controls will be consistent with the Fund Agreeement
only if the Fund's prior approval is secured. The need for such approval
provides the Fund with an opportunity to extend conditionality to the
Article VIII, section 2(b) privilege of unenforcable claims.
The approval of the Fund, however, is not required for non-restric-
tive regulations of current payments.'0 5 In its interpretation of Article
VIII, the Fund stated that "the guiding principle in ascertaining whether
a measure is a restriction on payments and transfers for current transac-
tions under Article VIII, section 2, is whether it involves a direct govern-
mental limitation on the availability or use of exchange as such." 0 6 Arti-
cle VIII, section 2(a) applies "regardless of the motivation for the
restrictions and the circumstances in which they are imposed."10, The
Fund could find that restrictions are in existence even in the absence of
formulated regulations prescribing such restrictions, as evidenced by the
strict position taken by the Fund on payment arrears.0 8 Payment arrears
arise from governmentally imposed delays in making foreign currency
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
105. Article VIII, section 2(a) prohibits restrictions on current payments, while Article
VIII, section 2(b) covers exchange control regulations. The term regulations is broader than
the term restrictions, because regulations may be non-restrictive. Gold, Exchange Con-
tracts, supra note 60, at 782. Consequently, non-restrictive regulations affecting current
payments and transfers are consistent with the Fund Agreement without the need for ap-
proval by the IMF. Accordingly, they automatically trigger the protection of Article VIII,
section 2(b).
106. IMF DECISION No. 1034 (60/27), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 241-42.
107. Id. at 242.
108. Gold, Exchange Contracts, supra note 60, at 782 n.19.
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available for payments recognized as legitimate under a country's ex-
change control system. The Fund stated that "undue delays in the availa-
bility or use of exchange for current international transactions that result
from governmental limitations give rise to payment arrears and are pay-
ment restrictions under Article VIII, section 2(a). . . . The limitation
may be formalized, as for instance compulsory waiting periods for ex-
change, or informal or ad hoc."' 0 9 Under these principles, any governmen-
tal regulation interfering with the availability of foreign exchange needed
to make debt service payments to foreign lenders when due would fall
within the Article VIII, section 2(a) prohibition against restrictions on
current payments."0
If Article VIII, section 2(a) is triggered, the approval of the Fund is
necessary before the Article VIII, section 2(b) defense can be claimed. It
is through the need for such approval that Article VIII, section 2 condi-
tionality comes into place. In other words, through the need for Article
VIII, section 2(a) approvals, the availability of the Article VIII, section
2(b) defense by a debtor country, seeking to impose the exchange restric-
tions, can be conditioned upon adoption of austerity measures of the type
normally associated with stand-by arrangements under Article V, section
3.
The mechanism for Article VIII, section 2 conditionality is already in
place. The Fund has declared that before it will grant approval of pro-
posed restrictions on current payments it must be "satisfied that the
measures are necessary and that their use will be temporary while the
member is seeking to eliminate the need for them.""' The decision to
approve the proposed exchange controls can be subjected to conditions at
109. Paragraph 1 of the Conclusions attached to IMF DECISION No. 3153 (70/95), SE-
LECTED DECIIONS, supra note 53, at 244. The Fund reasoned that "restrictions resulting in
payment arrears arising from informal or ad hoc measures do particular harm to a country's
international financial relationships, because of the uncertainty they generate. This uncer-
tainty is particularly harmful to the smooth functioning of the international payments sys-
tem and has pronounced adverse effects on the credit worthiness of the debtor country,
which may extend beyond the period of the existence of the restrictions." Id. at 244. An
undue delay is defined by the Fund as "a substantial delay beyond that usually required for
ascertaining the bona fides of exchange applications or the time that can be regarded as
normally required for the administrative processing of applications for exchange." Id.
110. Realistically, a debtor country with a deteriorating foreign debt ratio and a
shortage of foreign currency will primarily focus on debt service payments in its efforts to
stop the hemorrhage of currency through exchange restrictions. Debt service is, in most cir-
cumstances, a major cause of a payment crisis for developing countries and there would not
be much of a point in restricting other kinds of external payments only. Nowzad, Debt in
Developing Countries: Some Issues for the 1980's, Fin. & Dev., March 1982, at 14.
111. IMF DECISION No. 1034 (60/27), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 242. Rule
H-4 of the Fund's By-Laws, RULES AND REGULATIONS (40th ed. 1983), provides that the re-
quest for approval must be in writing and state the reasons for the request. Rule H-5, id.,
provides that the decision to approve or not to approve is made by the Executive Board of




the discretion of the Fund.1 1 2 The Fund's decision on payment arrears
makes this point explicit by declaring that a member requesting approval
under Article VIII, section 2(a) "should be expected to submit a satisfac-
tory program for [the] elimination [of the payment arrears]." '" 3 In many
ways, therefore, Article VIII, section 2 conditionality is already implicitly
used by the Fund, whenever approval of restrictions on current payments
is requested by a member.
All that is needed to establish Article VIII, section 2 conditionality is
an express link between Article VIII, section 2(a) approvals and Article
VIII, section 2(b) unenforceability of exchange contracts, insofar as inter-
national loan agreements are concerned. Such a link is readily available
because restrictions approved by the Fund are ipso facto "maintained or
imposed consistently with [the Fund] Agreement."" 4 Accordingly, the
availability of Article VIII, section 2(b) relief for a debtor country in a
liquidity crisis depends on the Fund's approval of the exchange restric-
tions sought to be imposed by such country to deal with a shortage of
currency to service external debt.
D. A Variation on the Allied Bank Scenario: Exchange Controls Affect-
ing Repayments of Principal Only
Since Article VIII, section 2 conditionality requires that the Fund be
112. All that is needed to make this process entirely parallel to the stand-by arrange-
ments procedure is to require a member seeking approval to impose exchange restrictions on
current payments to submit a "letter of intent" to the Fund, setting forth the purpose, type,
and duration of the restrictions, as well as the policies and objectives of the adjustment
program in support of which the restrictions are sought to be imposed. The Fund's decision
granting approval under Article VIII, section 2(a) would then have to incorporate by refer-
ence the terms of the "letter of intent" and should expressly refer to the protection of Arti-
cle VIII, section 2(b) as a necessary complement of the adjustment program. Such reference
would comply with the procedure announced in IMF DECISION 446-4, SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 53, at 233, where the Fund undertook to "advise whether particular exchange
control regulations are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agreement." Id.
at 234. The Fund's decision could be pleaded in the courts of all members as conclusive
evidence on the issue of unenforceability of a contract pursuant to Article VIII, section 2(b).
113. IMF DECISION No. 3153 (70/95), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 245. As a
matter of fact, the Fund in this decision assumed that a member seeking approval of restric-
tions giving rise to payment arrears would also request a stand-by arrangement and that the
same adjustment program would apply to both approvals:
Fund financial assistance to members having payment arrears should be
granted on the basis of performance criteria or policies with respect to the
treatment of arrears similar to the criteria or policies described in the preced-
ing paragraph for the approval of the payment restrictions. In general, the un-
derstandings should provide for the elimination of the payment arrears within
the period of the stand-by arrangements.
Id.
114. EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 483; Gold, Exchange Contracts, supra note 60, at 784.
Sir Joseph Gold wrote that "if the IMF has approved regulations, to hold that nevertheless
they are inconsistent with the purposes of the IMF would mean that the IMF has failed the
direction in the last sentence of Article I: 'the Fund shall be guided in all its policies and
decisions by the purposes set forth in this article.'" Id.
1985
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
given an opportunity to intervene, there cannot be an imposed Fund con-
ditionality if no current restrictions are imposed. This means that a
debtor country could attempt to make available to domestic borrowers
the protection of "Article VIII, section 2(b) conditionality," by solely re-
stricting the repayment of external debts in one lump sum, while not in-
terfering with the availability of foreign exchange for regular debt service
payments." 5 So long as full repayment of a loan does not fall within the
definition of current transfers in Article XXX (d)(1) (the loan not being
trade-related or short-term) " 6 such exchange restrictions would only af-
fect capital movements. It is possible that this conduct would allow a
debtor in bad faith to default on an international loan by, for example,
ceasing debt service payments and still seeking to take advantage of the
Article VIII, section 2(b) defense in an action for breach of contract
brought by foreign lenders in the court of another member. In fact, the
borrower could argue that capital controls are authorized by Article VI,
section 3 117 and therefore, are automatically "maintained or imposed
consistently with [the Fund] Agreement"" 8 without the need to request
the Fund's approval." 9 If the restrictions were indeed authorized by Arti-
cle VI, section 3, the courts of all members would be forced to deny the
enforceability of international loan agreements, insofar as acceleration
clauses and cross-default clauses are concerned, because they would be
contrary to the legitimate exchange controls of another member.
This does not mean that the courts of all members would be power-
less to grant relief to creditors against a debtor in breach, because Article
115. The problem with this scenario is that conditionality effectively forces a member
seeking to impose exchange restrictions to implement an adjustment program aimed at cor-
recting the causes of the member's difficulties and thereby eliminate the need for the re-
strictions. Without conditionality, such adjustment efforts, which are normally highly un-
popular politically, might never be undertaken.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 101-103.
117. Article VI, section 3 provides that "members may exercise such controls as are
necessary to regulate international capital movements, but no member may exercise these
controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transactions or which will
unduly delay transfers of funds in settlement of commitments." A "control" authorized by
Article VI, section 3 can be defined as a governmental action directly related to the availa-
bility or use of exchange for making capital transfers, regardless of whether such control is
restrictive or nonrestrictive. J. GOLD, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS UNDER THE LAW
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 21, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as GOLD, CAPITAL MOVEMENTS]. This definition of controls under Article VI, section 3
makes the term coextensive with "exchange control regulations" in Article VIII, section
2(b), insofar as capital movements are concerned. Id. at 6.
118. It is safe to assume that all regulations included within the Article VI, section 3
authorization are consistent with the Fund Agreement. This is not, however, to say that all
capital controls are within the Article VI, section 3 authorization, as will be shown infra,
text accompanying notes 121-131.
119. If this argument were accepted, there would be no occasion for the Fund to apply
conditionality to the imposition of exchange restrictions imposed by debtor countries to deal
with their external debt problems. The benefit of Article VIII, section 2(b) would thus be




VIII, section 2(b) only applies to exchange contracts, and not to court
orders. Payment in full of the outstanding amount of the loan, plus any
eventual damages, would be due by the defaulting borrower as a judg-
ment debtor, not as a contract debtor. Moreover, the judgment debt
would arise from the breach of a contract whose terms are in no way con-
trary to the exchange regulations of any member, since by hypothesis, the
country of the borrower would not interfere with the making of debt ser-
vice payments in accordance with the terms of the loan.
While Article VIII, section 2(b) does not address the situation where
a court order is contrary to the legitimate exchange controls of any mem-
ber, other doctrines, such as act of state or international comity, may be
relevant. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that any court would refuse to
grant relief against a defaulting debtor who breached in bad faith, be-
cause the debtor's country, arguably also in bad faith, tried to shield the
debtor from such relief through foreign exchange restrictions. The Allied
Bank II holding that the Costa Rican exchange restrictions constituted
an extraterritorial taking of property, and were therefore not entitled to
the protection of the act of state doctrine, strongly supports this conclu-
sion, at least when the situs of the debt is outside the country of the
defaulting debtor. When the situs of the debt is in the debtor's own coun-
try, international comity (or lack thereof) can be claimed to deny recogni-
tion to exchange controls on capital transfers when they interfere with
the enforcement of judicial remedies against a debtor in breach. Again,
Allied Bank If can be used as authority for such a proposition.
Similar issues would be raised if a debtor country restricted both full
repayment of external debts and the making of debt service payments,
but the Fund's approval for the latter restrictions, affecting current pay-
ments, were neither sought nor granted. The conclusions reached in the
case where only capital controls were imposed would be even more com-
pelling in this case. Since the loan agreement on which the borrower de-
faulted would not be contrary to any legitimate exchange regulations of a
member, unapproved current restrictions being inconsistent with the
Fund Agreement, the courts of any member would still have full power to
enforce the contract according to its terms. The debtor country would
then be in an even worse position to claim that its capital controls should
be respected by a foreign court on grounds of comity or act of state, be-
cause such country would have breached its obligations under an interna-
tional treaty.
E. Some Reflections on the Policy of the Fund Agreement: Article VI,
Section 3 Capital Controls and International Loans
Even though a debtor country would be unable to defeat Article VIII,
section 2 conditionality through Article VI, section 3 capital controls
(with the possible exception of acceleration and cross-default clauses),
there is something disconcerting about the statement that Fund members
can, consistently with the Fund Agreement, prohibit the repayment of
international loans pursuant to Article VI, section 3. It is submitted that
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such a statement is overbroad and possibly repugnant to the true policy
underlying the Articles. Article VI, section 3, in fact, is not an unquali-
fied, blanket authorization for any exchange restriction purporting to reg-
ulate capital movements. The Agreement itself, as well as the history and
practice of the Fund, imposes various limitations on a member's ability to
control capital transactions. 2 0 Capital controls, for example, are prohib-
ited by Article VI, section 3 if they "unduly delay transfers of funds in
settlement of commitments."'' The meaning of this clause is ambiguous
and it may relate to current or capital transactions only or to both.'2 2 A
reasonable interpretation is that the clause refers to "commitments to
make capital transfers entered into before a restriction is imposed on cap-
ital transfers."' 22 Under this interpretation, exchange controls that would
impede the repayment of prior loans would be prohibited by Article VI,
section 3. As such, they would be inconsistent with the Fund Agreement
and the Article VIII, section 2(b) defense would be unavailable.
Moreover, the Fund's interpretation of Article VI, section 3 states
that in regulating capital movements members should pay "due re-
gard. . .to the general purposes of the Fund.' 2114 Although the purposes of
the Fund in Article I do not expressly address capital movements, there is
ample evidence that Lord Keynes, as well as other drafters of the Bretton
Woods Agreement, contemplated a distinction between loans from credi-
tor countries to debtor countries to develop resources or maintain equilib-
rium, which they deemed desirable, from short-term speculative move-
ments or flights of currency from deficit countries, which they viewed as
120. A possible, and very effective, argument against the availability of the Article VIII,
section 2(b) defense in these circumstances would be that in general, foreign exchange re-
strictions imposed after the conclusion of a contract do not come within Article VIII, section
2(b). This position is supported by Dr. Mann, who maintains that "Article VIII(2)(b) is
concerned with the effectiveness of contracts, that is to say, with their initial 'validity'
rather than the legality or possibility of their performance." MANN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF
MONEY, supra note 60, at 377. Accordingly, he wrote, "contracts which at the date of their
conclusion are consistent with, but during their lives become contrary to the regulations
cannot be caught by [the text of Article VIII(2)(b)]." Id. at 378.
For purposes of analysis in this paper, however, it is indispensable to assume that sub-
sequent exchange restrictions do in fact trigger the protection of Article VIII, section 2(b).
See supra, note 73 and accompanying text. The very concept of "Article VIII, section 2(b)
conditionality" is rendered meaningless by a realization of this assumption, insofar as ex-
change restrictions are used as a means to deal with payment crises after incurring external
debt. It is therefore impossible to rely on the argument outlined above in this paper. To
maintain that subsequent restrictions on current transactions are within the Article VIII,
Sections 2(b) protection, but subsequent restrictions on capital transactions are not, would
be a little like wanting to have your cake and eat it, too.
121. Article VI, section 3.
122. GOLD, CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 117, at 55 n.22.
123. Id. Sir Joseph Gold wrote that the argument against assuming that the clause re-
lates exclusively to current transactions is that such transactions are mentioned expressly in
the preceding clause. Id. There are, however, arguments in favor of a contrary interpreta-
tion. Id. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 456 n.357.
124. IMF DECISION No. 541 (56/39), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 116.
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undesirable. 2 5 It can reasonably be concluded that the freedom to control
capital movements was not intended to impede international transfers of
productive capital."' While the distinction between productive capital
and speculative capital is far from clear in practice, 127 it is reasonable to
assume that most commercial bank loans to foreign governments for gen-
eral balance of payments support, as well as most bank loans for invest-
ment projects and financing of inventory, constitute productive capital
flows.
Although the purposes of the Fund in Article I contain no explicit
reference to productive capital, several implicit references to it have been
suggested. One of the purposes of the IMF is "to assist . . . in the elimi-
nation of foreign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world
trade.' 2 8 Sir Joseph Gold suggested that among the restrictions to be
eliminated are those that inhibit the flow of productive capital. 2 9 Other
implicit references to productive capital might be seen in Article I(ii),
which mentions the "expansion and balanced growth of international
trade" as one of the purposes of the Fund, and in Article I(iii), concerning
the promotion of exchange stability.2 0 Moreover, after the second amend-
ment to the Fund Agreement, Article IV, section 1 refers to the exchange
of capital among countries as an essential purpose of the Fund.' A plau-
sible argument can be made that, insofar as capital controls imposed by
debtor countries make it impossible for borrowers to repay foreign lend-
ers, they disrupt the flow of productive capital from creditor countries to
deficit countries. To the extent that this disruption hampers the balanced
growth of world trade, and impedes the free exchange of capital among
members, the exchange restrictions affecting capital transfers conflict
with the purposes of the Fund. As such, they are not authorized by Arti-
cle VI, section 3 and therefore, are inconsistent with the Fund
Agreement.
125. See generally GOLD, CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 92, at 7-12.
126. Id. at 8. Productive capital simply means "a more than temporary addition to the
capital stock of the recipient country." Id. at 9. Productive capital should be contrasted
with speculative capital. The former creates long-term, equilibrating flows, the latter creates
short-term disequilibrating flights from the currency of a country whose economy is weaken-
ing. Id. at 6-7.
127. See generally EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 458-9.
128. Article I, section 4.
129. GOLD, CAPITAL MOVMENTS, supra note 117, at 12.
130. Id. at 13.
131. The Fund's interpretation of Article VI, section 3 expressly mandates that a mem-
ber's regulation of capital movements not interfere with the provisions of Article IV. IMF
DECISION No. 541 (56/39), SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 116. Article IV, section
l(iii) provides that a member must not manipulate exchange rates in order to prevent bal-
ance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other mem-
bers. To the extent that capital controls conflict with these mandates, they are prohibited
by Article VI, section 3.
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V. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2 CONDITIONALITY AND THE ALLIED BANK
SITUATION
It is interesting to see how the situation at issue in the Allied Bank
litigation could have been handled if Article VIII, section 2 conditionality
had been used. If such a procedure had been available when Costa Rica
had to confront its economic crisis and the consequent shortage of foreign
currency, the Costa Rican government would not have declared a unilat-
eral halt to the payment of debt service to foreign lenders. Instead, Costa
Rica would have requested the Fund to approve exchange control restric-
tions affecting current payments and it would have agreed with the Fund
on an adjustment program to be implemented to remedy the country's
economic crisis, so that in due time the exchange restrictions could be
withdrawn. The Fund would have approved the restrictions under Article
VIII, section 2(a) conditioned upon the adoption of austerity measures. If,
following a default of debt service, the foreign lenders had sought to exer-
cise their creditors' remedies in the United States courts, the Costa Rican
borrowers would have simply had to plead the Fund's decision to secure a
dismissal of the action because of Article VIII, section 2(b). Faced with
the inability to enforce their contracts in the courts of any member, all
the foreign lenders would have had no choice but to join in the reschedul-
ing of the debt. At the same time, the lenders would have had the com-
fort of the Fund's supervision of Costa Rica's adjustment efforts and
could have confidently looked forward to a resumption of regular pay-
ments, pursuant to a schedule agreed upon by the Fund and Costa Rica.
The foreign lenders would not have had the opportunity to interfere with
the rescheduling or the adjustment process by resorting to litigation, as
Fidelity did in Allied Bank. At the same time, the rights of lenders would
have been safeguarded and investors' confidence would not have been dis-
rupted because of the Fund's role as "guarantor" of the entire reschedul-
ing and adjustment.
13 2
If Article VIII, section 2 conditionality had been used to handle the
Costa Rican debt crisis, the cooperative adjustment of international debt
problems under the auspices of the IMF, so highly praised by both the
Allied Bank III-" court and the U.S. government, would have been
strengthened, while all the drawbacks complained of by the lenders in
their criticism of the Allied Bank P4 decision would have been avoided.
This conclusion is supported by an examination of the arguments offered
by the parties and amici in the course of the Allied Bank litigation.
The United States government, as amicus,35 argued on rehearing
132. In a lot of ways, the outcome would have been identical to that normally secured
through stand-by arrangements and Article V, section 3 conditionality, as, for example, in
the Mexican crisis of 1982.
133. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
134. 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984)(withdrawn). See supra, note 1 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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that the Allied Bank I decision was inconsistent with the "strategy of
voluntary cooperation" heretofore adopted to deal with the debt crisis.13
According to the amicus, such a strategy requires strong adjustment ef-
forts by debtor countries and cooperative action on the part of the inter-
national financiers. This strategy works best when the IMF serves as an
"objective mediator," by approving the economic austerity measures de-
veloped by the debtor, establishing external financing requirements, and
acting as a catalyst in arranging new loans.1 3 7 The brief for the United
States cited numerous U.S. government sources to show that the United
States strongly supports this approach, including a strong role for the
IMF.138 They argued that this approach is disrupted by judicial recogni-
tion of a country's unilateral suspension of payments on its foreign debt.
This position met with full approval of the Second Circuit in Allied Bank
II, which held that international cooperation and negotiation in the con-
text of private international debt difficulties is highly desirable and de-
mands that lenders display full confidence in the validity and enforceabil-
ity of their contract rights. 9 If there were unilateral deferments of debt
service on external loans by debtor countries through foreign exchange
restrictions, there would be a real danger that borrowers would be in a
position to "jawbone" their foreign lenders. The bargaining process would
become skewed and unbalanced, and cooperation between the parties
would become impossible. Article VIII, section 2 conditionality, however,
is the opposite of unilateral rescheduling. Article VIII, section 2 condi-
tionality would maximize the chances of effective cooperation between
borrowers and lenders by giving the IMF strong, direct leverage in deal-
ing with both. All of the parties involved would have a strong incentive
(and no viable alternative) to join in the "cooperative adjustment of in-
ternational problems" truly under the auspices of the Fund.
Both the United States government and the Clearing House, as
amici, criticized the analogy drawn by the Allied Bank I court between
Costa Rica and a debtor filing for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. 40 Amici argued that the lack of a "previously rec-
ognized neutral body acting as a kind of bankruptcy court" and the lack
of fundamental procedural safeguards to protect the interests of all credi-
tors make the two situations radically different.' Amici argued that the
136. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae on Rehearing at 8, Allied Bank Inter-
national v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited
as United States Brief].
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 10 n.6.
139. 757 F.2d at 519.
140. This analogy was one of the main reasons why the Second Circuit in Allied Bank I
affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the defendants. See supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text. The same court in its Allied Bank II decision made no mention of the
analogy. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
141. United States Brief, supra note 136, at 13 n.9. Brief for the New York Clearing
House Association as amicus curiae on Rehearing at 3, Allied Bank International v. Banco
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analogy was faulty because a debtor cannot be allowed to "declare itself
to be bankrupt and then dictate the terms of its creditors' remedies,"" 2
without any assurance that an "impartial plan of adjustment" will be
adopted." " All of these concerns would be addressed if Article VIII, sec-
tion 2 conditionality were used, because the Fund would indeed assume
the role of a neutral third party. The Fund would approve and oversee
the debtor's adjustment efforts, thereby safeguarding the interests of all
creditors. Procedures could be put in place for periodic consultation be-
tween creditors and the Fund so as to avoid an unregulated "cramdown"
of a reorganization agreement between a debtor country and a majority of
its creditors on an unwilling minority. " 4
All the parties in Allied Bank recognized the critical link between
lenders' confidence in the enforceability of their loan agreements and
their willingness to extend new credit to sovereign borrowers." A contin-
uous flow of foreign commercial lending to sovereign debtors is essential if
a generalized solvency crisis is to be avoided and the stability of debtor
countries preserved." 6 The recognition of unilateral deferments on pay-
ments of foreign debt would make the banks even more reluctant to put
new money into a country that is rescheduling its external debt, while an
extension of conditionality to Article VIII, section 2(b) would increase
their willingness to do so. It is well known that lenders' confidence is
boosted by the adoption of IMF backed austerity measures by debtor
countries in connection with stand-by arrangements." 7 If the Fund can
require of sovereign debtors the adoption of similar austerity measures as
a condition for granting approval of exchange restrictions under Article
VIII, section 2(a), there is no reason why foreign lenders should not be
equally reassured. In fact, Article VIII, section 2 conditionality would
greatly increase the Fund's leverage in dealing with commercial lenders as
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Clearing
House Brief].
142. Clearing House Brief, supra note 9 at 3.
143. Clearing House Brief, supra note 141, at 27.
144. United States Brief, supra note 136, at 13 n.9.
145. See, e.g., Clearing House Brief, supra note 141, at 23, and United States Brief,
supra note 136, at 7.
146. A recent commentator noted that "from the borrowing countries' perspective, the
debt problem is an economic growth problem. Their main concern is to acquire enough for-
eign exchange to import the necessities to sustain economic growth while simultaneously
paying debt service .... These dual objectives of growth and debt service are at times in
conflict. But if the banks do not opt for growth, their chances of repayment are substantially
reduced. Thus, the banks are willing, in conjunction with a financial stabilization program,
to put new money into a country that is rescheduling debt." Meissner, Debt: Reform With-
out Governments, 56 FOREIGN POL'Y 81, 82-83 (1984).
147. Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign
Debts at 2 (1984, unpublished) [hereinafter cited as Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas]. The au-
thor writes that "as far as both creditors and debtors are concerned, the IMF's credits are
far less important than its approval of the proposed austerity measures. Without such ap-




well as borrowers, because of the binding effect of Article VIII, section
2(b) on private contract creditors. It has been written that after the Mex-
ican crisis, the Fund has increasingly gone beyond a mere supervisory role
with regard to austerity measures and has played an active role in arrang-
ing an overall financing package for the debtor. 4" The Fund has gone so
far as to indicate a level of new commercial lending that should be part of
the overall adjustment program and to refuse to sign a stabilization agree-
ment until that level was met. 4" Article VIII, section 2(b) can be a formi-
dable lever available to the Fund to pressure foreign banks to extend new
credit since it effectively bars them from any judicial or administrative
remedy for default.8 0 Consequently, Article VIII, section 2 conditionality
would invigorate and assure a flow of new money to rescheduling debtors,
instead of interrupting it.
The main argument raised by the borrowers in Allied Bank, support-
ing recognition of the Costa Rican exchange restrictions, was that volun-
tary rescheduling is always vulnerable to the attempts of a recalcitrant
creditor bank to secede from the restructuring, to demand special privi-
leges, to call a default on its loans, and to secure a judgment and execu-
tion in a foreign court, thereby causing the entire rescheduling effort to
crumble."" The defendants noted that the "rogue bank" is often "beyond
the influence of either its peers or its government," 152 and suggested that
granting recognition to foreign exchange restrictions in the United States
courts is "the last restraint on a recalcitrant creditor and provides the
means for judicial action which does not place the fate of a restructuring
exclusively in the hands of private sector arm wrestling."' 5 3 Plaintiff and
amici, on the other hand, tried to convince the court that the problem of
recalcitrant banks was of no concern.
5
4
The increasing difficulty and fragility of the process of voluntary
debt rescheduling, due to the unwillingness of smaller banks to cooperate
with the larger creditors, is well known.'55 The danger of a "domino ef-
148. Lipson, International Debt and International Institutions at 10, 12 (1984,
unpublished).
149. Id. at 12.
150. IMF DECISION No. 446-4, SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 53, at 233.
151. Defendant's Brief, supra note 9, at 4, 15, 20.
152. Id. at 20.
153. Id. at 21.
154. The Clearing House argued that "it is not at all uncommon in the rescheduling of
foreign loans for one or more banks to decline to participate. In some instances these banks
have been bought out by other participants . . .and in others they have been paid by the
debtor after threatening litigation." Clearing House Brief, supra note 141, at 5.
155. Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas, supra note 147, at 4. The author notes that "if we
expect large banks to cooperate because of their heavy outstanding commitments to sover-
eign debtors and because of their status as permanent fixtures of the Euromarkets, then we
would expect to find the holdouts, outliers and mavericks among the smaller banks with
fewer international links .... The aim of the holdouts is essentially to reduce their expo-
sure without any loss of asset value. To do so, however, reduces the debt available to the
borrower and may imperil the entire rescheduling if other creditors follow suit." Id.
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fect" triggered by a default called by a smaller bank is constantly a threat
hanging over the entire rescheduling process. 5 Although there are very
harsh informal sanctions against recalcitrant banks, the danger that the
rescheduling will "unravel like a cheap sweater" and a "mad scramble of
creditors for assets' 157 will be unleashed cannot be avoided. There are
increasing doubts about the continuing ability of the large international
banks to secure voluntary cooperation from all creditors by "private sec-
tor arm wrestling.' 5 8 Allied Bank II may very well decrease such ability
to a large extent, since it is now proven that a single creditor bank can
refuse to join the rescheduling and can obtain judicial relief against the
debtor.5 " Article VIII, section (b) would ipso facto resolve the problem of
recalcitrant creditors, because it would foreclose any hope of obtaining
satisfaction of their rights outside the restructuring process. This is in-
deed what happens in a domestic reorganization of a business under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code once a plan of reorganization has
been adopted.
VI. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2 CONDITIONALITY AND THE FUND'S ROLE IN
THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS: THE NEEDED SYSTEMIC SOLUTION
These thoughts on the potential for Article VIII, section 2 condition-
ality raise some fundamental issues for future debate concerning the role
of the IMF in the inter-ntional debt crisis. The main question is whether
the traditional instruments used by the Fund to deal with the growing
burden of external debt, namely conditionality under the stand-by ar-
rangements of Article VI, section 3 are adequate to deal with an interna-
tional financial system that is profoundly different from the one where
such instruments were first developed. 60 In today's system, international
banks are no longer simple channels for short-term capital movements
induced by trade or by speculation,6 " but are also principle suppliers of
156. Lipson again writes that "the threat to call a formal default and force the accelera-
tion of payments is another potential source of leverage for small creditors .... Since all
international loan agreements contain cross-default clauses, some observers have suggested
that a single default could start a prairie fire .... " Id.
157. Allied Bank 1, 733 F.2d at 26.
158. Lipson, Bankers' Dilemmas, supra note 147, at 19.
159. The day after the Allied Bank II decision, the Wall Street Journal quoted a lawyer
associated with the case as saying that the decision "is going to encourage small banks to
demand repayment of overdue debt and make international restructurings much more diffi-
cult." Wall Street Journal, Mar. 19, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
160. Sir Joseph Gold wrote that:
a development of recent years that was not foreseen at the time when the origi-
nal Articles were negotiated is the emergence and enormous growth of interna-
tional capital markets in various parts of the world. The development of these
markets, which for convenience can be referred to collectively as the Eurocur-
rency market, has become a cardinal element of the international monetary
system.
GOLD, CAPIrrAL MovEMNTs, supra note 117, at 2.
161. Typical international capital flows are generated by the need to settle trade and
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productive capital to fuel the growth of developing countries.162 While in
the old scenario international banks were able to precipitate a nation's
currency crisis indirectly by amplifying the pressures generated by other
actors, mainly speculators,'1 3 in the new scenario large banks are in a po-
sition to cause such crises directly because of their status as contract
creditors.
The drafters of the original Articles were mostly concerned with cur-
rent transfers and payments for trade-related transactions and with inter-
national flows of speculative capital, or "hot money.'"4 Capital flights
away from weakening currencies were particularly disruptive of interna-
tional monetary stability. When a nation's economy weakened or
strengthened, making its currency a candidate for adjustment, the banks
acted as conduits for speculators, or as speculators themselves, and were
the instruments of a "run" of the currency. The real battle was between
speculators selling or buying foreign currency and central banks buying
and selling domestic money. The battlegrounds were the foreign exchange
markets and the controlling factor was the level of reserves available to
counter speculation. When the pressure became too intense, central banks
would call the IMF to their rescue; stand-by funds would become availa-
ble to replenish reserves and a severe austerity package would be intro-
duced to restore confidence in the currency. Article V, section 3 condi-
tionality became the perfect instrument to manage this kind of crisis.
In the 1970's, however, the system changed because of the great suc-
cess of commercial banks in recycling the petro dollar glut. 6 5 By increas-
ing their balance of payments lending to unprecedented levels, commer-
cial banks became direct actors in the system, rather than mere conduits
or magnifiers of pressures generated elsewhere. Given their enormous net
exposure toward developing countries, commercial banks are now in a po-
sition to cause an international solvency crisis by simply refusing to
reschedule sovereign debts. The fact that banks have everything to lose
from a generalized default of international loans, does not change the
conclusion that the battle today is no longer between speculators and cen-
other current transactions when a country experiences a surplus or a deficit in the current
account of its balance of payments, by the desire of corporations to hedge anticipated pay-
ments or receipts to be made in foreign currencies or to maintain working balances, by
differentials in interest rates available on short-term investments in one country compared
to another, or by predicted changes in currency exchange rates influencing the decisions of
investors on the deployment of their reserve funds. EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 453.
162. Large scale lending by commercial banks directed toward non-oil exporting devel-
oping countries developed out of the oil crisis of 1973. Commercial banks typically have
provided funds to private and public firms for investment projects, financing of inventory
and the like. Id. at 129. Commercial bank lending to foreign governments directly for bal-
ance of payments support is a relatively new phenomenon, but has reached massive propor-
tions. Id.
163. Aronson, Financial Institutions in the International Monetary System, 12 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 341, 343 (1980).
164. GOLD, CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 117, at 1.
165. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 59, at 130.
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tral banks, but rather between contract creditors and debtors with cash
flow problems. The battleground is no longer the exchange markets, but
the markets for the developing countries' exports, their domestic markets
for imports and the money markets of New York City with their fluctuat-
ing yields. The crises today are not caused by speculative fever, but by a
steadily deteriorating external debt ratio in a world of high interest rates.
So far the Fund has had to rely on its traditional instruments to ad-
dress the problems posed by this new scenario.16 Beginning with the
Mexican crisis, the Fund, on the invitation of the creditor and debtor
countries, has greatly increased its direct participation in multilateral ne-
gotiations to reschedule the external debt of several developing mem-
bers.16 7 The Fund's new role, however, has had to rely on the old script of
stand-by arrangements and Article V, section 3 conditionality.' 8 These
old instruments might be increasingly inadequate for the new task.
While the Fund's involvement via a stand-by arrangement undoubt-
166. Sir Joseph Gold wrote that "the disturbances of the international monetary sys-
tem and the growth of a vast international capital market that is not subject to interna-
tional regulation have led to suggestions that the formal powers of the Fund in relation to
capital transfers should be increased. These suggestions have made no progress." GOLD,
CAPITAL MovEmrrs, supra note 117, at 46.
167. Id. at 47. The Fund maintains a closer liaison with private financial institutions
and with other international organizations on the volume and terms of financial flows and
on the debt problems of developing members. In the rescheduling process, the Fund has
provided technical and advisory services, has made financial assistance available to debtors
to assist them in their efforts to resume normal economic relations and their development
programs, and has made impartial evaluations of progress by debtors following the renegoti-
ation. Id.
168. Gold provided a clear summary of the Fund's use of stand-by arrangements to deal
with the international debt crisis:
In reaching understandings with members on financial support for their eco-
nomic and financial programs, the Fund emphasizes policies that will help a
member to eliminate the conditions responsible for a disequilibrating outflow
of capital or to establish the conditions that will promote the inflow of equili-
brating or productive capital. For example, some members in persistent bal-
ance of payment difficulties have accumulated arrears on current payments
and have faced the possibility of default in servicing external debt. These diffi-
culties have had a detrimental effect on capital inflow and have induced capital
outflow, with the result that the member's problems have been intensified. The
Fund sought, therefore, to reach understandings with a member on policies
that will improve its medium-term balance of payments prospects and in this
way provide for a continuation of debt service and encourage capital inflow.
Programs supported by the Fund often include provisions dealing with man-
agement of the member's external debt and limitation of the amount of me-
dium-term external debt to be undertaken or guaranteed by the public sector
and sometimes the private sector. The Fund pays much attention to the ques-
tion whether a member's borrowing abroad is to support a development pro-
gram or is for general budgetary or balance of payments purposes. The Fund
may advise a member that the volume of borrowing for these purposes may
mask a need for adjustment, which will become more difficult if the foreign




edly causes a strong boost in foreign lenders' confidence and increases
their incentive to remain in the balance of payments financing busi-
ness, 169 the Fund's role is indirect and through persuasion, instead of be-
ing direct and binding. The Fund has a powerful influence on interna-
tional private lenders, but lacks any direct regulatory authority upon
them. In other words, the Fund lacks any direct leverage over recalcitrant
lenders, except for the ultimate threat of refusing its assistance altogether
and watching the system collapse. The positive conclusion of the
rescheduling process depends upon the good will and wisdom of creditor
banks and their ability to compel recalcitrant banks to contribute their
share.
The Fund has so far been remarkably successful in bringing lenders
and borrowers together on the appropriate adjustment programs and in
persuading private lenders to produce enough new credit to support
them. The process, however, is constantly vulnerable to the demands of
"holdout" or "rogue" banks, who can always resort to litigation to enforce
their creditors' remedies. The size and number of these recalcitrant lend-
ers might very well increase as the size and number of debt reschedulings
increase. The process is therefore skewed, because the Fund's powerful
leverage over debtor countries via conditionality is not paralleled by any
direct authority of the Fund over private lenders. There are reasonable
grounds to fear that the old instruments used by the Fund will not suc-
ceed in eliminating the risk of a system collapse.
Article VIII, section 2 conditionality could be the needed systemic
and institutional solution, in a situation like Allied Bank. Using Article
VIII, section 2(a) in combination with Article VIII, section 2(b), the Fund
would be able to extend indirectly its regulatory authority to private in-
ternational lenders. The proposed approach would give the Fund a good
measure of direct control over the debt restructuring process, because Ar-
ticle VIII, section 2(b) would indeed become the functional equivalent of
a reorganization in bankruptcy. The binding effect of Article VIII, section
2(b) on the courts of all members makes it the equivalent of an automatic
stay of all collection actions by international creditors. As a price for such
immediate and complete, if only temporary, relief, debtor countries would
169. Sir Joseph Gold again summarized this effect very concisely:
Approval by the Fund of a stand-by or extended arrangement for a member
under which the member can purchase foreign exchange is a signal to other
potential lenders, whether international, public, or private, that the member's
policies are adequate to bring about balance of payments adjustment. Not in-
frequently, these potential lenders await announcement of favorable action by
the Fund and then make their own resources available. This finance may be
substantially in excess of the resources provided by the Fund. Moreover, other
lenders may make the continued availability of the resources they agree to pro-
vide dependent on the member's observance of the terms of the arrangement
with the Fund and the member's continued ability to obtain foreign exchange
from the Fund in accordance with the arrangement.
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have to renounce unilateral deferments on external payments through
foreign exchange restrictions and accept the conditions of an IMF backed
adjustment program. The incentive for a defaulting debtor country to
seek the Fund's assistance would indeed be great. Article VIII, section 2
conditionality would also make the system symmetrical by giving the
Fund equal leverage over both lenders and borrowers. Article VIII, sec-
tion 2 conditionality could become the linchpin of the Fund's contribu-
tion to solving the external debt crisis of developing members.
Redefining Taxation of International




The use of the unitary tax method by various states in the United
States has engendered increasing controversy in the past few years. This
method of taxation has its origins in efforts by state taxing authorities to
tax the full income of corporations doing business both within and
outside the state.'
Congress has failed to enact legislation that effectively limits the
states' authority to tax income of corporations resident or doing business
within their territories. Nor has the Supreme Court successfully articu-
lated meaningful delineations of the scope of state taxing authority. As a
result, the states have been given free rein to operate in this area, often
giving rise to difficult jurisdictional problems. Traditionally, states have
sought to tax the out-of-state income (both U.S. and foreign) of corpora-
tions domiciled within their boundaries by considering only the income of
the corporation's subsidiaries located in the state. The more recent target
of taxation has been not only these subsidiary companies, but also the
foreign parent companies of these domiciled subsidiaries. Such activities
come under the category of unitary taxation.
Three constitutional issues are raised by the practice of the unitary
taxation method. First, the fourteenth amendment due process clause2 re-
quires that strictly lawful procedures be followed by the states. Second,
the interstate commerce clause' embodies the national interest in assur-
ing that excessive state taxation does not impede the free flow of com-
merce among the states. Both of these issues attend any situation where
the income of a multijurisdictional corporation is taxed, regardless of
whether the taxing state attempts to reach beyond United States borders.
When a state does seek to tax income outside U.S. borders, however, the
t This article does not reflect the Reagan Administration's recent announcement to
preempt state unitary tax legislation. However, the relevance of Professor Baker's analysis
remains unchanged. (Eds.)
* Associate Professor of International Business Law, University of Texas at Austin;
B.B.A. 1968, University of Miami; J.D. 1974, Southern Methodist University.
1. Hellerstein, State Income Taxation of Multi jurisdictional Corporations: Reflections
on Mobil, Exxon, and H. R. 5076, 79 MICH. L. REV. 113, 126 nn. 74 & 75 (1980); See G.
ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 101 (2d ed. 1950).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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third constitutional issue surfaces under the foreign commerce clause": to
assure states do not infringe upon the authority of a nation to regulate
commerce with foreign nations. This article examines these constitutional
issues and reviews the recent responses of the U.S. Executive and Con-
gress to this issue.
I. WHAT IS UNITARY TAXATION?
The unitary method of taxation was a response to the increased com-
plexity of corporations conducting business activity in several jurisdic-
tions. It was created to assess the income of a functionally related enter-
prise (the "unitary business") operating in more than one state.5 Taxing
authorities found that it was especially difficult to assess the income at-
tributable to any given state, and other methods of taxation' failed to do
so accurately. Formula apportionment 7 provides a means of determining a
reasonable share of the total income of a multijurisdictional corporation
by imputing it to a single jurisdiction. A state first determines whether a
unitary business exists; if a business is a part of a unitary enterprise, the
state will apportion the total income of the unitary business between the
taxing jurisdiction and the rest of the world, using a formula. The unitary
method of formula apportionment is employed by forty-five states and
the District of Columbia.8 The formulas vary,9 but the most widely
adopted formula is that used by California, which bases its assessment of
income on the proportion of the unitary business' total payroll, property,
and sales located within the State."0 This form of taxation has been con-
stitutionally upheld" and has been recognized by the twenty-three states




5. Smith, A Levy That Spans the Ocean, Wall St. J., Dec. 23, 1983 at 8, col. 4.
6. The other two means of taxing corporate income are separate accounting and specific
allocation. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 116. Specific allocation, which traces income to a
single source, is not widely used in the taxation of multijurisdictional corporations since
there is difficulty in ascertaining the specific source of income generated by such a corpora-
tion. Id. at 116-117. Under the separate accounting method, income attributed to a certain
geographic or functional area of the multijurisdictional enterprise is treated separately from
other parts of the enterprise. Id. at 117. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
7. The terms "unitary method" and "formula apportionment" are used
interchangeably.
8. Weissman, Unitary Taxation: Its History and Recent Supreme Court Treatment, 48
ALB. L. REV. 48 (1983).
9. Id.
10. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 117-18. "By averaging the ratios of the taxpayer's
property, payroll, and sales within a state to its property, payroll, and sales throughout the
business, the formula yields a fraction that can be applied to the taxpayer's net income to
determine the portion taxable by the state." Id. at 118.
11. See, e.g., Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel Maxwell, 283 U.S. 123
(1931); Bass, Ratcliff & Bretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
12. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165 (1983).
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The unitary method of taxation is used to assess income not only of
operations within several of the United States, but also of business opera-
tions in other countries, resulting in the state taxing foreign corporations.
This result occurs either when the foreign parent corporation has a sub-
sidiary doing business in a state using the unitary method, or when a
parent company with foreign subsidiaries is itself a resident of the state,
dependent, of course, upon the existence of a unitary business relation-
ship between the parent and the subsidiary or affiliate. The unitary
method, when used to tax such an enterprise, is referred to as "worldwide
combined reporting."' 13 Ten states 4 now use the worldwide combined re-
porting method.
II. DUE PROCESS
A state may not tax value earned outside its territory absent some
connection between itself and the activity sought to be taxed. The due
process clause imposes two restrictions on states. First, some minimal
connection between the income-generating activity sought to be taxed
and the taxing state must be established. 15 The Supreme Court has in-
cluded in this requirement that part of the business take place within the
state 6 and that some bond of control or ownership must exist between
the state and remaining parts of the "unitary business."' 7 The second re-
quirement imposed by the due process clause is that the "out-of-state
activities of the purported 'unitary business' be related in some concrete
way to the in-state activities."'" In essence, this requirement mandates
the existence of a unitary business. 9 If there was doubt in anyone's mind
that apportionment of income required the presence of a unitary busi-
ness, that doubt was allayed by the Court's decision in ASARCO, Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Commission.20 ASARCO is a New Jersey corporation
having its principle commercial headquarters in New York. Its primary
business in Idaho, the taxing state, is silver mining, though it also mines
other metals in other states. Idaho sought to tax the dividends, interest
13. Weissman, supra note 8, at 48 n. 2.
14. As of this writing the ten states that use worldwide reporting are Alaska, California,
Idaho, Indiana, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon (although repeal of its
law will become effective January 1, 1986) and Utah. Massachusetts until recently used
worldwide combined reporting; however the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held
that the state tax commissioner lacks the authority to use this method in the absence of
regulations aprising taxpayers of the law. See Polaroid Corp. v. Comm'n of Revenue #53479,
1984. See also Sheppard, No Unitary Method in Massachusetts, 25 TAX NoTEs 1057 (1984).
15. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 121.
16. Container, 463 U.S. at 165; see also Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207, 220 (1980); Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444-445 (1940).
17. Container, 463 U.S. at 166; see also ASARCO v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S.
307, 327-328 (1982).
18. Container, 463 U.S. at 174-5.
19. See generally ASARCO, 458 U.S. 307 and F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Tax'n and Reve-
nue Dept. of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
20. ASARCO, 458 U.S. 307.
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income, and capital gains of ASARCO's five foreign subsidiaries. The
Court held that intangible income, such as the dividends, interest, and
capital gains realized by a corporate taxpayer from investments in affili-
ated corporations, will be apportionable income only if a unitary business
relationship exists between the corporation whose securities generate the
income and the corporation receiving the income.2 1 Two earlier Supreme
Court cases, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont and
Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue,2 can be distin-
guished because the corporations in those cases operated unitary busi-
nesses, whereas ASARCO proved that the essential factors which evi-
dence the existence of a unitary business were wholly absent.
23
In ASARCO, the Court "assumed that the position of Idaho [was]
that a unitary business relationship between ASARCO and the dividend
paying companies is a necessary prerequisite to its taxation of the income
in question, but that the unitary business concept should be expanded to
cover the facts of the ASARCO case."2 The amicus curiae brief of the
Multistate Tax Commission, 2s however, espoused a theory that, had this
position been adopted by the Court, would have broadened the concept of
the unitary method dramatically. The view set forth in the brief was that
"there can exist a relationship between stock investments and the busi-
ness of the owner of the investments which is sufficient alone to justify
the apportionment of any income from the investments.. 2 The Court did
not address this theory, and its holding that a unitary business relation-
ship is required would seem to preclude any possibility that anything less
than that would suffice. The ruling in ASARCO left open hope for mul-
tinational corporations. First, it held that the dividends, interest income,
and capital gains of foreign subsidiaries would not, under these circum-
stances, form a portion of the tax base of a corporation. The decision was
significant if for no other reason than it was the first time in fifty years
that an income taxpayer had successfully shown a due process violation
with regard to the elements of nexus and rational relationship. 27 More-
21. Id. at 329-330. See Peters, Supreme Court Requires Unitary Relationship before
States Can Tax Investment Income, 57 J. TAX'N 314 (1982). Query: would it be different if
the income at issue were operating income? The Court didn't differentiate in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Comm'r of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980), nor in Exxon, 447 U.S. 207.
22. Mobil, 445 U.S. 425; Exxon, 447 U.S. 207.
23. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 320-324.
24. Peters, supra note 21, at 315.
25. The Multistate Tax Commission is the "administrative agency of the Multistate
Tax Compact, whose purposes include the promotion of accuracy, equity, uniformity and
convenience in the state tax treatment of multistate and multinational businesses. There are
nineteen member states and ten associate member states of the Compact." Hellerstein,
supra note 1, at 114 n. 6. The constitutionality of the Compact was sustained in U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
26. Peters, supra note 21, at 315.
27. The last time the Court had found such an argument persuasive was in Hans Rees,
283 U.S. at 134-135. Unsuccessful attempts included Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S.
267 (1978); Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. North Caro-
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over, multinationals could still hope at this point that the Court would
find unconstitutional state taxation on a worldwide basis.28 It should be
noted, however, that Idaho conceded that ASARCO was not a unitary
business, a fact that substantially weakens the impact of the decision in
favor of the corporation.
Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Board of the State of Cali-
fornia2" illustrates that the significance of the determination of whether a
business will be classified as a unitary business cannot be underestimated,
for it is this determination that will decide the method of taxation that
will be used. The requirement that a unitary business exist before world-
wide combination reporting is used is susceptible to a great many more
qualifications and much more complexity than that of the first require-
ment of nexus.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme
Court decision in Butler Brothers v. McColgan,0 which set forth the sem-
inal definition of a unitary business. The California Supreme Court deter-
mined that a unitary business is one characterized by unity of ownership,
unity of use, and unity of management. 1 This definition has been criti-
cized as overbroad,32 and indeed, almost any multijurisdictional corpora-
tion could fit this description. The California court's further comments
indicate that each situation will have to be decided on its own facts and
whether those facts demonstrate interdependence.3 The Supreme Court,
in its decisions, has announced several distinguishing characteristics of
the unitary business beyond the three unities announced in Butler
Brothers.34
From its initial efforts to determine the scope of the unitary business,
the Court has said that the existence of a "vertical" enterprise suffices. 35
Vertical enterprises are those whose different components, such as drill-
lina ex rel Maxwell, 297 U.S. 682 (1936); Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365,
168 S.E. 397 (1933), aff'd per curiam, 291 U.S. 642 (1934). The Court did, however, invali-
date the District of Columbia's single-factor sales formula for apportioning corporate in-
come on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. See General Motors Corp. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
28. ADvISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SPEcIAL REPORT-STATE
TAXATION OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, March, 1983, reprinted in TAX NOTES, 995,
1001, (1983) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REPORT].
29. 539 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
30. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
31. Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal.2d 664, 111 P.2d 334, (1941).
32. Weissman, supra note 8, at 65. See also Keesling & Warren, The Unitary Concept
in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42, 47-48 (1960).
33. The court wrote, "[i]f the operation ... of the business done within the state is
dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business without the state, the opera-
tions are unitary; otherwise, if there is no such dependency, the business within the state
may be considered to be separate." Edison California Stores v. McColgan, 30 Cal.2d 472, 183
P.2d 16, 21 (1947).
34. 315 U.S. at 508.
35. See, e.g., Hans Rees, 283 U.S. 123; Underwood Typewriter 254 U.S. 113.
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ing, refining, and sales, are in different states. A strong argument can be
made for taxing such an operation because each component part does de-
rive from the taxing state some benefit that may justify a tax imposition.
This central operations criterion has been used to justify both taxing of
component parts in states of the United States 6 and in integrated busi-
nesses operating across national boundaries.
3 7
The principle was later extended to horizontal operations, which are
defined as a series of similar operations under common management, con-
trol, or both,3 8 or that share risks. Interrelations will exist between the
affiliated firms, but one is not the customer of the other. The Court has
recognized the problem of the practice of tax avoidance, whereby compa-
nies doing business in a state seek to dodge some of their tax burdens by
setting up apparently discrete entities elsewhere. The logic is more
strained here, however. Assuming that the rationale a state relies on to
tax income earned outside its borders is that some of the resources of that
state were used to generate the income, the argument is much weaker in
the case of an enterprise that is horizontally integrated. 9
In its recent cases, the Court appears to have retained its previous
distinction between vertically integrated businesses and those businesses
engaged in the same line of business. In Exxon, an oil company con-
ducting marketing activities in Wisconsin challenged that state's formula
apportionment which took into consideration all of its operating income,
arguing instead that the state should tax only the company's marketing
activities. Similarly, in Mobil, an oil company challenged Vermont's in-
clusion in its tax base income received by the company in the form of
dividends from subsidiaries and affiliates doing business abroad. In both
of these cases, the Court found the existence of a unitary business. The
continuous flow and interchange of common products between subsidiar-
ies and domestic corporations noted in Mobil and Exxon4 1 were sufficient
to constitute a unitary business relationship.
On the contrary, no unitary business was found to exist in
Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of New Mexico.
4 1
At issue in Woolworth, as in Mobil, were dividends of four foreign subsid-
iaries 42 of the F.W. Woolworth company, a corporation domiciled in New
York and operating a chain of retail stores throughout the United States.
36. Underwood Typewriter, 254 U.S. 113.
37. Bass, 266 U.S. 271.
38. See Butler Bros., 315 U.S. 501.
39. A possible rationale for permitting the use of the unitary method in this situation
might be derived from examination of the enterprise's "operational interdependence" which
would ascertain the degree of interdependance between subsidiaries controlled by a parent
corporation. See Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the
Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L. TAX J. 487, 501-503 (1968).
40. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
41. 458 U.S. 354 (1982).
42. Woolworth owned all of the outstanding stock of three of the foreign subsidiaries
and approximately 53% of another. Id. at 362.
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The subsidiaries in question conducted retail sales similar to those oper-
ated by Woolworth in the United States. The Woolworth Court noted
a critical distinction between a retail merchandising business ... and
the type of multi-national business... in which refined, processed, or
manufactured products (or parts thereof) may be produced in one or
more countries and marketed in various countries, often worldwide. In
operations of this character, there is a flow of international trade,
often an interchange of personnel, and substantial mutual
interdependence.
43
The same kind of interaction and interdependence did not exist between
the corporation and the subsidiaries as existed in Mobil and Exxon. Simi-
larly, ASARCO's silver mining and its subsidiary's (Southern Peru) au-
tonomous business were found to be insufficiently connected to permit
the companies to be classified as a unitary business." The distinction be-
tween vertically integrated enterprises, which supply a stream of products
and services, and affiliated corporations may not be as cut and dried as it
first appeared, as evidenced by the Court's comment that Woolworth po-
tentially had authority to operate its subsidiaries as integrated divisions
of a single unitary business.4 5 It was unclear how Woolworth would be
able to conduct its business as an "integrated" rather than a "discrete"
business, since its subsidiaries were engaged in the same kind of busi-
ness-not providing raw materials to or purchasing products from
Woolworth.4 The statement suggests that under some circumstances, a
horizontal business might be considered to be a unitary enterprise.
Centralization of management and control occupied a lesser role in
ascertaining the existence of a unitary business in ASARCO and
Woolworth.4' The Court still looked into the "nature and extent of inter-
corporate sales, the actual exercise of control by ASARCO over the affili-
ated corporations, and the centralization of management services, "48 but
it failed to find a sufficient management or control linkage in ASARCO 49
43. Id. at 371 (footnote omitted). However, the Court did not decide Woolworth on the
grounds that it was not a vertically integrated business.
44. Peters, supra note 21, at 315.
45. Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 362.
46. 458 U.S. 354.
47. See Peters, supra note 21, at 318.
48. Id. at 314.
49. The Court recognized that there were some occasions when the corporations con-
ducted transactions with each other. There also were some centralized services as well as the
use of a patent for a fee. In short, the potential for ASARCO to exercise control over the
companies existed. However, the majority did not find compelling the factors the dissent
found persuasive; the dissent recognized a relationship between ASARCO's investment deci-
sion making and business conducted in the taxing state. It also emphasized the importance
of the investments on the business conducted by ASARCO in the taxing state and the busi-
ness advantages, such as stability, source of raw materials and outlet for products derived
from the investments.
The majority conducted a detailed analysis of only the one subsidiary that would be
most likely to be named a unitary business, Southern Peru. ASARCO owned 51.5% of
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and Woolworth." The Court summarized the major relevant issue to be
whether contributions to the income of the subsidiaries or affiliates re-
sulted from the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state. Because the ex-
tent of managerial control did not rise to the level of creating a unitary
business, the state's attempts to tax the income in question were no more




An argument somewhat similar to the corporate form argument is
one that alleges that the constitutionality of a unitary tax will depend on
the accounting system. Exxon's challenge of the Wisconsin unitary tax
focused on both prongs of the due process test. Exxon argued that its
separate accounting is evidence that neither prong of the due process test
was satisfied.
52
The Supreme Court apparently adopted Wisconsin's argument that a
state is justified in applying its apportionment formula merely by virtue
of the existence of a unitary business within the state. Most striking,
though, was the definitive way in which the Court dispensed with the
issue of separate accounting. Exxon had argued that Wisconsin should
use separate accounting rather than apportionment and thereby include
income only from the marketing activities. After Exxon, however, a com-
pany's separate accounting for tax purposes will not be binding on a
state.53 Although a company may still use separate accounting to prove
Southern Peru's outstanding stock and received 35% of its copper output. The Court, how-
ever, found other aspects of the relationship controlling. Pursuant to a management con-
tract with Southern Peru, ASARCO could elect only 6 of the 13 directors, though a vote of 8
was necessary to pass any resolution. ASARCO was only one of Southern Peru's stockhold-
ers; a unanimous vote of all four was required to alter the articles or by-laws. Based on these
and other findings of the trial court, the Court found Southern Peru to be a discrete enter-
prise, operating independently of ASARCO and not otherwise controlled by ASARCO. The
majority rejected Idaho's argument that corporate purpose should define a unitary business.
458 U.S. at 362.
50. In Woolworth, the Court examined the three requisite elements of a unitary busi-
ness. See supra text accompanying note 31. First, the Court found "little functional integra-
tion" between the parent and the subsidiary. The subsidiaries were free to choose their own
store sites, advertising, accounting, legal purchasing, personnel, training, and financing. 458
U.S. at 364-365. Second, the Court found that management was not centralized and that
"each subsidiary operated as a distinct business enterprise." Id. at 366. Finally, the Court
observed, that economies of scale were intentionally ignored. Id. at 366-368. Support for the
last two elements-centralized management and economies of scale-was evidenced by sep-
arate offices (with one exception), and the absence of exchange of personnel, central mer-
chandise or management training, any central nonretailing policies or tax planning, depart-
ment or section devoted to overseeing the foreign subsidiary operations, or formal
interchange of ideas between parent and subsidiary management. Id.
The Court did not find pervasive the presence of several common directors, frequent
informed communications, or that major financial decisions by the subsidiaries required
parent approval. Also, the Court gave little weight to the fact that the parent and subsidiary
published unsolicited financial statements. 458 U.S. at 368-369.
51. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 328, quoting Bass, 266 U.S. 271, 283 (1924).
52. Exxon, 447 U.S. at 221.
53. Id.
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that certain income is unrelated to the business' activities,54 it cannot use
separate accounting to avoid a state's application of its apportionment
formula if a portion of the unitary business is found to exist within the
state.55
The type of income received by the corporation has no bearing on
whether a state will be allowed to tax. Only in Exxon was the taxable
income dispute over operating income. Operating income is clearly more
susceptible to taxation under the unitary principle, since that money
would be used to further the business, part of which has been established
to exist in the taxing state. In Mobil, however, the dispute concerned div-
idend income received by a nondomiciliary corporation. The Court's deci-
sion to allow taxation established that the due process clause does not
preclude inclusion of foreign source dividend income from subsidiaries
and affiliates in the apportionable tax base of a nondomiciliary corpora-
tion.5 Dividend income was also at issue in ASARCO and Woolworth,
and though the Court held these sums not taxable by the states, the deci-
sion was based on the absence of a unitary business relationship rather
than the type of income.
5 7
The analysis in Mobil shows that the corporate form of a business
enterprise will not be a decisive factor in determining the existence of a
unitary business. The Mobil Court stated:
Superficially, intercorporate division might appear to be a more at-
tractive basis for limiting apportionability. But the form of business
organization may have nothing to do with the underlying unity or di-
versity of a business enterprise. Had appellant [Mobil] chosen to op-
erate its foreign subsidiaries as separate divisions of a legally as well
as functionally integrated enterprise, there is little doubt that the in-
come derived from those divisions would meet due process require-
ments for apportionability. . . Transforming the same income into
dividends from legally separate entities works no change in the under-
lying economic realities of a unitary business, and accordingly it ought
not to affect the apportionability of income the parent receives.58
Thus, the multicorporate form will not in and of itself shield income dis-
tributed as dividends from apportionment in the enterprise's tax base if a
unitary business is found to exist, "for the linchpin of apportionability in
the field of state income taxation is the unitary business principle." 59 The
54. In determining whether certain income will be taxed, the Court "looks to the 'un-
derlying economic realities of a unitary business,' and ... [if the income will be nontaxable,
it] must derive from 'unrelated business activity' which constitutes a 'discrete business en-
terprise.'" Id. at 223-224 (quoting Mobil, 445 U.S. at 439, 441-442).
55. Weissman, supra note 8, at 81. See also John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
38 Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 569 (1951), appeal dismissed, 343 U.S. 939 (1952); Butler Bros., 315
U.S. 501.
56. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 126.
57. ASARCO, 458 U.S. at 330; Woolworth, 458 U.S. at 372.
58. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 440-441.
59. Id. at 439.
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taxpayer must show that underlying economic realities warrant the for-
mal and legal distinction between the separate corporate entities.60
Exxon and Mobil struck fear in the hearts of corporate executives;
the opinions reflected a continuation of judicial restraint from earlier
cases, but afforded no further delineation of the unitary business or re-
strictions imposed by the due process clause. The Court's unwillingness
to announce a single definition of a unitary business was equivalent to an
announcement that, absent congressional action, the states would con-
tinue to enjoy broad leeway in taxing a portion of a corporation's world-
wide income."1
With the decision of ASARCO and Woolworth came rekindled hope
that the Court, in the absence of repeatedly requested congressional ac-
tion, would limit the scope of the states' taxing power. Some thought this
would signal a return by the Court to a closer economic analysis of inter-
state and international tax issues. Further, in the absence of due process
restrictions, surely the Court would seize upon the commerce clause. The
Supreme Court's most recent opinion addressing the unitary taxation
method, Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,62 corrected
these ill-placed hopes.
Container is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Illinois whose
business activities involved the production and distribution of paper-
board and paperboard-based packaging.13 Container controlled twenty
foreign subsidiaries in Western Europe and Latin America during the
three-year period at issue, though Container and its subsidiaries were
highly decentralized.6"'
In its due process clause argument, Container focused on one of the
major inherent problems of formula apportionment, alleging that formula
apportionment was inaccurate due to differing wage and profit rates be-
tween the parent corporation and its foreign subsidiaries.65 Such an argu-
ment, however, had little chance of success after the Court's decision in
Mobil, 6 on which the Container court relied heavily. Because Container
was found to be carrying on a unitary business, "a state may apply an
apportionment formula to the taxpayer's total income to arrive at a rough
approximation of the corporate income attributable to activities within
the state."67 While neither formula is perfect, the Court found that sepa-
rate accounting results in no greater accuracy than formula apportion-
ment. Only gross miscalculations of taxes will warrant a state tax being
60. Id. at 440-441.
61. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 151.
62. 463 U.S. 159.
63. Container, 117 Cal. App. 3d 988, 991, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123 (1981).
64. Id.
65. See 463 U.S. at 174-5, where Container disclosed the amount of money required to
produce one dollar of net income during the years in question.
66. See supra text accompanying note 61.
67. 117 Cal. App. 3d at 1003, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
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struck down, and here the Court found none that would merit such a
remedy."
III. COMMERCE CLAUSE & FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
The use of the unitary method of taxation prompted complaints of
commerce clause violations from many corporations. The Supreme Court
had identified the major restraint imposed by the commerce clause to be
that a state tax may not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce
by subjecting a multijurisdictional enterprise to taxation not borne by a
single jurisdictional business. 9 Such a situation arises due to multiple
taxation.
The Supreme Court addressed the commerce clause restrictions on
implementing the unitary tax in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.70
Complete Auto added predictability to commerce clause challenges to
unitary taxes by establishing a four-part test. The unitary tax will be up-
held if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the tax-
ing State, if [it is] fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the
State. '"71
However, when a foreign corporation is taxed, internationally ac-
cepted standards establishing principles for taxation become involved.
Two important sets of rules for this purpose are: "(1) those defining a
permanent establishment, such as a branch or subsidiary corporation,
that can be taxed by the host country; and (2) those specifying the proce-
dures to be used to account for transactions between related parties in
measuring the income of a permanent establishment. 72 Under this sec-
ond set of rules, the branch or subsidiary is to be treated as a separate
entity. This is often called the "water's edge" or "arm's length" rule. It is
practiced by the federal government 73 and the Internal Revenue Service
68. The Court found that only a 14% discrepancy in taxable income allocable to Cali-
fornia resulted from application of the unitary tax as would have resulted from Container's
own separate accounting method. 463 U.S. at 174-5 nn. 11-12, 184. Although 14% seems not
to be an insignificant amount, the Court compared it to the situation in Hans Rees. North
Carolina's one-factor formula assessing taxable income on the basis of tangible property was
struck down after a finding that a 250% discrepancy in taxable income attributable to the
taxing entity resulted from the application of the formula method. 283 U.S. at 135. Hans
Rees imposes a theoretical limit on the permissible distortion resulting from formula appor-
tionment. It is unlikely, however, that a taxpayer will be able to make the requisite showing
that "there is no rational relationship between the income attributed to the state and the
intrastate values of the enterprise." Container, 463 U.S. at 180 (quoting Exxon, 447 U.S. at
220) and that the income apportioned to a state is "out of all appropriate proportion to the
business transacted in that state." Id. (quoting Hans Rees, 283 U.S. 123, 135.)
69. See Mobil, 445 U.S. at 442-446.
70. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
71. Id. at 279.
72. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 998.
73. Id., at 998 n. 18.
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in the form of section 482 adjustments. 74 It is also used in concluding
foreign tax treaties."' This approach treats transactions occurring be-
tween related foreign and domestic corporations as being performed at
arm's length: "income attributable to the foreign entity is calculated by
reference to a transaction between individual parties.
76
The significance of the divergent practices of federal and state taxing
authorities arises from the power of Congress "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations."'77 Moreover, the Constitution forbids states from making
separate arrangements with foreign governments.7" Suggestions to make
the states conform to federal practice have long been discussed and con-
sidered. 9 Yet Congress has still failed to act on any proposed legislation.
]lased on this lethargy, the Court has been reluctant to prescribe that
states' taxing practices emulate the federal mode. In Mobil, where such
treatment was said to be mandatory, the Court stated, "[a]bsent some
explicit directive from Congress, we cannot infer that treatment of foreign
income at the federal level mandates identical treatment by the States."80
The Court did not take a definitive stand on the issue until Japan
Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles."1 In Japan Line, the Court found
unconstitutional Los Angeles' local property tax on Japanese cargo con-
tainers which had already been taxed in Japan. The Court held that the
commerce clause will not allow a state to "impose a [fairly apportioned,]
non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax on foreign-owned instrumen-
talities (cargo containers) of international commerce"8 used exclusively
in furtherance of such commerce. Although it recognized that "interstate
commerce must bear its fair share of the state tax burden, 8 3 the Court
said that multiple taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce
Clause. ' The Court, therefore, identified two more hurdles, in addition to
the requirements of Complete Auto, 8 that must be overcome to validate
74. "Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code and the regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to the Code make it clear that commonly controlled entities are to be treated as if they
were separate entities for the purpose of determining taxable income from intercompany
transactions." Weissman, supra note 8, at 54. See Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1) (1968). The reg-
ulations under section 482 are designed to require that all intercompany transactions be
conducted at arm's length and allow the Internal Revenue Service to intervene by correcting
any understatements of income or other misallocations which do not accurately reflect the
tax conduct of two otherwise uncontrolled taxpayers.
75. For example, the OECD treaty and the model income tax treaty issued in June 1981
reflect a "water's edge" rule. SPEciAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 998.
76. Id.
77. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1.
79. See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
80. 445 U.S. at 448.
81. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
82. Id. at 435-36.
83. Id. at 444. (quoting Washington Revenue Dept. v. Ass'n of Washington Stevedoring
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1978)).
84. Id. at 446.
85. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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a tax on interstate commerce.8 6 These factors are "the enhanced risk of
multiple taxation" that may result from simultaneous application of state
taxes and taxes imposed by a foreign government,"7 and the possibility
that "a state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair
federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential."88
Japan Line can be distinguished from earlier cases where multiple
taxation was alleged. For example, in Mobil, the Court noted that "the
factors favoring use of the allocation method in property taxation have no
immediate applicability to an income tax."8 8 Also, Japan Line involved
multiple taxation at the international level, whereas Mobil, which had
conceded the power of the state of its commercial domicile to tax 100% of
its foreign source dividends, was ultimately concerned solely with multi-
ple taxation among the states. 0 While multiple taxation resulting from
different states' taxes might burden foreign commerce, the Court could
ultimately remove the burden, if it so chose, because it has the power to
mandate and restrict state taxing measures. In Japan Line, however, the
Court lacked a similar power since it had no authority to dictate the tax-
ing measures of one of the taxing entities-Japan. The Court, therefore,
lacked the ability to enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing
bodies.8 ' Moreover, actual multiple taxation existed in Japan Line, since
Japan had already taxed the full value of the cargo containers.92 Conse-
quently, any levy on them by a state would result in double taxation.
These factors compelled the Court to deny Los Angeles the power to tax
the Japanese containers at all.
93
The second restriction imposed on unitary taxation by the commerce
clause after Japan Line was that a state tax could not prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice when regulating commercial re-
lations with foreign governments." The Court looked at factors other
than the fact that Japan Line involved a foreign taxing entity. Also miti-
86. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 448-51. The Japan Line Court noted some of the problems inherent in the
taxation of entities involved in international commerce:
A state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce may frustrate the
achievement of federal uniformity in several ways. If the State imposes an ap-
portioned tax, international disputes over reconciling apportionment formulae
may arise. If a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the international tax
structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against
American-owned instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions . . . If other
States followed the taxing State's example, various instrumentalities of com-
merce could be subject to varying degrees of multiple taxation.
Id. at 450 (footnote omitted).
89. Mobil, 445 U.S. at 448.
90. Id.
91. Japan Lines, 441 U.S. at 447.
92. Id. at 452 n. 17.
93. Id. at 447-48.
94. Id. at 449.
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gating against implementation of the unitary tax was evidence of federal
government intent in the rationale behind the Customs Convention on
Containers-to remove impediments to the use of containers as instru-
ments of international traffic" 5-to which both Japan and the United
States were signatories.
After adopting additional criteria for determining the validity of a
tax on foreign instrumentalities, the Court again had to consider what
level of risk was appropriate. Two possible tests were available. The
Court rejected the predominant national interest test, which called for
national intervention if the state action fell clearly within the domain of
national interests." Instead, it adopted the serious national harm test
which was much more susceptible to the interests of states' autonomy.
This test requires a showing of serious economic or political harm being
done to the nation by failure of states to harmonize tax practices with the
federal government and foreign governments.
97
In Container, the Court did not articulate further restrictions on
states' authority to tax and thus did not broaden the factors in Japan
Line. Container based its commerce clause claim on the issue of multiple
taxation.9 8 Before the Supreme Court, the issue was whether California
was required to employ the arm's length method of taxation.9 Since the
claim involved international commerce, the two additional requirements
mandated by Japan Line had to be applied.
In considering the first of Japan Line's criteria-that a state's tax
should not increase the risk of multiple taxation, 0 0 the Court distin-
guished property tax in Japan Line and income tax at issue in Container.
The Court conceded the existence of double taxation, but it indicated
that, absent demanding that the state not tax the multinational corpora-
tion at all, it was unable to present a cure. The Court refused to favor
either the separate accounting method or the formula apportionment
method since both result in double taxation."' The Container Court
95. Id. at 453.
96. SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 1002.
97. Id.
98. Through its method of separate accounting, Container alleged that during the years
in question, California's apportionment formula attributed an average of four million dollars
more to domestic operations and four million dollars less to Container's foreign subsidies.
Weissman, supra note 8, at 90 (citing Container's Brief). Furthermore, Container claimed
that in one instance the California formula apportioned slightly less to Colombia than the
Colombia subsidiaries paid in Colombian income taxes, while Container's Dutch subsidiary
paid taxes equivalent to 97% of the pretax income attributed to the Netherlands by the
formula. Based on these facts, Container argued that the tax violated the Court's two con-
siderations outlined in Japan Line.
99. Container, 463 U.S. at 163.
100. Id. at 185-6.
101. The Court noted that, although "double taxation is a constitutionally disfavored
state of affairs, particularly in the international context, Japan Line does not require
forebearance so extreme or one-sided [as to force upon the state the separate accounting
methodology]." Id. at 193.
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found no cure for multiple taxation, and refused either to espouse an ab-
solute prohibition against double taxation in the foreign commerce
realm' O2 or to require a state to adopt the arm's length approach.
The Court next considered whether California's tax of Container
would "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
essential."1 0 3 A state's tax would "violate this so-called 'one-voice' stan-
dard if it either implicates foreign policy issues .. .or violates a clear
federal directive.' 0 4 Noting that the most obvious foreign policy implica-
tion is the threat that a state tax might offend U.S. trading partners and
lead them to retaliate, the Court articulated three factors that prevented
California's tax of Container from having adverse foreign policy
implications.0 5
First, the Court distinguished Japan Line, where the California tax
in question created an automatic asymmetry in international taxation.'06
Second, the Court emphasized that the tax here was imposed on a domes-
tic corporation rather than a foreign enterprise. 0 7 In a footnotes 08 the
Court stated that this factor would be less important in a case where a
domestic corporation was owned by foreign interests. 0 9 Finally, the Court
noted that Container was subject to California tax in one way or another,
and that the amount it paid was more a function of California's tax rate
than of its allocation method." The Court estimated that disfavorable
foreign response to this factor would be at most "attenuated.""'
The Court also concluded that California's tax did not violate a fed-
eral directive, basing its decision primarily on its reading of congressional
intent."2 The Court first noted that federal tax statutes do not preempt
state use of the unitary tax."13 Although tax treaties usually mandate the
use of the arm's length methodology, that requirement is usually waived
by either signatory country in regard to its own domestic corporations.
Moreover, none of the tax treaties have prescribed a specific tax system
for states."" Finally, the Court cited Congress' failure to enact legislation
102. Id. at 189.
103. Id. at 186 (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448). Interestingly, the Court voiced
its own feelings of incompetence in trying to delineate foreign policy. Nevertheless, it pro-
ceeded to enumerate criteria for determination of state infringement on federal turf in the
foreign policy context. Id. at 194.
104. Id. at 193-4.
105. Id. at 194.
106. Id. at 194-5 (quoting Japan Line 441 U.S. at 453).
107. Id. at 195.
108. Id. n. 32.
109. See infra discussion of foreign-based multinational corporations.
110. Container, 463 U.S. at 195.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 196.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court also noted that on at least one occasion, Congress has attached a
reservation declining to consent to a provision that would restrict states' authority to use
the apportionment formula. See 124 CONG. REc. 18400, 19076 (1978).
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regulating state taxation.'1 5
IV. THE PREDICAMENT OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS WITH DOMESTIC
SUBSIDIARIES
The Court's decision in Container left open the question of whether
the worldwide unitary method may be applied to tax the worldwide in-
come of a foreign corporation that has a U.S. domestic subsidiary. It has
been predicted that the next case regarding the unitary tax will be such a
case." Westinghouse is currently seeking certiorari, hoping that the
Court will reach the issue of the appropriateness of applying the unitary
tax to domestic subsidiaries of a foreign corporation on its set of facts.1 17
Similarly, Alcan Aluminum, Ltd., a Canadian corporation with a U.S.
subsidiary subject to California's unitary tax, is challenging its imposition
by seeking certiorari after the District Court's dismissal of the action on
the ground that it lacked standing to sue." 8 The Supreme Court refused
to hear Shell Petroleum, N.V.'s appeal, despite the fact that the ten EEC
countries urged the Court to review it."' Nevertheless, Shell illustrates
some of the major problems inherent in a situation where a state seeks to
assess taxes due on a domestic subsidiary whose parent is a foreign mul-
tinational corporation.
Shell Petroleum, N.V. (SPNV), a Netherlands holding company hav-
ing a place of business in the Netherlands, alleged that the California Tax
Board assessed or planned to assess additional taxes under the California
tax apportionment formula on two of its subsidiaries-Shell Oil and Scal-
lop Nuclear. SPNV contended that the Board, in finding a unitary busi-
ness to exist, would combine the income of all the companies worldwide
that are more than fifty percent owned, directly or indirectly, by
SPNV.12 0 Such an application, SPNV alleged, would result in gross dis-
proportion between the income attributed to California activities and the
income actually earned by Shell Oil and Scallop Nuclear in California.' 2 '
As discussed earlier, the earlier Supreme Court cases have continu-
ally held that the taxpayer's accounting system will not impeach the va-
lidity of the taxing formula. This is true even when factors affecting inter-
national commerce and trade relations were found to exist.'22 The
rationale for application of formula apportionment in these situations,
115. Container, 463 U.S. at 196-7.
116. See New Unitary Approach Mulled in Wake of Treasury Decision, 21 TAX NoTEs
69 (1983) [hereinafter cited as New Unitary Approach].
117. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 55 N.Y.2d 364, 434 N.E.2d. 1044, 449
N.Y.S.2d 677 (1982), prob. juris. noted, 459 U.S. 1144 (1983).
118. Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 558 F. Supp. 624
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
119. Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, 570 F. Supp. 58 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
120. Shell Petroleum N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 1983).
121. Id.
122. See Mobil, 445 U.S. 425; Exxon, 447 U.S. 207; Container, 463 U.S. 159.
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however, is much weaker. The only economic or constitutional justifica-
tion for applying the formula apportionment method is based on the as-
sumption that a dollar spent on sales, property or payroll in one jurisdic-
tion will yield the same result if applied to the same use in another
jurisdiction.'2 3 The assumption rarely holds true when applied to various
states, but it is never true when applied to different nations, whose econo-
mies and societies are far from homogeneous. The costs of property, pay-
roll and sales are usually much lower in foreign countries, 12 4 resulting in a
disproportionate amount of income being attributed to the United States,
and more specifically, the state applying the unitary tax method.1
25
Similar circumstances prompted Alcan to challenge California's im-
position of tax on the unitary business it found to exist.22 Alcan owned a
subsidiary that conducted business in California. Although the subsidiary
operated in the red, the formula attributed income to the California sub-
sidiary since California combined the worldwide income of the Canadian
parent corporation. The truth of the subsidiary's losses was substantiated
by the fact that the Internal Revenue Service had investigated Alcan sev-
eral times during the years in which California sought to assess taxes
(1972-81), and it determined that section 482 adjustments'2 7 were neces-
sary. That Alcan shut down its California operations further shows the
truth of the subsidiary's unprofitability. 28 Foreign trading partners are
understandably aggravated at the prospect of paying taxes on a business
that is already losing money, merely because of its location within a uni-
tary tax state, and threats of relocation and retaliation have followed. 29
The foreign multinational corporation will not be able to protect its
rights adequately when state taxing authorities impose a tax on its world-
wide income simply because the corporation's subsidiary is located within
a unitary tax state. Although the domestic subsidiary will be able to bring
123. See generally, Smith, supra note 5.
124. Sony Corporation attested to this fact before the task force. See infra notes 149-
159 and accompanying text. According to Sony, a disproportionate amount of income is
attributed to the United States under the apportionment method because the costs of prop-
erty, payroll, and sales are higher. Sony cited its specific problem to be the discrepancy in
efficiency between its Japanese and Californian television manufacturing operations: even
though its Japanese operations are more efficient, part of the income generated by the oper-
ation is attributed to California because the costs in California are higher. Most of the com-
plaints lodged at the Nov. 16 task force hearing concerned the distortions of income in favor
of the taxing state resulting from application of worldwide formula apportionment. Shep-
pard, Unitary Group's Task Force Begins to Assess Proof of Harm, 21 TAX NOTES 821
(1983).
125. Weissman, supra note 8, at 56. Another factor that will contribute to the distor-
tion in income attributed to a jurisdiction is if the activities of two components of a unitary
business are not matched; i.e., one is labor intensive while another is capital intensive. Also,
fair attribution may be difficult due to fluctuating exchange rates.
126. Alcan Aluminum Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 539 F. Supp. 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
127. See supra note 74.
128. Alcan, 539 F. Supp. at 513-14.
129. See generally Smith, supra note 5.
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suit in the state court to protest the imposition of a tax that has already
been paid, that subsidiary cannot invoke a tax treaty between the U.S.
and the country in whose territory its parent corporation is domiciled.
This is true even though the spirit of the treaty is clearly violated. Simi-
larly, the foreign parent will not be allowed to bring suit in the federal
courts because it lacks standing. The parent can invoke the treaty rights;
however, they are likely to be held inapplicable since the tax at issue was
levied on the subsidiary-not the parent, and for matters of standing, the
presence of "unitary business" will not be considered. 30
V. CONGRESSIONAL/EXECUTIVE RESPONSE
As the phenomenon of unitary tax has burgeoned into an omnipres-
ent onus on corporations, and the problems accompanying the method
have become more and more visible, Congress has offered little solace.'
Although Congress has been called upon to allay the difficulties, its re-
sponse thus far has yielded only narrow legislation that falls far short of
an adequate remedy.132 On other occasions, Congress has feigned interest,
evidenced by bills and hearings that, in the end, have yielded no legisla-
130. See Smith, supra note 5; see generally Shell 570 F. Supp. 58.
131. Congress did not exercise its commerce power to legislate in the state tax area
until 1959. Hellerstein, supra note 1, at 131. See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1964, ch. 106, § 41, 13
Stat. 111 (codified as amended, at 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1976)).
In 1959, Congress for the first time passed legislation limiting the power of the states to
tax interstate commerce. See Act of Sept. 19, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976)). This was a specific response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Northwestern State Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). Northwest-
ern held that a state could constitutionally impose a nondiscriminatory, fairly apportioned
net income tax upon a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce in the
taxing state. A mere seven months after Northwestern, Congress enacted legislation estab-
lishing a minimum threshold of intrastate activities that must be exceeded by a foreign
corporation in a state before that state may subject such a corporation to a tax measured by
net income. 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1976).
One of the other pieces of federal legislation limiting state tax authority under Con-
gress' commerce powers was likewise a direct reaction to a Supreme Court decision. In Ev-
ansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972), the
Court upheld enplaning charges as reasonable amounts charged to defray the costs of build-
ing or maintaining airport facilities used by the passengers. Congress responded by prohibit-
ing the states from imposing user charges in connection with carriage of persons in air com-
merce. 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976).
132. Some legislation has surfaced, though its scope is limited. Hellerstein, supra note
1, at 113 nn. 3 & 4. See 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1976) (prohibiting states from imposing electrical
energy taxes discriminatorily against out-of-state purchasers); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d) (1976)
(prohibiting states from imposing stock transfer taxes when only nexus between the state
and the transaction is the presence of a transfer agency); 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976) (prohibit-
ing states from imposing user charges in connection with the carriage of persons in air com-
merce); 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1978) (prohibiting states from taxing railroad property more
heavily than other industrial and commercial property); Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 92-296 § 3, 94 Stat. 793 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11503a) (prohibiting states from
taxing motor carrier property more heavily than other industrial and commercial property).
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tion. 33 In recent opinions, 34 the Supreme Court has invited Congress, if
it is dissatisfied with the Court's laissez-faire approach, to enact meaning-
ful legislation. 3 ' Bills have been introduced in Congress which propose to
prohibit the states from using the worldwide unitary method,3 6 but no
hearings have yet been scheduled. 37
A major problem with the proposed legislation is that, without clarifi-
cation of the Administration's stance, it is doubtful whether the legisla-
tion can muster enough support.' The Executive Branch, which rarely
involves itself in the area of state taxation, has been conspicuously active
concerning the topic of unitary tax,3 9 though its signals have been ambiv-
alent and increasingly phlegmatic. The Administration filed an amicus
curiae brief supporting the anti-unitary tax position in Chicago Bridge &
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.;" however, its failure to file one in
Container despite urgings from corporate interests and foreign govern-
ments" might have been critical."" After the Container case had been
decided, foreign representatives again approached the administration,
urging that it file for Supreme Court rehearing of the case." 3 Great Brit-
133. Chairman's Report on the Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group Activi-
ties, Issues, and Recommendations, 24 TAx NoTEs 581 (1984)(hereinafter cited as Chair-
man's Report); Additional Views of Worldwide Unitary Taxation Working Group Mem-
bers, 25 TAx NoTEs 1043 (1984). See infra note 151.
134. See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1978); Washington Revenue,
435 U.S. 734, 749 (1978).
135. The Court's decisions, however, have given states substantial leeway. See Moor-
man, 437 U.S. 267; Washington Revenue, 435 U.S. 734; National Geo. Soc'y v. State Bd. of
Equilization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977); Complete Auto, 430 U.S. 274; Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
136. Bernick, Cabinet Council Recommends Anti-Unitary Position, 20 TAx NOTEs 901
(1983).
137. Id.
138. Id. Bob Ragland, Director of Taxation at the National Ass'n of Manufacturers,
said that, without support from the Administration, supporters of anti-unitary tax legisla-
tion "aren't going to go out on a limb" for the legislation. New Unitary Approach, supra
note 116, at 69.
139. See, e.g., Japan Line (U.S. filed a brief and argued as amicus curiae); House For-
eign Source Income Hearings on H.R. 5076 at 38-55 (statement of Hon. Doland C. Lubick,
Asst. Sec. of Treas. for Tax Policy); Tax Treaties with the United Kingdom, the Republic
of Korea, and the Republic of the Phillipines: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. of For-
eign Relations, 95th Congress, 1st Sess., 13-40 (1977) (statement of Hon. Laurence N.
Woolworth, Asst. Sec'y of Treas. for Tax Policy) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Tax
Treaties].
140. Appeal dismissed, 463 U.S. 1220 (1983).
141. New Unitary Approach, supra note 116, at 69.
142. The Supreme Court did not find the failure to file a brief dispositive of the Ad-
ministration's view, but concluded nonetheless that, in the Administration's view, federal
interests were "not seriously threatened by California's decision to apply the unitary busi-
ness concept and formula apportionment." Container, 463 U.S. at 196.
143. Administration Seeks Unitary Method Compromise, 20 TAX Noras 1026 (1983).
See, e.g., Letter from Marc Lalonde, Canadian Minister of Finance, to Donald T. Regan,
U.S. Secretary of the Treasure, (Aug. 8, 1983), reprinted in 20 TAx NoTEs 684 (1983). Letter
from Nigel Lawson, United Kingdom's Chancellor of the Exchequer, to U.S. Treasury Don-
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ain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was especially vocal. 1 4  More-
over, after a meeting of the Cabinet Council on Economic Affairs, top
Reagan Administration officials recommended to President Reagan that
the Administration oppose the worldwide unitary tax. 145 Reagan instead
referred the issue back to the Cabinet Council,'4 6 an action that was seen
as a stalling tactic.1"7
At the same time as President Reagan announced his intent not to
file a petition for rehearing of the Container case, the Administration an-
nounced the creation of a working group 14 8 to study the international ap-
plication of worldwide unitary taxation.149 The working group held its
first meeting in November, 1983.150 Composed of representatives of the
federal government, state governments, and the U.S. business commu-
nity, 1 5 1 the group was assembled to consider: the definition of a unitary
aid T. Regan, (July 12, 1983), reprinted in 20 TAX NoTEs 450 (1983). Letter from James Q.
Riordan, Senior Vice President of Mobil Corporation, to Donald T. Regan, U.S. Treasury
Secretary, (Aug. 9, 1983), reprinted in 20 TAX NoTs 692 (1983). Representatives of the
states' interests, while pleased that the administration failed to file an amicus curiae brief
or to petition the court for rehearing in Container, were still not entirely satisfied. For ex-
ample, James Rosapepe of the Multistate Tax Commission, indicated that the Administra-
tion's action "fell short of the pro-unitary position that the states were urging the Adminis-
tration to adopt." New Unitary Approach, supra note 116, at 69.
144. See, e.g., Shears, Reagan Snubs Thatcher's Efforts to Halt U.S. Unitary Taxes,
The Daily Telegraph, Sept. 24, 1983, at 6.
145. Bernick, supra note 136, at 901.
146. Bernick, Reagan Sends Back Cabinet Recommendation on Unitary Tax, 20 TAX
NOTES 965 (1983).
147. Id.
148. Id. This act, too, can be viewed as foot dragging. The creation of a working group
was the least decisive of four options suggested and presented to the Cabinet Council by a
Treasury Department option paper. The other options presented were as follows: First, it
described the Conable-Mathias position, now contained in S. 1225 (H.R. 2196) that the
states not be permitted to use the unitary method. Another option ... was that it do noth-
ing on the ground that no federal question is involved. A third option . . . was that the
application of the unitary method be limited in the case of foreign corporations with U.S.
subsidiaries. Sheppard, Chapoton Labels Unitary Tax Method an Irritant in International
Relations, 21 TAX NoTEs 439 (1983).
149. Reagan announced that the purpose of the working group was to study the unitary
issue and to develop a federal policy on the unitary method that is "conducive to harmoni-
ous international economic relations, while also respecting the fiscal rights and privileges of
individual states." New Unitary Approach, supra note 116, at 69. (citing press release of
Donald T. Regan, Sept. 23, 1983).
150. Sheppard, Unitary Method Group Tries to Define Problem, 21 TAX NoTEs 525
(1983).
151. The members of the Working Group, who were chosen by the Administration, are:
Phillip Caldwell, Ford Motor Co. & Business Roundtable
Owen L. Clarke, National Ass'n of Tax Administrators
Kent Conrad, Multistate Tax Commission
Gov. George Deukmejian, California
Clifton C. Garvin, Exxon Corp.
Robert E. Gilmore, Caterpillar Tractor Co.
Gov. Scott Matheson, Utah
Charles I. McCarty, BATUS, Inc.
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business; application of the three-factor (payroll, sales, and property) ap-
portionment formula in the international context; uniform rate setting
and information sharing among the states; the desirability of federal leg-
islation; and the possibility of information sharing between federal and
state governments. 152 Each member of the working group in turn selected
a representative to serve on the task force, whose purpose was to provide
technical expertise in implementing the policies decided on by the work-
ing group.' 53
Representatives of states' interests have been particularly obstinate.
They have refused to consider any options until some national harm has
been demonstrated, 5 " and have threatened to boycott if the alternative of
federal legislation was not withdrawn. 155 They became a bit more amiable
when it was pointed out that their very presence in the work group indi-
cated that the Reagan Administration considered use by the states of the
unitary tax harmful to national interests.5' The states' representatives
have also pushed for "full accountability," alleging that double taxation
was rarely at issue, but that, instead, corporations had income on which
they paid no tax.157 Assuming that corporations do have income that is
not required to be reported anywhere, the states would require that all
income be reported somewhere, or a legitimate excuse be given for not
reporting. 58 Although this approach seems more than slightly avaricious,
Peter McGowan, Safeway Stores
Lee Moffitt, Florida
David E. Nething, National Conf. of State Legislatures
John R. Opel, International Business Machines
Norma Pace, American Paper Institute
Edmund T. Pratt, Jr., Pfizer, Inc.
Gov. James R. Thompson, Illinois
John B. Tucker, New Hampshire
Administration representatives included:
Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury
John E. Chapoton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy
Robert B. Hawkins, Jr., Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
Charles E. McLure, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Analysis, Staff Director
John A. Svahn, Assistant to the President for Policy Development
W. Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
152. Sheppard, supra note 148, at 439.
153. Sheppard, supra note 150.
154. Sheppard, supra note 124, at 821.
155. Sheppard, Federal Legislation Haunts Unitary Method Working Group, 21 TAX
NOTES 1011 (1983).
156. Sheppard, supra note 124, at 821. At the same time, Administration officials pro-
duced letters from eight countries evidencing dissatisfaction with the use of the unitary
method. Among those countries were Australia, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. More-
over, it was assumed that other countries, such as Great Britain, were seeking to redress
their grievances through the State Department.
157. Sheppard, supra note 150, at 525-26; Sheppard, Unitary Task Force Seeks to De-
fine Full Accountability, 21 TAX NOTES 132 (1983).
158. Sheppard, supra note 157, at 132.
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"full accountability" has been adopted as a goal of both the task force
and the working group. States have said that they will consider an alter-
native to formula apportionment only if they are convinced that business
investment and jobs are at stake, and they can be sure that they will lose
no revenue. 59 Given the obstinance of the states and the equally firm
positions of corporate interests, it is not surprising that the group's study
has resulted in less than revolutionary findings and resolutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
For several reasons, states support the unitary tax method over the
separate accounting method, the only apparent alternative.' The pri-
mary interest states have in the unitary method is the revenue its imple-
mentation generates. States also complain that the use of the separate
accounting method would create serious administrative problems. States
also argue from the vantage point of fairness, positing that they will be
unable to accurately assess the tax liability of an enterprise if formal ap-
portionment is disallowed. Tax burdens will be shifted inequitably to
smaller businesses if the multinationals are allowed to avoid their tax
burden. Proponents of the unitary method argue that concepts of state
sovereignty require that they be allowed to employ formula apportion-
ment and cite self-correcting forces, such as judicial supervision and state
competition, as sufficient to prevent the occurrence of national harm.
The difficulties created by the use of separate accounting, however,
are far less burdensome than those created by the use of the unitary
method. Either method engenders administrative problems, but the bur-
den seems much more appropriately placed on states, who can retrieve
tax information from the federal tax authorities'' than to burden corpo-
rations with massive paperwork with which they might be unable to
comply.
Use of the unitary method in the international arena may have seri-
ous ramifications. Discontented trading partners may choose to trade
with other countries rather than risk imposition of tax on the worldwide
income of their own multinationals. The lack of tax harmonization may
lead other countries to retaliate against United States interests operating
in their territory and may lead to serious impairment of trade relations,
including the inability to conclude tax treaties.'6 2
159. Sheppard, supra note 157.
160. Sheppard, supra note 150, at 525.
161. At least some of the information necessary to assess tax liability under the sepa-
rate accounting method is already given to the states, since most states' laws require that
the federal government report to the states when making a § 482 adjustment. Sheppard,
supra note 124, at 822.
162. The United States is party to at least 30 tax treaties. In testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, Laurence Woodworth, the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, reported:
We view tax treaties as an important element in the international economic
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The problems arising out of states' use of formula apportionment
demonstrate that, in the international arena, the unitary method should
not be used. Each argument advanced by proponents of the unitary
method is met by a problem that rises to the level of national harm and
cannot be easily resolved. Unfortunately, a resolution does not seem
forthcoming, since both the Judiciary and the Legislature await some def-
inite signal from the Executive. The Executive Branch should abandon its
stance of ambiguity and lethargy in favor of an affirmative position for
international trade, for ultimately, the condition of relations with our for-
eign trading partners will affect the nation and the individual states much
more than any problems proponents of the unitary tax can advance.
policy of the United States. One of our fundamental objectives is to minimize
impediments to free international flows of capital and technology and this ob-
jective is fostered by having the broadest possible network of income treaties.
Among the major impediments to free capital and technology flows are the
rules of national tax systems and their interaction with the systems of other
countries. Tax treaties seek to eliminate, or at least mitigate the impact of
these impediments.
Treaties accomplish the minimization of impediments by a variety of
means, the principal ones being the elimination or reduction of double taxation
and the elimination, to the extent possible, of discriminatory tax rules which
distinguish unreasonably between domestic and foreign investment.
At the same time, tax treaties also serve other policy objectives-for exam-
ple, the prevention of tax avoidance and evasion, and the fostering of interna-
tional cooperation between the tax authorities of Contracting States.
Hearings on Tax Treaties, supra note 139, at 28 (Statement of Asst. Sec. of the Treas.,
Laurence Woodworth).
Chapoton, in a speech before the National Association of State Bar Tax Sections, in
Washington, D.C., on Oct. 21, 1983, cited one instance of a country's refusal to continue tax




In Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Courts




Since the United States Supreme Court's approval of "minimum con-
tacts" as a basis for state court jurisdiction over persons not present in a
forum state, general purpose long-arm statutes have become part of the
jurisprudence of almost every state. These statutes typically subject a
party who is not present in a state to suit there, so long as the cause of
action arises from certain contacts of the party in the state. An example
of this type of long-arm jurisdiction is an action in one state to recover
for personal injuries incurred within its borders, but resulting from the
use of a defective product manufactured by a company with no physical
presence in the forum. The distribution of the defective product in the
forum state would generally be a sufficient state "contact" on which to
assert personal jurisdiction over the distant manufacturer.'
There is, however, no general federal law akin to a state long-arm
statute which authorizes in personam jurisdiction in a federal district
court. Such a void restricts the court's authority over persons who cannot
be served with process within the geographic boundaries of the state in
which the district court sits. Although some statutes that establish federal
rights and remedies do authorize extraterritorial service of process in
cases arising under them,2 most do not. Thus, for many federal causes of
action in which extraterritorial service of process is needed it is necessary
to rely on Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 Rule 4(e)
permits a federal plaintiff to utilize the long-arm jurisdiction provided by
the law of the state in which the district court sits.'
An approach to long-arm jurisdiction which invests a federal court
with the same degree of long-arm jurisdiction as a state court has little to
command for itself. As it concerns alien corporations, current law on ex-
traterritorial in personam jurisdiction in federal courts creates a signifi-
cant loophole through which these corporations can avoid personal juris-
* B.S. 1967, University of Illinois; J.D. 1970, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1971,
University of London. Partner, Davis, Graham, & Stubbs; Lecturer, University of Denver
College of Law.
1. Cf. World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
2. See infra note 7.
3. Rule 4(e) permits extraterritorial service of process pursuant to federal law (where it
is authorized) and, alternatively, under applicable law of the forum state.
4. See infra at 62.
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diction in any federal court. This situation arises from the fact that Rule
4(e) looks to state law principles of extraterritorial personal jurisdiction,
which (in both a statutory and constitutional sense), depend upon the
alien corporation's activities or contacts with the forum state. If these
contacts are insufficient to satisfy state statutory or fourteenth amend-
ment due process criteria, the state long-arm statute cannot be invoked,
and long-arm jurisdiction in that forum is unavailable. Moreover, if the
alien corporation has no state contacts sufficient to permit the use of a
state long-arm statute, but there are sufficient contacts with the United
States as a whole to satisfy a fifth amendment due process test of juris-
diction, current law would permit such a defendant to escape federal ju-
risdiction under most circumstances.
With regard to a foreign corporation,5 current reliance on state long-
arm jurisdiction may be interfering with policies embodied in the general
and specific federal venue statutes of Title 28 of the U.S. Code. For exam-
ple, section 1391(b), allows federal question cases to be brought, inter
alia, in the district in which the claim arose. That district may not, how-
ever, be the one in which the defendant has sufficient contacts under
state law to support in personam jurisdiction. Since a federal court is con-
stitutionally permitted to exercise jurisdiction over any domestic corpora-
tion regardless of where located, Rule 4(e)'s dependence on state contacts
effectively increases locational requirements of federal venue law (e.g.,
contacts with the forum state). When so viewed, Rule 4(e) may be unin-
tentionally derrogating from policies expressed in federal venue statutes
and may be an unnecessary circumscription on a plaintiff's choice of fora.
The discussion which follows examines the current status of federal
long-arm jurisdiction, the practical problems associated with its use, and
the constitutional limits on federal in personamn jurisdiction. The conclu-
sion drawn is that a generally applicable federal standard for long-arm
jurisdiction presents the possibility of a more rational assertion of in per-
sonam jurisdiction by federal courts over distant parties - especially
alien corporations. Such a standard should be authorized either by stat-
ute or as an amendment to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
for use in federal question cases.
II. THE PROBLEM: THE USE OF STATE LONG-ARM STATUTES IN FEDERAL
QUESTION CASES CREATES A GAP BETWEEN A FEDERAL COURT'S ACTUAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REACH OVER DISTANT PARTIES
Several federal remedial statutes contain provisions for extraterrito-
rial service of process in cases arising under them. Section 12 of the Clay-
ton Antitrust Act, for example, provides:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the anti-trust law against a cor-
5. In this article, "foreign corporation" refers to a United States domestic corporation
not registered to do business in a particular state. An "alien corporation" is one incorpo-
rated in a foreign country.
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poration may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is
an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or
transacts business, and all process in such cases may be served in the
district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
(emphasis added.)6
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is similar, authorizing
extraterritorial jurisdiction wherever a defendant is an inhabitant, trans-
acts business, or in any district in which an unlawful act has occurred.
7
Under the Clayton Act, the "transacts business" test of anti-trust
venue has permitted long-arm jurisdiction to be exercised over corporate
defendants with no physical presence in the forum state.6 Long-arm juris-
diction under the Securities Exchange Act has extended to defendants
with virtually no contacts with the forum state, when venue was based on
the occurrence of an unlawful act in that state.9
Many federally-created causes of action, however, contain no provi-
sions for extraterritorial service of process.10 In proceedings under such
statutes, in personam jurisdiction over a corporation which cannot be
physically served in the forum state depends upon state long-arm law,
6. Clayton Antitrust Act §12, 15 U.S.C. §22 (1982).
7. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §27, 15 U.S.C. §78aa (1982) provides in perti-
nent part:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules
and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such title or rules and
regulations, may be brought in any such district [wherein any act or transac-
tion constituting the violation occurred] or in the district wherein the defen-
dant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such
cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabi-
tant or wherever the defendant may be found.
Other federal long-arm provisions are found in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 §4 & 5, 28 U.S.C. §1391(0, §1608 (1982) (service of a summons on a foreign state or
agency or instrumentality thereof may be made by mail wherever the party is located, if
other specified methods not available); federal interpleader, 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1982) (service
may be made in any district in which a party resides or is found) and the Miller Act §2, 40
U.S.C. §270b (1982) (where venue is proper,extraterritorial service of process is authorized
in suits by subcontractors on federal construction projects against sureties on payment
bonds).
8. See, e.g., B.J. Semel Associates, Inc. v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Lippa's Inc. v. Lenox Inc., 305 F. Supp. 175 (D. Vt. 1969). For a review of
personal jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, see Hovenkamp, Personal Juris-
diction and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis,
67 IOWA L. REV. 485 (1982); Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporations in Anti-
trust Actions: Toward a More Uniform Approach, 54 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 330 (1980); Note,
Personal Jurisdiction Over Alien Corporate Parents and Affiliates in Antitrust Actions: A
Plea for Perspicuity, 5 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 149 (1977)
9. See, e.g., Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist., 491 F. Supp. 1364, 1377-79
(N.D. Cal. 1980).
10. No federal long-arm jurisdiction is provided, for example, under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964; for federal trademark infringement (15 U.S.C. §1051 et seq.) in patent matters,
see Activox, Inc. v. Envirotech Corp. 532 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); and in admiralty
actions, see DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd
654 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1981).
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incorporated through Rule 4(e) of the federal rules, rather than upon any
federal statute. Rule 4(e) provides, in pertinent part, that:
. . .Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the dis-
trict court is held provides. . .for service of a summons... upon a
party not an inhabitant or found within the state,. . .service
may. . .be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed in the [state] statute or rule."
Thus, in situations where no federal statute is available, Rule 4(e)
directs a federal plaintiff to the long-arm statute of the state in which the
district court sits. In such a case, the in personam jurisdictional question
depends upon an examination of the defendant's contacts with the forum
state, even when there is a federal claim. Such a "state contacts" test in
federal question litigation arises from the requirement in Rule 4(e) that
when a state long-arm statute is relied on for service of process, service
"is to be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by
the [state] statute. . . ." Most state statutes will explicitly require exami-
nation of contacts with that state. 2 Even for those states whose statutes
are not so explicit, the fourteenth amendment imposes the same "state
contacts" requirement; it permits them, as a matter of due process, to
''exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only so long
as there exist 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum
state.""
For statutory and/or constitutional reasons, when a district court re-
lies on Rule 4(e) and a state long-arm statute for in personam jurisdic-
tion, it will only examine contacts of the defendant with the state in
11. See supra note 4.
12. The District of Columbia statute is typical in this respect. It reads in pertinent
part:
A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the per-
son's -
(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in
the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, en-
gages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue
from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of
Columbia;
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of
Columbia; or
(6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk,
contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within
the District of Columbia...
13 D.C. CODE ANN. 423 (1981) (emphasis added).
13. World-wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
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which the court sits. 1 4 However, if the in personam jurisdiction of a fed-
eral district, court at least when hearing a federal question, is not consti-
tutionally limited by the state-based territorial principles of the four-
teenth amendment due process, and if venue is properly laid in a
particular district, is it correct that the in personam jurisdiction of the
federal court should nevertheless be no greater than that of a state court?
Should not federal venue statutes (supplemented by use of forum non
conveniens principles) determine where a domestic corporation (or an
alien corporation doing business in the United States) must defend fed-
eral question litigation, rather than have state borders (which are only
arbitrary boundaries of federal judicial districts in federal question cases)
perform that function?' 5
III. IN A FEDERAL QUESTION CASE THE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OF A
FEDERAL COURT IS GREATER THAN THAT ALLOWED STATE COURTS UNDER
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES
Much of the Supreme Court's teaching on due process limitations on
in personam jurisdiction of courts has arisen in review of state court (or
federal court diversity) actions. The principal decisions in this area -
such as International Shoe v. Washington; Hanson v. Denkla and World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,'6 - are fourteenth amendment due
14. Virtually all courts which have considered this point have so held. See infra notes
22-31 and accompanying text.
15. In a diversity action, of course, the federal court is merely sitting as a state court,
and its use of a state long-arm statute, and its restriction to state contacts, follows directly
from the principles of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., National
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 331 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting):
"Neither the Federal Constitution nor any federal statute requires that a person who could
not constitutionally be compelled to submit himself to a state court's jurisdiction forfeits
that constitutional right because he is sued in a Federal District Court acting for a state
court solely by reason of the happenstance of diversity jurisdiction."
16. In International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the question was whether certain con-
tacts of employees of a Delaware corporation in the State of Washington could subject it to
suit there for the collection of a state tax. The Court explicitly rejected the notion of "pres-
ence" as a basis for jurisdiction over a corporation, and described a qualitative test under
the fourteenth amendment to determine whether the corporation's activities in the state are
of such a quality and nature as to make the exercise of jurisdiction over it fair and
reasonable.
Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), concerned the jurisdiction of a Florida state
court over a Delaware trustee in an action by residuary legatees of the trust settlor. The
Court followed the fact-dependent approach articulated in International Shoe but, in this
instance, found the trustee's contacts with Florida insufficient, under the fourteenth amend-
ment to warrant jurisdiction in that state.
World-wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), was a products liability action brought in
an Oklahoma court by parties who had suffered injuries in an accident while driving through
Oklahoma, in a vehicle purchased in New York. The Court held that the fourteenth amend-
ment did not permit the New York automobile retailer that sold the car to the injured
plaintiff and its wholesaler to be sued in Oklahoma. The International Shoe approach,
which placed considerable weight on the convenience to a party of litigating in a distant
state as a fourteenth amendment factor, was refined somewhat, as the Court noted that
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process decisions. The requirements they impose as a matter of constitu-
tional law arise from the limits of state government in our federal
system. 7
Due process limits on the in personam jurisdiction of a federal court
arise, of course, from the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court has not
opined on whether International Shoe principles (i.e., minimum contacts,
fundamental fairness) would govern in determining the constitutional
reach of a federal court in a federal question case. However, it is clear
that the due process clause of the fifth amendment will not impose a
state contacts test of in personam jurisdiction. Indeed, as early as 1878
the Supreme Court held that,
nothing in the Constitution... forbids Congress to enact that, as to a
class of cases or a case of special character, a circuit court - any cir-
cuit court - in which the suit may be brought, shall, by process
served anywhere in the United States, have the power to bring before
it all the parties necessary to its decision. 8
Thus, any person (e.g., a domestic corporation) located anywhere in the
United States could, constitutionally, be subject to the jurisdiction of any
federal court.1 9 Indeed, such was the precise holding in a case where the
Federal Trade Commission sought to enforce an investigative subpoena
against a corporation in the Northern District of Texas. 20 The corporation
had neither an office nor any other presence within the state. The fifth
circuit, noting that the FTC had statutory authority for such an assertion
of personal jurisdiction, held that it did not violate due process. Accord-
ing to the court,
[b]ecause the district court's jurisdiction is always potentially, and, in
concepts of federalism impose limits on state court jurisdiction regardless of the conve-
nience to the defendant.a products liability action brought in an Oklahoma court by parties
who had suffered injuries there in an accident while driving a vehicle purchased in New
York. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment did not permit the New York auto-
mobile retailer that sold the car to the injured plaintiff and its wholesaler to be sued in
Oklahoma. The International Shoe approach, which placed considerable weight on the con-
venience to a party of litigating in a distant state as a fourteenth amendment factor, was
refined somewhat, as the Court noted that concepts of federalism impose limits on state
court jurisdiction regardless of the convenience to the defendant.
17. As the Supreme Court noted in World-wide Volkswagen, the due process clause
"acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1979).
18. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878).
19. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 682 (1935)
(jurisdiction over reorganization proceedings of a railway line extending over many districts
and states may be conferred upon a single district court); Cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946) (Rule 4(f), allowing service of process anywhere within a
state embracing two or more judicial districts, is in harmony with the Enabling Act); Rob-
ertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925) (limiting the Transportation Act of 1920's
grant of jurisdiction to the district court where the defendant resides).
20. F.T.C. v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1981).
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this case, actually co-extensive with the boundaries of the United
States, due process requires only that a defendant in a federal suit
have minimum contacts with the United States. . . .[The subject cor-
poration]. . ., as a resident United States corporation, necessarily has
sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy the requirements
of due process.2
The true International Shoe analogy in the federal system, however,
is that of the alien corporation which has no presence in the United
States, yet has certain "contacts" with the United States; for example, a
foreign manufacturer whose products are distributed in the United States
by an independent company. In this instance, the constitutional due pro-
cess limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court
should not depend on a party's contacts with any particular state. Indeed,
numerous lower court decisions have held that the fifth amendment test
of due process in federal question cases is different from, but may be de-
rived by analogy to International Shoe's state-based minimum contacts
test. Since the sovereign in a federal question case is the United States,
these cases hold that appropriate contacts of the defendant with the
United States as a whole will satisfy fifth amendment due process.2 2
Moreover, current federal statutory law in several areas appears pre-
mised on the assumption that in personam jurisdiction in federal ques-
tion cases need not have any connection to state or judicial district con-
tacts. In the area of securities regulation, for example, the occurence in a
particular district of an act or transaction constituting a violation of the
securities laws is a basis for service of process anywhere the defendant
may be found. In personam jurisdiction over a particular defendant in
such cases is not related to the defendant's own contacts with the state in
which the district court sits.23
The jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade (formerly the
Customs Court) is also not based on any state contacts. In actions
brought by the United States against private parties to enforce import
revenue laws, service of process may be made anywhere in the United
States and abroad. 4 Although the full reach of this court's in personam
jurisdiction does not appear to have been judicially determined, it plainly
is not based on state contacts.
2 5
21. Id.
22. See e.g., SIPC v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589
F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978); Alco Standard Corp.
v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
23. See, e.g., Warren v. Bokum Resources Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (D.N.M.
1977): "Given the extraterritorial service of process provision of §27, it is evident that so
long as venue is properly laid in the forum district for claims brought under the 1934 Act, it
is not necessary that each defendant have personally engaged in acts or transactions within
the forum in order to sustain personal jurisdiction over him."
24. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 4(d)(7)(h).
25. Apart from its numerous statements that the process of a federal district court may
run anywhere in the United States, the Supreme Court has not determined the specific
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IV. ALTHOUGH NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED, RULE 4(E)
NEVERTHELESS IMPOSES A STATE CONTACTS REQUIREMENT ON FEDERAL
COURT IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
While it appears that a state contacts test is not part of a fifth
amendment due process limitation on federal in personam jurisdiction,
most courts have viewed Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as requiring such contacts in cases where a specific statute does not au-
thorize a different basis for long-arm jurisdiction.
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 26 an action under fed-
eral trademark law, is a prime example. In Wells Fargo, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the question of personal jurisdiction over an
alien defendant who was being sued on a claim arising under federal law.
The court had to decide whether it "may appropriately consider not only
the alien defendant's contacts with the forum state, but also the aggre-
gate contacts of the alien with the United States as a whole."27 The dis-
trict court had found the defendant's state contacts inadequate to satisfy
fourteenth amendment due process.2" As noted above, federal trademark
law (unlike the antitrust and securities laws) contains no provisions for
the extraterritorial exercise of personal jurisdiction, and therefore the dis-
txict court had relied on a state long-arm statute.29
The Court of Appeals considered the argument that due process, in a
federal claim in a federal court, will be satisfied by an aggregation of
United States contacts. But, the court specifically rejected such an ap-
proach on statutory grounds: "[Niot only must the requirements of due
process be met before a court can properly assert in personam jurisdic-
tion, but the exercise of jurisdiction must also be affirmatively authorized
by the legislature.""0 Since the legislature (through the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure) had not authorized a national contacts basis for federal
jurisdiction, the court considered itself unable to use it.31
A similar result, which follows analogous reasoning, was reached in
the arena of admiralty law. Admiralty is another area in which there is no
federal statutory provision for long-arm jurisdiction. In DeJames v. Mag-
limits, if any, imposed by the Constitution on in personam jurisdiction of federal courts in
federal question cases. Several lower court decisions on the subject, applying International
Shoe type reasoning (i.e. minimum contacts with the United States as a whole), are cited
infra nn. 44 & 47. See also Stabilisierungsfond s fur Wein v. Kaiser, 647 F.2d 200, 204 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237 (6th Cir. 1981); Honeywell
v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1975); and Abraham, Constitu-
tional Limitations Upon the Territorial Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due
Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963); Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corpora-
tions and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961).
26. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).




31. Id. at 418.
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nificence Carriers, Inc.,32 a foreign defendant's contacts with the forum
state were held to be inadequate to satisfy state statutory and fourteenth
amendment criteria. The court therefore considered whether a "national
contacts" basis for personal jurisdiction could be utilized. From constitu-
tional and policy perspectives, the court found such an approach
unobjectionable:
[T]he court believes that it is not unfair nor unreasonable as a matter
of due process to consider the nationwide contacts of an alien defen-
dant in determining whether jurisdiction exists. . . . This court also
believes that many good policy reasons exist for applying the national
contacts theory, particularly in those federal question cases involving
alien defendants. In addition to affording greater protection to the
rights of domestic plaintiffs, the national contacts approach would
promote greater uniformity of treatment in actions involving federal
rights since the jurisdiction of the federal court would not depend
upon the liberality or conservatism of the laws in the state in which
the court sits.33
As in Wells Fargo, however, the court was compelled to reject the
theory because of Rule 4(e)'s requirement that extraterritorial services of
process "is only possible in those situations where the in-state activities
of the defendant would be sufficient to invoke the long-arm statute had
the defendant been sued in state court".
34
In another decision, Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 35 a district court went to some lengths to explain that, but for
Rule 4(e), a national aggregated contacts basis for extraterritorial juris-
diction would be available to a district court. The case was an antitrust
action in which the question presented was whether proper jurisdiction
could be asserted over a Greek company, with no office in the United
States but some contacts with the forum state. The court upheld jurisdic-
tion based on state contacts and the state long-arm statute, but only after
concluding that it was precluded from considering national contacts as a
measure of jurisdiction:
[Wie feel that the appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court
where the suit is based on a federally created right is whether the
defendant has certain minimal contacts with the United States, so as
to satisfy due process requirements under the fifth amendment ...
Unfortunately, this course has not been left open to us by the federal
rules or statutes. That is, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has
provided statute or rule whereby substituted service may be made
upon an alien corporation having certain minimal contacts with the
United States. 6
32. 491 F. Supp. 1276 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd 654 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1981).
33. Id. at 1283.
34. Id.
35. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
36. Id. at 390. Other federal question cases similarly declining to adopt a national con-
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Although the reasoning of these cases is sound and they appear to
admit of no other result, there are nevertheless several district court opin-
ions reaching directly contrary results (i.e. holding that aggregated
United States contacts may be used to support extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, despite the absence of statutory authorization). An example, is Cry-
omedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd.,3 7 a patent action in which a British com-
pany resisted the in personam jurisdiction of the district court in
Connecticut. The company argued that it did not have sufficient contacts
with that state to satisfy due process. The British defendant conceded,
however, that its contacts with at least one other United States jurisdic-
tion were adequate to satisfy due process if it was sued in that other
forum.3
The district court did not consider the sufficiency of the British de-
fendant's contacts with Connecticut. Rather, it upheld jurisdiction based
upon a "national contacts" analysis. The court reasoned that since a fed-
eral court is not subject to fourteenth amendment limits on state court
jurisdiction, and since the British company had adequate contacts with
other jurisdictions in the United States, jurisdiction in Connecticut was
proper. The court did not address Rule 4(e) or any statutory basis for
long-arm jurisdiction, resting its decision essentially on its general conclu-
sion that extraterritorial jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case
would be constitutional. 9
Another district court decision upholding extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on a national contacts test is Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S.40 Holt
was an admiralty action in which a Norwegian corporation contended it
did not have sufficient contacts with the forum state to support jurisdic-
tion under the state long-arm statute. The court upheld its own jurisdic-
tion on the basis that "defendant's contacts with the United States, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, are constitutionally sufficient to enable
this court to render a binding judgment against it."4
Rule 4(e) did not enter into the court's analysis in Holt. Because the
litigation presented a claim under federal law, the court reasoned neither
the law of the state in which it sat (i.e., the state long-arm statute) nor
tacts test of jurisdiction because of the absence of authorization to do so are Activox, Inc. v.
Envirotech, 532 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. v. J. E. Ber-
nard & Co., 508 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Finance Co. of America v. Bank American
Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D.Md. 1980); and Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle AG, 83 F.R.D.
414 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
37. 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975).
38. Id. at 292.
39. Applying the criteria of "fairness" and "reasonability" used in International Shoe,
the court pointed out that, inasmuch as the British defendant had no place of business
anywhere in the United States, there could be little difference to it in convenience in de-
fending in one east coast jurisdiction (where it had requisite "contacts") versus another
(where it did not). Id. at 292.
40. 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973).
41. Id. at 358.
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the fourteenth amendment were applicable. Rather, according to the
court, the jurisdictional question was one under the fifth amendment,
which looks to a defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole.
The court did note that even if due process were satisfied, it might, nev-
ertheless, be restricted in the exercise of in personam jurisdiction through
a statute or rule of procedure. Having ignored Rule 4(e), the court found
no such restriction in this case.
Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, A.G.,4 2 is another
decision basing extraterritorial jurisdiction, at least in part, on aggregated
national contacts. Despite its acknowledgment that a national contact
test "has not yet been generally accepted and there is no specific statu-
tory authority for it,"4 3 the court nevertheless relied on it. The court held
that where the defendant is an alien and where there is no other forum in
which to litigate a claim, the defendant's aggregated contacts with the
United States can support extraterritorial jurisdiction.44 Rule 4(e) was
not discussed.
4 5
None of the foregoing cases upholding extraterritorial jurisdiction
based on national contacts are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. As noted above, Rule 4(e) authorizes service of process pursu-
ant to federal or state statute, "under the circumstances and in the man-
ner prescribed in the statute." To rely on a state long-arm statute for
extraterritorial service of process (as these cases do), but to ignore the
circumstances under which it may be invoked (i.e., the presence of appro-
priate minimum contacts with the state), is a plain misapplication of Rule
4(e).
A reading of these decisions reveals, instead, that the court in each
instance was presented with a situation in which the exercise of its in
personam jurisdiction was reasonable and constitutional, and made prac-
tical sense under the circumstances of the case. In several of the deci-
sions, the courts appear to have utilized a national standard in order to
prevent a situation where a foreign defendant would escape federal juris-
diction because of its limited contacts with any particular state. Under
42. 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977).
43. Id. at 664.
44. The court addressed personal jurisdiction from both a national contacts and state
contacts perspective, and appears to have based jurisdiction on both. As to state contacts,
the court observed that if they were "the sole consideration, I would hold they were not
sufficient to ground jurisdiction." Id. at 663. However, the court concluded that "[biased on
the defendant's physical contacts with the State, their substantial contacts with the country
as a whole, and New Hampshire's interest in protecting its corporate citizens injured as a
result of torts such as those alleged here, I find that this court has jurisdiction." Id. at 668.
45. See also Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983); and see
First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 299 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). In an-
other case, Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah
1973), the court also upheld jurisdiction based on national contacts, noting that the alien
defendant there might otherwise escape federal jurisdiction altogether, since its state con-
tacts might be too dispersed to support jurisdiction in any state.
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these circumstances, the courts ignored the requirement of a statutory
authorization for in personam jurisdiction, and relied instead on their
constitutional power to bring a particular defendant before them. On pol-
icy grounds the result may be correct, but on technical legal grounds it is
undoubtedly flawed.
V. A GENERAL FEDERAL LONG-ARM STATUTE WOULD CURE THE
ANOMALIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
It is difficult to identify a rationale for the inconsistent treatment of
long-arm jurisdiction in federal legislation. To be sure, the presence of
authorization for extraterritorial service of process in specific statutes is
understandable. For example, federal interpleader 46 is a procedure specif-
ically created to adjudicate in a single proceeding, the conflicting claims
of various persons. This procedure would have little practical value if it
could not reach all interested parties, regardless of their contacts with a
particular forum. Moreover, the nationwide jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade is explainable because there is only one such court in
the United States.
47
On the other hand, it is difficult to explain why federal long-arm ju-
risdiction is available for antitrust and securities law actions, but not for
admiralty, patent, trademark, and civil rights actions. And even among
statutes with long-arm authorization, there are differences which are diffi-
cult to explain. Under the Clayton Act, for example, long-arm jurisdiction
is available if venue is proper, with venue based on contacts with the fo-
rum state (i.e., presence or doing business). 48 The securities law also col-
lapses personal jurisdiction into venue and allows venue to be had in any
district in which an unlawful event occurred. Long-arm jurisdiction over
any defendant, regardless of its contacts with the district is then available
if venue is proper.
4 9
It is likely that the differing statutory treatment of long-arm jurisdic-
46. See supra note 7.
47. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
48. 15 U.S.C. §22 (1982); see e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 175 F. Supp. 793 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). This limitation on in personam jurisdiction in antitrust actions is criticized, and a
statutory national contacts test urged, in 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 5.06, 5.16 (2d ed. 1980).
A distinctly minority view is that extraterritorial in personam jurisdiction under the
antitrust laws may be exercised without regard to forum state contacts. See General Electric
Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
49. Rule 4(e)'s reliance on state long-arm statutes, when no federal statute is available,
creates its own differences of in personam jurisdiction from judicial district to judicial dis-
trict, since there are differences (albeit not great ones) among the long-arm statutes of vari-
ous states.
This, however, is not the only example of differing treatment of federal question cases
depending on the district in which suit is brought. Another is where federal law provides no
limitation period on bringing a federal claim, in which case state law provides no limitation
period. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1945).
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tion under various federal laws occurred unintentionally, rather than as
the result of deliberate legislative choice to authorize extraterritorial ju-
risdiction in one context and not the other, or to expand its scope in one
instance and contract it in another. The legislative history of the long-
arm sections of the anti-trust laws, for example, does not reveal any par-
ticular rationale or theory on which those sections were based, other than
to maximize personal jurisdiction. 50
With regard to Rule 4(e), nothing in it or its history reveals a specific
reason why long-arm jurisdiction in federal question cases is limited to
situations in which there is specific statutory authorization, or a state
long-arm statute. As originally adopted in 1937, Rule 4(e) read:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court provides
for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of sum-
mons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
service shall be made under the circumstances and in the manner pre-
scribed by the statute, rule, or order.
The provision is essentially the first sentence of the current rule, author-
izing extraterritorial service pursuant to a federal statute. The Advisory
Committee Note to this subpart merely states that various federal long-
arm statutes available in specific causes of action "are continued by this
rule."6'
Rule 4(e) was amended only once, in 1963, when what currently ap-
pears as its second sentence was added, permitting service of process pur-
suant to a state long-arm statute. It is clear from the Advisory Committee
Note accompanying the new subparagraph that the amendment was in-
tended to accommodate the development of the new principles of state
extraterritorial jurisdiction following the landmark 1945 International
Shoe decision:
The second sentence, added by amendment, expressly allows resort in
original Federal actions to the procedures provided by State law for
effecting service on nonresident parties (as well as on domiciliaries not
found within the State). . . . The necessity of satisfying subject-mat-
ter jurisdictional requirements and requirements of venue will limit
the practical utilization of these methods of effecting service. Within
those limits, however, there appears to be no reason for denying plain-
tiffs means of commencing actions in Federal courts which are gener-
ally available in the State courts. [Citations omitted] .... If the cir-
cumstances of a particular case satisfy the applicable Federal law
(first sentence of Rule 4(e), as amended) and the applicable State law
(second sentence), the party seeking to make the service may proceed
50. The only discussion of long-arm jurisdiction in the legislative history of the Clayton
Act is in S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1914), where it is merely noted that the
provision "require[s] no special explanation here."
51. J. MOORE & J. LuCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.C1[2] (2d ed. 1984)(advisory
note at 4-19).
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under the Federal or the State law, at his option."2
Why the Supreme Court did not go further in the 1963 amendment
to Rule 4(e) and allow federal in personam jurisdiction to the fullest ex-
tent permitted by the Constitution, is not explained. However, it does not
appear that the Advisory Committee ever considered such action.
53
The absence of a general authorization for long-arm jurisdiction,
whether by statute or rule, not only creates anomalies, such as alien de-
fendants with U.S. contacts not being amendable to suit, but may actu-
ally frustrate Congressional intent as expressed in several venue statutes.
Probably the most prominent example is the alien venue statute,5 4 per-
mitting an alien to be sued in any district. With such a provision, Con-
gress has apparently determined that the relative convenience of a defen-
dant is of no relevance if that party is an alien. Yet, when suit is brought
under federal legislation in which a state long-arm statute must be used,
a plaintiff must nevertheless search for a district court in a state in which
the alien defendant has the "minimum contacts" necessary to satisfy the
state long-arm statute. Thus, the freedom which Congress gave in section
1391(d) regarding choice of forum, Rule 4(e) takes away by imposing
state contacts as an additional requirement for in personam jurisdiction.
55
A fifth amendment "U.S. contacts" test of jurisdiction makes excellent
sense in such a situation.
Even the general venue provision for federal question actions - au-
thorizing suit in any district where all defendants reside or in which the
claim arose,s s may be undermined by a state contacts requirement. "State
contacts" means that federal question litigation against multiple defen-
dants residing in different districts, could occur in a single forum only if
the plaintiff were fortunate enough to be suing defendants who had the
necessary "minimum contacts" with that jurisdiction. If, for example, the
claim arose in the Southern District of New York, and one of the defen-
dants was a California corporation with no contacts in New York, but
52. Id. at 4-32. Prior to International Shoe, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of state
courts was still constrained by the territorial concepts of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877). Thus, even in the case of pre-International Shoe non-resident motorist statutes,
which conferred in personam jurisdiction over out-of-state motorists involved in automobile
accidents in the state, the perceived need for in-state service was satisfied by the fiction of a
state official (e.g. a commissioner of motor vehicle licensing) being deemed the out-of-state
motorists' in-state agent for service of process. See. e.g., Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352
(1927).
53. The American Law Institute, in its 1969 Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Be-
tween State and Federal Courts, published a proposed new Title 28 of the U.S. Code in
which, in §1314(d), nationwide service of process would be available in all federal question
cases.
54. 28 U.S.C. §1391(d) (1982).
55. The requirement is also artificial as one to secure in personam jurisdiction because
such jurisdiction, in a federal question case in a federal court, need not be based on state
contacts to satisfy due process.
56. 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) (1982).
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with a branch office across the Hudson River in New Jersey, an action
against all defendants could not be brought in the Southern District of
New York.
Requiring the federal court in New York to depend on minimum con-
tacts with that state in such a situation makes little sense. Constitution-
ally, the process of the New York court could extend to the California
corporation, and the presence of its branch office in New Jersey assures




In an era of high-speed travel and instantaneous communications, re-
liance on state borders to determine the in personam jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts in federal question cases is an anachronism. The extension of
federal in personam jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the
Constitution would facilitate the closing of a loophole alien corporations
have used to escape federal jurisdiction, and would also economize federal
litigation against multiple domestic parties by providing a single forum
for adjudication of most claims.5s It would also avoid the time and effort
spent in litigating 12(b) motions based on lack of personal jurisdiction,
when the issue is limited to the technicality of whether a large foreign
corporation with extensive U.S. contacts has sufficient contacts with the
forum state. Cases of legitimate inconvenience to litagants arising from
such expanded jurisdiction could be resolved through careful application
of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Although a few courts have attempted to fashion such a federal long-
arm jurisdiction on a common law basis, it appears that it is up to Con-
gress or the Supreme Court (through an amendment to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure) properly to achieve such a result.
57. Any burden or inconvenience that would occur if a "state contacts" test were aban-
doned-for example, if the branch office of the California corporation discussed in the text
were located in Baltimore rather than Newark-could be addressed in a forum non con-
veniens motion.
58. From a policy perspective, there is little difference between federal venue statutes
and modern principles of personal jurisdiction, since both direct litigation to a forum having
some substantial relationship to either the claim or the defendants. Cf., 4 C. WRIGHT & A.




We have introduced this new "critical essays" section in order to ac-
commodate the vast, yet often overlooked body of work written by legal
scholars on contemporary political and policy issues. We frequently re-
ceive manuscripts in this subject area, and for years have decided against
publication because so much of this work does not conform with the stan-
dard criteria for "law review articles"-either for lack of extensive docu-
mentation or fully developed legal analysis. However, the Journal recog-
nizes the inextricable link between law, politics and policy, and we have
decided to publish, on a periodic basis, those works which elucidate im-
portant positions on the most critical issues of our day.
"Critical Essays" is a forum for viewpoints. These articles are in-
tended as articulate expressions of current concerns, by scholars and
practitioners with expertise in the matters explored in this forum. When-
ever possible, the Journal will allow the divergence of views on these mat-
ters to remain intact and uninhibited. It should be noted that the opin-
ions expressed are solely those of the authors and not of the Journal. We
welcome reader response.
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Ignoring International Law: U.S. Policy on
Insurgency and Intervention in Central
America
Louis RENA BERES*
"I can assure you that in this Administration, our actions will be gov-
erned by the rule of law; and the rule of law is congenial to action
against terrorists." Secretary of State George Shultz**
Early in May, 1985, undaunted by Congressional opposition to fur-
ther funding for the contra rebels,' President Reagan urged plans to em-
bargo all trade between Nicaragua and the United States. These plans,
representing the latest response to what the President calls Nicaragua's
"aggressive activities in Central America,"2 express a continuing U.S. pat-
tern of disregard for the normative requirements of international law.
Nurtured by fear that Nicaraguan activities are "supported by the Soviet
Union and its allies,"3 they are offered without any respect for the per-
emptory principles of non-intervention and self-determination.
Curiously, in defending its forceful actions against the Sandinista
government, the Reagan administration no longer feels the need for legal
justifications. Although these actions were originally defended largely in
terms of the U.N. Charter's Article 51 provision for collective self-defense
(i.e., that they were undertaken by the U.S. in law-enforcing response to
alleged Nicaraguan support for anti-government rebels in El Salvador),
4
the current position of the Reagan administration is grounded exclusively
upon geopolitical considerations. As a result, the Reagan administration
* Professor of Political Science and International Law, Purdue University; B.A. 1967,
Queens College of New York; Ph.D. 1971, Princeton University.
** BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 629, TERROR-
ISM AND THE MODERN WORLD (1984).
1. At the time of this writing, there is evidence that this opposition may end and that
further support for U.S. military intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua will re-
ceive Congressional authorization.
2. Christian, Action Urged to Counter 'Aggressive Actions' by the Sandinistas, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 1985, at 1.
3. Id.
4. OFFICE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY FOR LATIN AMERICA, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, BACKGROUND
PAPER: NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SUPPORT FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION
(1984). See also, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NEWS BREIFING: INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON EX-
TERNAL SUPPORT OF THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR (1984). The Reagan administration's
original "white paper" was widely discredited by press reports. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, COMMUNIST INTERFERENCE IN EL SALVADOR, REP. No. 80 (Feb. 23, 1981) with Kwitny,
Apparent Errors Cloud U.S. 'White Paper' on Reds in El Salvador, Wall St. J., June 8, 1981,
at 1, col. 6.
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seriously undermines worldwide respect for the rule of law. The most visi-
ble and dramatic manifestations of this country's "outlaw" behavior are:
(1) its wanton disregard for the territorial and jurisdictional integrity of
another state, and (2) its decision, announced on January 18, 1985, not to
participate further in proceedings of the case brought by Nicaragua in the
International Court of Justice.5
Initially, the Reagan administration also sought to justify its support
for contra activities in terms of the principle of humanitarian interven-
tion. It has now muted this rationalization, however, in the face of obvi-
ous policy contradictions. Since the administration continues to support
other regimes in the region that are vastly more repressive than that of
the Sandinistas,' its alleged concern for human rights is merely a contri-
vance. Indeed, it is now plain that U.S. tactics in Central America are
motivated entirely by Realpolitik and by the desolate machinations of
anti-Sovietism.
From the standpoint of modern international law, humanitarian in-
tervention certainly has its place. Operating within the severely limiting
context of a decentralized and sovereignty-centered system-one without
collective enforcement machinery-individual states must increasingly
act on their own to protect and promote human rights. In this connection,
however, the standard for permissible intervention must hinge, inter alia,
on more than ideological motives and it must be applied uniformly wher-
ever egregious violations are in evidence. The sharply divergent and in-
5. Dep't of State to the American Embassy at the Hague, telegram NO. 017113, Jan. 18,
1985. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U. S.), Juris-
diction and Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26).
6. According to the opening paragraph of the AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 1984
listing for Nicaragua: "Amnesty International's concerns included trials of political prisoners
which fell short of internationally accepted standards; the detention of prisoners of con-
science; the detention of political prisoners after their sentence had expired; and the pro-
longed incommunicado detention of political prisoners in the custody of the Direccion Gen-
eral de Segurdad del Estado (DGSE), Department of State Security. Amnesty International
welcomed the release in a December 1983 amnesty of most of the Miskito and Sumo Indian
prisoners known to the organization, some of whom it had believed were prisoners of con-
science." AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT. 1984 at 178.
A comparison with the opening paragraph of Amnesty's 1984 assessment of El Salvador
suggests a significantly greater respect for human rights in the Sandinista regime. Regarding
El Salvador: "Amnesty International remained gravely concerned about the continued in-
volvement of all branches of the security and military forces in a systematic and widespread
program of torture, mutilation, 'disappearance' and the individual and mass extrajudicial
execution of men, women and children from all sectors of Salvadoran society. Paramilitary
civilian defense squads which operated under military supervision as well as so called 'death
squads' were also consistently named as having been responsible for such abuses." Supra at
148. Despite the Reagan administration's assurances that Salvadoran human rights have
significantly improved after the latest elections, these assurances are utterly without empiri-
cal foundation. In the words of the Americas Watch Report on Human Rights and U. S.
Policy in Latin America: "The human rights situation in El Savador continues to be bleak
and heading for no significant improvement." See WITH FRIENDs LIKE THESE 138 (C. Brown
ed. 1985).
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consistent policies adopted by the Reagan administration in Central
America regarding "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" states fail to meet
this standard.
Within the current system of international law, external decision-
makers are authorized to intercede in certain matters that might at one
time have been regarded as internal to a particular state. While, at cer-
tain times in the past, even gross violations of human rights were de-
fended by appeal to "domestic jurisdiction," today's demands for exclu-
sive competence must he grounded in far more than an interest in
avoiding "intervention." This trend in authoritative decision-making to-
ward an expansion of the doctrine of "international concern" has been
clarified by Lauterpacht's definition of intervention:
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal conno-
tation. It signifies dictatorial interference, in the sense of action
amounting to a denial of the independence of the State. It implies a
demand which, if not complied with, involves a threat of, or recourse
to, compulsion, though not necessarily physical compulsion, in some
form.
7
We can see, therefore, that intervention is not always impermissible,
and that, indeed, any assessment of its lawfulness must always be contin-
gent upon intent. Applying Lauterpacht's standard, where there is no in-
terest in exerting "dictatorial interference," but simply an overriding
commitment to the protection of human rights, the act of intervening
may represent the proper enforcement of pertinent legal norms. This con-
cept of intervention greatly transforms the exaggerated emphasis on "do-
mestic jurisdiction" that has been associated improperly with individual
national interpretations of Article 2(7) of the Charter and, earlier, with
Article 15(8) of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By offering a ma-
jor distinction between the idea of self-serving interference by one state
in the internal affairs of another state and the notion of the general global
community's inclusive application of law to the protection of human dig-
nity, it significantly advances the goal of a just world order.' But there
must be consistency. In Grenada, the Reagan administration-faced with
a threat from what the President described as "leftist thugs"-responded
7. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (1950).
8. The importance of the changing doctrine of "intervention" to the shift in global "al-
location of competences" was prefigured by the Tunis-Morocco case before the Permanent
Court of International Justice in 1923. In this matter, the Court developed a broad test to
determine whether or not a matter is essentially within the "domestic jurisdiction" of a
particular state; "The question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question: it depends upon the develop-
ment of international relations." Although this test is hardly free of ambiguity, it does clar-
ify that the choice between "international concern" and "domestic jurisdiction" is not
grounded in unalterable conditions of fact, but rather in constantly changing circumstances
that permit a continuing adjustment of competences. It follows that whenever particular
events create significant violations of human rights, the general global community is entitled
to internationalize jurisdiction and to authorize appropriate forms of decision and action.
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with a "liberating" invasion.9 In Guatemala, however, where almost a
quarter of a million people have been exterminated during the past thirty
years by a succession of military dictatorships, the administration favors
the perpetrators of regime terror. Similar patterns of U.S. support are
enjoyed by the Stroessner regime in Paraguay, which practices genocide
against the Ache Indians under the approving eyes of the American em-
bassy in Asuncion, and by the Pinochet regime in Chile, which defiles
essential human rights on an almost equally savage scale.
Repression spawns rebellion. Although international law has consist-
ently condemned particular acts of international terrorism, it has also
made very clear that not all forms of insurgency are instances of terror-
ism. In fact, it has approved certain forms of insurgency that derive from
"the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of all peo-
ples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domina-
tion...." This exemption, from the 1973 General Assembly Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, is corroborated by
9. The invasion of Grenada by U.S. military forces took place on October 25, 1983. Led
by 1900 U.S. Marines and Army Airborne Rangers, the invasion force also included 300
troops representing Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, Antiqua and St. Vincent. By
October 30, the invasion had been completed and the island-a microstate located in the
southeastern Caribbean was "militarily secure." The stated U.S. governmental rationale for
the invasion was to protect the 1100 U.S. nationals residing on Grenada, including some 650
students at the St. George's University School of Medicine, and to meet an urgent request
by six Caribbean states that the U.S. assist in restoring political order on Grenada (states
belonging to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a regional body formed
by treaty in 1981). Moreover, in view of the President's explicitly-stated concern over the
9000 foot airport runway then being constucted by Cubans at Point Salines (a facility feared
as a potential fueling stop for Soviet planes carrying arms and other military equipment to
Nicaragua and as a base for launching "subversive operations" throughout the lower Carib-
bean basin), the invasion was also intended to counter Soviet-Cuban influence in the region.
Indeed, there is little question that its actual purpose was preeminently to depose the leftist
military junta that had seized power after the coup against Prime Minister Maurice Bishop,
and then to install a government to the United State's liking. None of these stated justifica-
tions, however, meets the requirements of international law. Although it is conceivable that
the lives of U.S. citizens had been endangered, the actual military operation took the form
of a wholesale assault against the authority structure of another government. To meet the
expectations of long-standing customary international law, the intervention should have
been severely restricted in application: i.e., it ought to have been conducted as a limited-
purpose rescue mission.
As for the rationale of collective action, nowhere in the operative collective security
provision of the 1981 OECS Treaty (Art. 8) is there an option to invite outside assistance
against a member state (the U.S. is not a party to this Treaty). Furthermore, Article 8 deals
with "collective defense and the preservation of peace and security against external aggres-
sion," yet there was no external aggressor. OECS Article 8 also requires unanimous agree-
ment among member states before action can be taken, and that condition was never ful-
filled. Finally, and this is perhaps the central flaw of the invasion's rationale, no state has
the right under international law to intervene militarily in the affairs of another state be-
cause it finds another regime ideologically distasteful or potentially harmful. Rather, inter-
national law expects that every state be free to choose its own form of political institutions
under the principle of "self determination". There is no support under international law for
"anticipatory self-defense" if the danger posed is purely hypothetical.
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Article 7 of the 1974 Definition of Agression by the U.N. General
Assembly.1"
International law has also approved certain forms of insurgency that
are directed toward improved human rights where repression is neither
colonial nor racist. Together with a number of important covenants, trea-
ties and declarations, the U.N. Charter codifies many binding norms on
the protection of human rights. Comprising a human rights "regime,"
these rules of international law are effectively enforceable only by the ac-
tions of individual states or by lawful insurgencies (i.e., those that com-
bine "just cause" with respect for the humanitarian rules of war.)
Where it is understood as resistance to despotism, revolutionary in-
surgency has its roots as accepted practice in the Bible and in the writ-
ings of ancient and medieval classics. Support for such insurgency is not
the creation of modern international law. The tyranncide motif can be
found in Aristotle's Politics, Plutarch's Lives, and Cicero's De Officiis. In
the Preamble to the U.N. Charter, the peoples of the United Nations re-
affirm their faith "in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of na-
tions large and small" and their determination "to promote social pro-
gress and better standards of life in larger freedom."
Article 1 lists a main purpose of the U.N. as "promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." Similarly, in Ar-
ticle 55, the Charter seeks "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion." And in Article 56, all members of the
United Nations "pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55."
Reinforced by an abundant body of ancillary prescriptions, this obli-
gation stipulates that the legal community of humankind must allow, in-
deed require, "humanitarian intervention" by individual states in certain
circumstances. Of course, such intervention must not be used as a pretext
for aggression and it must conform to settled legal norms governing the
use of force, especially the principles of discrimination, military necessity
and proportionality. Understood in terms of the long-standing distinction
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello, this means that even where the
"justness" of humanitarian intervention is clearly established, the means
10. Interestingly enough, the most recent official U.S. government definition of terror-
ism does not allow for "just cause." According to a September 1984 definition offered by the
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs: "Terrorism is the use or threatened use of
violence for political purposes to create a state of fear that will aid in extorting, coercing,
intimidating or otherwise causing individuals and groups to alter their behavior." See Inter-
national Terrorism, DEP'T. ST. BULL. (Sept. 1984). By this definition, of course, the 18th
century revolutionary insurgency that led to the creation of the United States was pure
terrorism. Similarly, The U.S.-supported contras are also terrorists by this definition.
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used in that intervention must not be unlimited. The lawfulness of a
cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of violence.
We have seen, therefore, that contemporary international law con-
cerning human rights is necessarily founded upon a broad doctrine of hu-
manitarian intervention. Indeed, it is the very rationale of the prevailing
human rights regime to legitimize an "allocation of competences" that
favors the natural rights of humankind over any particularistic interests
of state. Yet, there is no evidence that U.S. support for the contras is at
all consistent with the imperative to oppose repressive governments.'
With such support, this country is not acting on behalf of the interna-
tional law of human rights. Rather, it is acting only to restore authorita-
rian repression to Nicaragua. Although this design does not flow from any
principled preference for regime terror, but solely from the presumption
that such terror is a "necessary evil" in the struggle against Marxism, it
represents a prima facie instance of aggression. Moreover, since U.S. sup-
port for contra rebels is directed against a country with which it has for-
mal diplomatic relations, this aggression may represent a remarkably dis-
ingenuous instance of lawlessness.
In support of the principle that foreign intervention is unlawful un-
less it is understood as an indispensable corrective to gross violations of
human rights, most texts and treatises on international law have long ex-
pressed the opinion that a state is forbidden to engage in military or
paramilitary operations against another state with which it is not at war.
Today, the long-standing customary prohibition against foreign support
for lawless insurgencies is codified in the U.N. Charter and in the authori-
tative interpretation of that multilateral treaty in the 1974 U.N. General
Assembly Definition of Aggression.
The legal systems embodied in the constitutions of individual states
are a part of the international legal order and are, therefore, an interest
that all states must defend against aggression. This peremptory principle
was expressed by Lauterpacht. According to Lauterpacht, the following
rule concerns the scope of state responsibility for preventing acts of insur-
gency or terrorism against other states:
International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining per-
sons within its territory from engaging in such revolutionary activities
against friendly States as amount to organized acts of force in the
form of hostile expeditions against the territory of those States. It also
obliges the States to repress and discourage activities in which at-
tempts against the life of political opponents are regarded as a proper
means of revolutionary action. 2
Lauterpacht's rule reaffirms the Resolution on the Rights and Duties
of Foreign Powers as Regards the Established and Recognized Govern-
ments in Case of Insurrection adopted by the Institute of International
11. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT: 1984, supra note 6.
12. 3 H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF PEACE 2-6 (1977).
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Law in 1900. His rule, however, stops short of the prescription offered by
the 18th century Swiss scholar, Emerich de Vattel. According to Book 2
of Vattel's The Law of Nations, which states that support insurgency di-
rected at other states becomes the lawful prey of the world community:
If there should be found a restless and unprincipled nation, ever ready
to do harm to others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up civil
strife among their citizens, there is no doubt that all others would
have the right to unite together to subdue such a nation, to discipline
it, and even to disable it from doing further harm.1"
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the philosopher Karl Jaspers con-
sidered the question of German guilt. In this connection, he wrote:
"There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each
co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially
for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do
whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty." Understood in terms of
the Reagan administration's refractory disregard for ongoing crimes
against humanity in Central America, Jaspers' doctrine suggests an ur-
gent need to confront overriding Nuremberg obligations while there is
still time. Should we, as Americans, continue to support only lawless
forms of destabilization, we shall surely lose our historic commitment to
justice.
From the point of view of the United States, the Nuremberg obliga-
tions are doubly binding. This is the case because these obligations re-
present not only current normative obligations of international law, but
also the doctrinal obligations engendered by the American political tradi-
tion. By their codification of the principle that fundamental human rights
are not an internal question for each state, but an imperious postulate of
the international community, the Nuremberg obligations represent a
point of perfect convergence between the law of nations and the jurispru-
dential/ethical foundations of the American Republic.
The United States has been committed to the idea of a Higher Law
from its beginnings. Codified in both the Declaration of Independence
and in the Constitution, this idea is based upon the acceptance of certain
principles of right and justice that prevail because of their own obvious
merit. Eternal and unchangeable, they are external to all acts of human
will and interpenetrate all human reason.
This idea and its attendant tradition of human civility runs continu-
ously from elements of Mosaic Law and Greek philosophy to the Ameri-
can Revolution of 1776. By its actual conveyance of higher law or natural
law thinking into American political theory, John Locke's Second Trea-
tise on Civil Government echoed a more than two-thousand year tradition
that the validity of civil law must always be tested against pre-existent
natural law. The codified American "duty" to revolt when governments
13. 2 E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 130 (C.W. Fenwick trans. 1916).
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commit "a long train of abuses and usurpations" flows from Locke's no-
tion that civil authority can never extend beyond the securing of man's
natural rights.
Significantly, the Declaration of Independence codified a social con-
tract that set limits on the power of any government. Its purpose was to
define a set of universally valid constraints upon secular political author-
ity. Since justice, which is based upon natural law, binds all human soci-
ety, the rights articulated by the Declaration of Independence cannot be
reserved only to Americans. Rather, they must extend to all human socie-
ties, and can never be revoked by positive or municipal law. It follows
that the principles of our own Declaration of Independence must shape
not only our own domestic political relations, but our relations with other
peoples as well. To do otherwise would be illogical and self-contradictory,
since it would nullify the timeless and universal law of nature from which
the Declaration derives. Indeed, this idea was reaffirmed recently by Sec-
retary of State George Shultz:
All Americans can be proud that the example of our Founding Fathers
has helped to inspire millions around the globe. Throughout our own
history, we have always believed that freedom is the birthright of all
peoples and that we could not be true to ourselves or our principles
unless we stood for freedom and democracy not only for ourselves but
for others."'
Curiously, the United States, founded upon the principles of revolu-
tion, has become the archetype of counter-revolution. Guided by short-
sighted economic considerations and supremacist politics, it has propped
up oligarachies, spawned militarism and thwarted hesitant national strug-
gles to enter the modern world. In this connection, Octavio Paz, the Mex-
ican poet and essayist, has commented:
This is tragic because American democracy inspired the fathers of our
Independence and our great liberals like Sarmiento and Juarez. From
the 18th century onward, for us modernization has meant democracy
and free institutions: and the archetype of this political and social mo-
dernity was United States democracy. History's nemesis: in Latin
America the United States has been the protector of tyrants and the
ally of democracy's enemies.15
Nuremberg established, beyond any doubt, the continuing validity of
natural law. While the indictments of the Nuremberg Tribunal were cast
in terms of existing or positive international law, the actual decisions of
the Tribunal reject the proposition that the validity of law depends upon
its "positiveness." The words used by the Tribunal ("So far from it being
14. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 659,
AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM 1 (Feb. 22, 1985).
15. Paz, Latin America and Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP IN LATIN
AMERICA 9 (1982) (a special publication devoted to the voices and opinions of writers from
Latin America, Foundation for the Independent Study of Social Ideas).
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unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go
unpunished") derive from the principle nullum crimen sine poena (no
crime without a punishment). This principle is a clear contradiction of
the underlying thesis of positive jurisprudence, the idea of nulla poena
sine lege (no punishment without a written law).
As an answer to the question, "What is law?," international law now
rejects all solutions that substitute force for justice. Rather than accept a
distinction between the "concept" and the "ideal" of law, international
law now recognizes that concept and ideal coincide. In the fashion of all
other legal systems, the law of nations is a branch of ethics. Taken to-
gether with the understanding that the supremacy of natural law has al-
ways been a part of the American political tradition, and that the current
position of international law is largely an "incorporation" of this tradi-
tion, this conclusion signals a compelling imperative for change in the di-
rection of American foreign policy on human rights.
To meet its obligations, the Reagan administration must first bring
its policies into line with its stated principles. In its most recent issue of
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (1984), the U.S. Department
of State stipulates that:
our human rights policy has two goals .... First, we seek to improve
human rights practices in numerous countries... A foreign policy in-
different to these issues would not appeal to the idealism of Ameri-
cans, would be amoral, and would lack public support .... As the
second goal of our human rights policy, we seek a public association of
the United States with the cause of liberty's
These are decent and correct objectives of a nation's foreign policy.
The problem, of course, is that they are not a truthful expression of our
policy. They are intended exclusively for domestic and international po-
litical consumption. They have nothing whatever to do with the opera-
tional standards for U.S. involvement in other countries. They are a lie.
The Reagan administration embraces only one standard of judgment
concerning American foreign policy: anti-Sovietism. Human rights have
nothing to do with this standard. It follows from this standard that ef-
forts to overthrow allegedly pro-Soviet regimes are always conducted by
"freedom fighters" (even where these efforts involve rape, pillage and
murder 7 and where these regimes are substantially less repressive than
16. The Department of State is required to enforce the human rights provisions man-
dated by section 116(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. The
Country Reports are also interesting for the strikingly different way they identify abuses in
"authoritarian" and "totalitarian" regimes and for their sharply different assessments from
those supplied by such independent human rights organizations as Amnesty International
and Americas Watch. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. Ironically, Secretary of State Shultz has often stated his commitment to the laws of
war of international law, and to the understanding that these humanitarian rules of armed
conflict apply as well to insurgent forces. According to Shultz: "The grievances that ter-
rorists supposedly seek to redress through acts of violence may or may not be legitimate.
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those of several U.S. allies) while efforts to oppose anti-Soviet regimes
(even where these efforts are essentially non-violent and undertaken by
the victims of genocidal regimes) are always conducted by "terrorists."
Consider President Reagan's press conference of March 21, 1985,
where he stated that the 17 blacks recently shot by South African police
had not been "simply killed," but were the excusable casualties of "riot-
ing." Moments later, reacting to a question about Nicaragua, the presi-
dent defended the use of force against a "Communist tyranny." In other
words, rebellion against apartheid must always be peaceful, while opposi-
tion to Sandinista rule must inevitably be violent. (This from the presi-
dent of a country founded upon the principle of "just cause" for
revolution).
With this view, black South Africans-although understandably un-
happy to be martyred by a uniquely repressive regime-are instructed to
be "patient" as the U.S. continues its policy of "constructive engage-
ment." At the same time, contra rebels-widely and authoritatively asso-
ciated with the execution of noncombatants in Nicaragua and with death-
squad activities in El Salvador and Honduras (not to mention their asso-
ciation with neo-Nazi groups in the United States)-are embraced by the
President as "our brothers." These "freedom fighters," said the President
on March 1, "are the moral equal of our Founding Fathers."
The central problem lies in this country's identification of East/West
competition as -the only meaningful axis of global conflict. Since such
identification makes anti-Sovietism the centerpiece of its policy on
human rights, the United States now fully accepts the pernicious doctrine
that might equals right. Rejecting former President Carter's declaration
of independence from "that inordinate fear of communism which once led
us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear,"' 8 it now offers a
parody of lawful and pragmatic behavior. Like a moth dancing in its own
flame, the U.S. is moved not by reason but by illusions of immortality.
The Reagan administration claims that it has now begun to change
its earlier views on human rights. Yet, there has been nothing to trans-
form its understanding of these rights as an instrument of the Cold War.
Clinging to the Manichean imagery of remorseless conflict between the
American Sons of Light and the Soviet Sons of Darkness, it is guided not
by the exigencies of politics but by the imperatives of "theology." With
such a desolate set of prescriptions, the President's trip to Bitburg Ceme-
tery in West Germany becomes easy to explain: We must learn to over-
look Nazism in order to compete effectively with the Soviets. Nazism was
The terrorist acts themselves, however, can never be legitimate. And legitimate causes can
never justify or excuse terrorism. Terrorist means discredit their ends." BUREAU OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 629, TERRORISM AND THE MODERN
WORLD 3 (Oct. 25, 1984).
18. From speech on "Humane Purposes in Foreign Policy," delivered at Commence-
ment Exercises at University of Notre Dame, Indiana (1977). Reprinted in THE HUMAN
RIGHTS READER 306 (W. Lacquer, B. Rubin eds. 1979).
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bad, but he would have us believe, only Communism is unforgivable.
In one of his best stories, Jorge Luis Borges, the Argentine writer,
describes a time in the future wherein governments no longer exist and
politicians have gone on to do what they are most capable of doing
(". . .some of them made good comedians or good faith healers. . ."). For
the moment, however, we must continue to deal with national leaders
who are hopelessly entombed by their barren imaginations and by the
banal syntax of power politics. Living outside of history, in parentheses,
these leaders will continue to oppose all forms of promising
metamorphoses.
The United States now founds its human rights policy on the prem-
ises of unreason. During the next several years, this policy will fail com-
pletely in terms of its own Realpolitik objectives as well as an instrument
of justice. In Nicaragua, for example, it is evident that the contras, even
with U.S. aid, have no chance of overthrowing the government. Moreover,
the prospect of Nicaragua becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union is tied
directly to Sandinista fears of continuing U.S. aggression. In other words,
the current policies of the U.S. regarding Nicaragua are not only unlaw-
ful, they are also self-defeating. They threaten to create the very condi-
tions they intend to prevent. Without a return to international law, the
prophecies of "another Cuba" will be self-fulfilled.
Should the Reagan administration continue to turn its back on inter-
national law in Central America, the victims of U.S.-backed repression
will eventually throw out their rulers. In the fashion of Nicaragua, each
successor government will join an expanding legion of states opposed to
the United States. Even more important, however, this country will lose
its capacity to bear witness as a righteous nation. A sinister parody of its
own best traditions, it will forfeit any remaining claims to moral leader-
ship, claims that lie at the heart of our widely-alleged superiority to the
Soviet Union.
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Confusing Victims and Victimizers:
Nicaragua and the Reinterpretation of
International Law
ROBERT A. FRIEDLANDER*
"The United Nations is the most concentrated assault on moral real-
ity in the history of free institutions, and it does not do to ignore that
fact or, worse, to get used to it." William Buckley'
"International law is that thing which the evil ignore and the
righteous refuse to endorse." Leon Uris 2
From the time of its earliest beginnings down to the present day,
public international law has been something less than a search for the
Holy Grail. Roman precedent provided the fertile soil for the roots of in-
ternational law, the writings of Augustine and Aquinas aided in its evolu-
tion, the development of sixteenth and seventeenth century classical the-
ory provided a firm foundation, and it was finally implemented by the
political realities surrounding the Peace of Westphalia.3 As it has evolved
over the past four and one-half centuries, the prime purpose of the law of
nations has been to prevent the emergence of a Darwinian global order.
The discredited political credo of the ancient world was that "might
made right." The charge of hostile critics in the present century, who ar-
gue that international law has failed to achieve its grandiose objectives,
has been that international law is merely what the international lawyers
delcare it to be. A jaundiced contemporary observer might add that inter-
national law, when viewed from a U.N. perspective, is what the anti-
Western bloc in the United Nations wants it to be."
International law does not consist of a fixed system of binding rules
imposed upon nation-states by the collective will of a world community.
* Professor of Law (On Leave), Pettit College of Law Ohio Northern University; Assis-
tant Counsel, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate. B.A. 1955, Northwestern University; M.A. 1957, Northwestern University;
Ph.D. 1963, Northwestern University; J.D. 1973, DePaul University College of Law. Mem-
ber, Advisory Board of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
The opinions presented in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect
in any way the views of the Subcommittee on the Constitution or of the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
1. Quoted in D. P. MOYNIHAN & S. WEAVER, A DANGEROUS PLACE 29 (1980).
2. L. URIs, ExoDus 498 (1958).
3. Cf P. HAGGENMACHECHER, GROTIUS ET LA DOCTRIN DE LA GUERRE JUSTE (1983); H.
WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA: FROM THE EARLIEST
TIMES TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1842, 1-64 (1845); Gross, The Peace of Westphalia,
1648-1948, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 25-46 (L. Gross ed. 1969).
4. Cf., e.g., MOYNIHAN & WEAVER, supra note 1, at 39-288.
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There is, for all intents and purposes, no compulsory judicial process.
Professor Beres writes of a law of the U.N. Charter and implies that it
contains a codified expression of international law." Professor Sohn opti-
mistically, and unrealistically, entitled a casebook of a generation ago:
Cases on United Nations Law, and then went on to write, in a second,
revised edition about a "constitutional law of the United Nations."'6 Yet,
despite their admonitions and exhortations, post-Charter international
law is not doing the job for which its advocates maintain it was intended.
Public international law is not a statutory system. It operates upon a
horizontal rather than a vertical plane and lacks a generalized means of
enforcement or coercion. Economic sanctions, as one form of coercion,
have not worked well, even when legitimated at the world community
level under the auspices of either the League of Nations or the United
Nations.7 The international legal process functions now, as in the past, on
the basis of comity, reciprocity, and mutuality. It is aided by treaties and
conventions, which in turn rely upon the principle of pacta sunt ser-
vanda, the good faith obligation to carry out treaty terms.
Treaties and conventions historically have provided much of the sub-
stantive nature of international law, though custom and tradition (partic-
ularly in the form of general practice) have been held to be of almost
equal significance. Professor D'Amato calls custom "perhaps the most ba-
sic and most important of the secondary rules of international law. . .."
Custom deals with a habitual activity more than a required pattern of
activity. Not by accident is pre-Charter international law often called cus-
tomary international law. Professor van Hoof, in his somewhat controver-
sial study of the sources of international law, claims that "custom is in
decline."9 A modern post-Charter tendency among the non-Western
United Nations majority is to emphasize the third category listed by Arti-
cle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice-"the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." The non-Western ma-
jority in the U.N. takes this view because they are able, by means of Gen-
eral Assembly declarations and resolutions, to refashion or to reinterpret
existing international norms, as well as to invent new ones.
What, then, is left as to the definitional aspect of international law?
Despite the extravagant claims made by its political advocates and aca-
demic acolytes, perhaps the most appropriate description is the famous
statement made by Justice Potter Stewart about a more exotic subject,
but which certainly can be made applicable to international law: I can't
define it, and I can't explain it, but I sure as heck know it when I see it.
5. L. BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER 101-104
(1984) [hereinafter cited as REALPOLITIK].
6. L. SOHN, CASES ON UNrrE NATIONS LAW (2nd. ed. rev. 1967).
7. For a recent dissenting view, see Editorial, When Sanctions Make Sense, The Econ-
omist, Aug. 3, 1985, at 59.
8. A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 270 (1971).
9. G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 114 (1983).
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International law is like its municipal counterpart in the sense that its
structure and institutions are merely reflective of the aspirations, ambi-
tions, and conduct of humankind. Not all of these characterizations are
particularly noble. In essence, public interntional law turns out to be a
code of generalized behavior governing the relations of nation-states. It is
not, as Professor Beres implies, a set of absolute principles to be enforced
and obeyed by the world community of nations. Whatever international
law is, it definitely is not a "branch of ethics."'
Public international law deals with such things as recognition of new
governments, creation of new states, the transfer of sovereignty, treaty
interpretation, determination of national and international boundaries,
self-defense, the laws of war-all being of prime importance in the turbu-
lent and chaotic contemporary world. Whether it be Central America, the
Middle East, or Southeast Asia, the fundamental challenge for the inter-
national legal system remains the same: How can stability and order be
introduced into regions where radical change is the desired end, and vio-
lence accompanied by disorder is the accepted and even the legitimated
means?
The twentieth century is unique in the history of international law in
that twice, following two prolonged global conflicts, an international se-
curity organization was created representing the world community of na-
tions. Each time the organization in question was given the express func-
tion of preserving a minimum standard of world order. Both the League
of Nations and the United Nations were, in origin and by design, collec-
tive security mechanisms which were specifically intended to maintain
and keep the peace. The League made a weak attempt and inevitably
failed. The United Nations in this respect seems to be following the same
path.1 '
Before the Second World War, in fact dating back to its very origins,
international law dealt primarily, if not exclusively, with nation-states.
Individuals, at best, were merely the objects of international law and not
the subjects. Since the end of the Second World War, largely as a result
of the Nuremberg trials, the U.N. Charter, and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights have brought individuals within the protection of the
international legal system. But so-called human rights "law" remains a
questionable body of principles, confusing and confounding the more set-
10. Beres, Ignoring International Law: U.S. Policy on Insurgency and Intervention in
Central America, 14 Den. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 77, 85 (1985) [hereinafter cited as International
Law].
11. The conservative columnist, James Kilpatrick, refers to U.N. debates as "the vapor-
ings of an impotent body,"and goes on to add "[i]ts purpose as a forum has been reduced to
a nullity." Kilpatrick, U.N. Assembly Again Shows Its Hypocrisy, The Blade (Toledo),
Sept. 23, 1981, at 14, col. 6. See also, Yesselson, Remarks, The United Nations: Reorganiz-
ing for World Order, 1976 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 144-148. Professor Yesselson's
phrase,"House of Blood," was expunged by the editors from the printed version.
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tied norms (themselves still debated) of public international law. 2 Pro-
fessor Beres has added to the confusion, and to the scholarly cacophony,
by melding together human rights, humanitarian intervention, and inter-
national law.
The claim that "contemporary international law concerning human
rights is necessarily founded upon a broad doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention,"113 is plainly in error. Humanitarian intervention, in the post-
Charter decades, is a highly controversial concept which has occasioned a
deep split among legal publicists. Humanitarian intervention can be a le-
gitimate and necessary remedy in certain well-defined instances (i.e.-ter-
rorists hostage seizure incidents),1 4 but non-Western support for this ap-
proach barely exists. The problem with Beres' analyses, and those by a
number of other critics of the Reagan Administration, 5 is that they com-
ingle and coalesce principles, norms, and rights, using these terms inter-
changeably, without careful distinction and delimitation. Their theoreti-
cal view of the law as it ought to be, rather than of the legal order as it
actually functions, implies-erroneously-that public international law is
a vertical system of law enforcement instead of a horizontal network of
mutuality and reciprocity.
From the time of the promulgation of the United Nations Charter, in
the last week of June, 1945, until the present day, the U.S. Department of
State has viewed the Charter of the United Nations as a multilateral
treaty, and a number of prestigous commentators share this view.' 6 This
means, first, that the U.N. Charter is not the fundamental law of the
world community of nations, although it can be considered as the consti-
tution of an international organization of sovereign entities. This signifies,
in turn, that the Charter is binding upon a particular member, or group
of members, in the same sense as the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (or
good faith obligation) operates with respect to the implementation of
treaty provisions between signatory parties.
12. Cf. the provacative analyses offered by M. MoscowiTz, THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1968); M. MOSKOWITZ, INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WITH HUMAN RIGHTS
(1974); M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? (1973); Watson, The Limited Utility of
International Law in the Protection of Human Rights, 1980 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 1-6;
Watson, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in Interna-
tional Law, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 609. For an opposing view, see the sweeping and all-embracing
claims put forward by L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978).
13. International Law, supra note 10, at 82; REALPOLITIK, supra note 5, at 107-8.
14. Friedlander, The Mayaguez in Retrospect: Humanitarian Intervention or Showing
the Flag?, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 601 (1978). For the authoritative pre-Charter view, see E.
STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921).
15. Among the most rabidly hostile are Sultan, Ronald Reagan on Human Rights: The
Gulag vs. the Death Squads, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 339 (1985); Boyle, International Law-
lessness in the Caribean Basin, 21-22 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 37 (1984); and REALPOLITIK, supra
note 5.
16. See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 622 (3rd. ed.
1979); G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 122,125 (6th
ed. 1976); J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 95 (1968).
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Second, violation of those treaty obligations, or the refusal to abide
by a specific obligation, raises the issue of how the failure to perform by
one party to a multilateral treaty affects the other signatories, or the ad-
versary signatory, in a confrontational situation. A fundamental question
for the international legal order, still unresolved, continues to be: what
role does the Charter play in the contemporary international legal sys-
tem? Professor Beres, in a rare moment of candor, reluctantly admits
that "[t]he state of nations is still the state of nature.'
7
President Reagan's foreign policy assumptions, even those that have
gone awry, have been favorably perceived by the majority of the Ameri-
can electorate, as contrasted with their decisive rejection of the ineffec-
tual Carter record, which current liberal analysts prefer not to remember.
A large portion of the general public believed that Carter had guessed
wrong on Iran and had guessed wrong on Nicaragua, when he literally
pulled the props out from under a weakening Samoza regime. The suc-
ceeding Reagan Administration, therefore, resolved to avoid any further
misjudgments occasioned by compromise and vacillation, which also
marked the generally unimposing Carter human rights record. Notwith-
standing the fact that the Carter White House claimed the highest prior-
ity for a human rights agenda, the realities of the Carter program were
confusion, disappointment, and frequent self-defeat.
For one thing, neither President Carter nor his State Department
subordinates ever defined human rights clearly, either for its friends or its
foes.18 For another, U.S. human rights implementation was properly
viewed by other governments as being arbitrary, capricious, vague, and
overbroad. In a final appearance before the Organization of American
States General Assembly in late November, 1980, the recently defeated
President assertively pointed with pride to what he claimed to be a new
governmental conscience created in the Western Hemisphere. Due in
good part to his efforts, Carter boasted, the cause of human rights had
now become an "historic movement."
The succeeding Reagan Administration quickly proclaimed a willing-
ness to aid the fight against radical terrorist insurrection or guerrilla in-
surgency in the Western Hemisphere. During the presidential campaign
of 1980, candidate Reagan warned, with respect to the threat of growing
Marxist subversion in Central America, that "[w]e are the last domino.""
Given the current security problems with Nicaragua and El Salvador, this
statement was hardly far-fetched. Thus, the Reagan Administration cor-
rectly maintained that a hands-off posture in Central America would in-
evitably result in an adverse domino effect.
17. REALPOLITIK, supra note 5, at 5.
18. See Friedlander, Human Rights Theory and NGO Practice: Where Do We Go
From Here? in GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO
STRATEGIES 219-222 (V. Nanda, J. Scarett, & G. Shepherd eds. 1981).
19. Quoted in Grande, A Splendid Little War: Drawing the Line in El Salvador, 6
INT'L SECURITY 27, 45 (Summer 1981).
1985
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Most critics of U.S. policy toward Central America, such as Professor
Beres, have yet to free themselves from the murky grip of the Vietnam
quagmire. All three presidential administrations during the last decade
found themselves immobilized by prior history and confrontational polit-
ics. It is undeniable that the Vietnam war dramatically exposed the limits
of American power in a dangerously chaotic world. It is also self-evident
that present U.S. policy in Central America represents, in part, a return
to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. This came about because Rea-
ganism in international affairs, as in domestic philosophy, sought to re-
vert to traditional values and to stress historic ideals.
Central America was chosen as the Administration's first ideological
battleground in the world arena. There is no doubt that the Reagan strat-
egy in Central America represents, basically, a return to the "Monroeism"
of the past. However, foreign intervention should be no more permissible
today than it was at the time of John Quincy Adams and James Monroe.
Based on the premise that freedom is not divisible, the national interest
is best served by opposing foreign governments propogating alien ideolo-
gies which initiate, sponsor, and sustain extremist insurgencies through-
out the Western Hemisphere.
There also appears to be emerging, though rather tentatively, a "Rea-
gan Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. So far, it has emphasized rhetoric
(a Reagan trademark) over specific implementation. But its meaning is
clear and gradually has been gathering congressional support. The pre-
mise under the Monroe Doctrine is simple and straightforward-that no
foreign government or expansionist ideology should be able to impose its
alien system by means of armed force from outside the Western Hemi-
sphere. The "Corollary," as it applies to Latin American and Carribean
regimes, is that military aid and assistance will be given to any beseiged
non-Marxist Latin American state whose political independence and ter-
ritorial integrity is violated by a hostile aggressor, espousing an expan-
sionists ideology.
That premise explains the U.S. security guarantee to Honduras. and
also explains the difference between the dangerous Soviet support of the
Sandinistas and the current Reagan Administration policy. The latter is
designed to protect not only the United States security interests, but also
hemispheric freedom. Russian and Cuban involvement in Nicaragua has
meant Marxist subversion in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and a growing mili-
tary threat to the borders of neighboring Honduras. These pressures re-
quire a policy similar to those of the Reagan Administration in order to
promote hemispheric peace.
The Monroe Doctrine has been, and remains, a generally recognized
legal norm.2 0 During the past generation, particularly under Presidents
Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, the United States interpreted Monroe's
20. Thomas & Thomas, The Organization of American States and the Monroe Doc-
trine-Legal Implications, 30 La. L. Rev. 541 (1970). For a critical approach, see Taylor,
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proclamation to be founded upon a previously asserted right to self-pres-
ervation, both for the United States and for the American continents. A
"Johnson Corollary" was created in connection with the 1965 U.S. inter-
vention in the Dominican Republic, wherein President Johnson justified
that actign as preventing a communist seizure of power in the Western
Hemisphere.2 The Dominican intervention was subsequently endorsed
by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.
TRB, The New Republic's lead columnist, wrote that "the Reagan
doctrine is the Brezhnev doctrine",2 2 and that the former implies that the
United States will uninhibitedly "molest" any nation in its national
desires.2 This argument ignores the factual reality. If there were any re-
maining doubts as to what the Sandinistas were up to in Central America,
they should by now be dispelled from the continuing indications of Nica-
raguan aid and assistance to the Marxist rebels in El Salvador. " Nicara-
gua has provided a haven for Red Brigade and PLO terrorists, and there
is more than mere suspicion that they have provided safe-refuge for other
perpetrators of international terror-violence.2  Those advocates of
Sandinista nobility and integrity seem to be rerunning the Vietnam story
all over again. "[T]here is already a richly elaborated romanticization of
the Sandinistas, much like the romanticization of the Vietnamese and
Cambodian Communists.
'26
Why the United States is held to an untenable standard by angry
critics of American foreign policy (wherever that policy may be applied),
while America's adversaries clearly are not, is one of the most perplexing
questions of U.S. academic and intellectual life. Despite the propagators
of political gloom and doom, American policy has worked in El Salvador
and democracy continues to improve, if it has not yet prevailed.2 ' No
journalist, to this writer's knowledge, has pointed to the fact that there
Jr., A Revival in Washington for the Monroe Doctrine, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1984, at 8, col.
1.
21. Rabe, The Johnson (Eisenhower?) Doctrine for Latin America, 9 DIPL. HIST. 95
(1985).
22. The Brezhnev Doctirne dates from 1968, when the First Secretary of the Soviet
Union Communist Party declared that once a state had become part of the Communist
system, it would not be allowed to revert back to its pre-Communist condition. Originally
applied to Eastern Eurpoe, it was later extended by implication to Central America, two
years after the invasion of Afghanistan. See Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and
Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L.
621, 678-9 (1985).
23. TRB, The Reagahnev Doctrine, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 29, 1985, at 4 and 41.
24. See, e.g., Omang, Nicaraguan Aid to Guerrillas Cited, The Washington Post, Aug. 9,
1984, at A31, col. 1.
25. Meese Assails Nicaragua, The Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1985, at A10, col.1. Pre-
mier Craxi of Italy denounced the Sandanistas for harboring some of the assassins of Aldo
Moro, when he visited the U.S. in March 1985.
26. Editorial, The Myths of Revolution, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 29, 1985, at 10.
27. For two examples of a worst case scenario by liberal critics of the Administration,
see Watson, A Test For Democracy, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26,1984, at 42-45; Preston, What Du-
arte Won, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Aug. 15, 1985, at 30-35.
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are tens of thousands of Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica, Honduras,
Mexico, and the United States, who by the summer of 1985, numbered
more than 50,000.28
The Soviet Union and its Cuban surrogates do not play by the rules,
nor do they care how the game is constituted, as long as they can destab-
lize or dominate the other players. This has forced the U.S. to make some
hard choices. Among the hardest was the decision of the Reagan Adminis-
tration to refuse to litigate the merits of the Nicaraguan charges against
the United States in the International Court of Justice (and to abstain
from litigating Nicaragua's violations of international law). Much heat
and considerable emotion have been generated by the U.S. withdrawal
from the Nicaraguan case. Probably the most restrained criticism, as
compared with that of Professor Beres, was the observation of two politi-
cal scientists that "[in challenging the Court's jurisdiction and subse-
quently abandoning its proceedings, the United States has called into
question the sincerity of its commitment to a public international order
under the rule of law."
2 9
The former Legal Adviser to the Department of State explained to
the author of this essay that "[c]onfidentially, we knew before we went to
the Hague that we were going to lose the case." 30 In fact, any impartial
observer could have warned the American delegation about making a spe-
cial appearance to contest jurisdiction as unsound legal strategy. Of
course, the World Court was going to take the case-if it did not, all that
would be left to the Court in the future would be the power to decide the
ultimate fate of contractual parties, territorial boundaries, and offshore
fishing rights.
One can argue that the political makeup of the Court is inherently at
odds with its juridical function. The dominance of nation-states would
tend to show that Justices of the World Court are inherently biased in
favor of their own national views (and more than susceptable to their own
government's political agenda), 1 but that also depends upon whose ox is
gored. The United States, an unwilling participant in the Nicaragua
case, 32 readily agreed to World Court jurisdiction in the recent U.S.-Cana-
dian fishing rights dispute, with a rather satisfactory outcome for the
American position. The same was true of the Tehran hostages case, 4
where the Soviet judge and the existing Islamic judge voted the way one
28. Senator David Durenberger (R., Minn.) has called it "a conspiracy of silence ......
131 CONG. REC. S1030 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 1985).
29. Joyner & Grimaldi, supra note 22, at 687.
30. Conversation with Davis Robison, Esq., U.S. Department of State, Washington,
D.C., Feb.28, 1985.
31. See Franck, Icy Day at the ICJ, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 379, 380-1 (1985).
32. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 215.
33. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Feb. 24, 1985).
34. United States Diplomatic & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 4.
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would expect. Given existing political considerations, many other govern-
ments were too vulnerable to future injury to have the decision turn out
adversely from the U. S. perspective. On the other hand, the decision
meant nothing as far as subsequent world events were concerned.
There has been much hand-wringing over the American decision to
refrain from participating in the adjudication of the merits of the Nicara-
gua case," largely centering on the need for an international rule of law.
The real issue remains, however, whose rules and what law? The very fact
that the Court virtually ignored its own prohibition against involving it-
self in an ongoing armed conflict, despite the nature of the Nicaraguan
charges, and of the U.S. counter-charges, demonstrates that the World
Court was primarily interested in extending its own competence and only
secondarily interested in refining and defining the substantive issues.
Last, but certainly not least, is the question of the significance of
World Court decisions in international law. Here, the answer is less than
clear, since in World Court practice, stare decisis, is not recognized as an
official technique of decision-making. Moreover, as Professor van Hoff has
pointed out, the major effect of World Court jurisprudence is confined to
the parties before the Court in a particular dispute."6 A number of au-
thorities have despaired in recent years about the dwindling of the
Court's prestige and about the noticeable diminution of its influence.3"
Consequently, the Court has utilized the Nicaraguan complaint to revive
its flagging fortunes and to restore its fading image. The problem is that
this re-energizing has occurred at U.S. expense.
Critics of the Reagan Administration have for the most part gener-
ated more heat than light (exacerbated by the Administration's over-
blown rhetoric). On the other hand, as the Anglo-American journalist,
Henry Fairlie, has cogently observed, "America is not an empire, and
lives in a world in which it cannot claim to be an empire, but it has not
yet defined its role." 8 As in the past, the argument between Administra-
tion supporters and Administration opponents, between liberal critics and
conservative defenders, between polemicists and legalists, continues to be
over the nature of that role. Nowhere has this been more dramatically
focused than on Nicaragua.
The distinguished scholar, George Lichtheim, no unabashed admirer
of U.S. foreign policy, has wisely written that "casting the United States
in the role of the global aggressor results in nothing but further obfusca-
tion."' 9 The hard fact and cold reality is that the Soviet Union and its
Cuban surrogate have created a Marxist-oriented fortress in Central
35. Hassan, A Legal Analysis of the United States' Attempted Withdrawal from the
Jurisdiction of the World Court in the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua, 10 U. DAYTON
L.J. 295 (1985).
36. VAN Hoop, supra note 9, at 170-176, 267.
37. See id., at 173-175.
38. Fairlie, The Empire's New Clothes, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 29, 1985, at 17-19.
39. G. LICHTHEIM, IMPERIALISM 147 (1972).
1985
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
America in the guise of the Sandinista regime. One might well ask, if the
Sandinistas were not fighting the rebel Contras, then what would they do
with their oversized army and extensive military hardware? The Contras
are in fact performing an important Central American security function,
which is the prevention of Nicaraguan expansionism (in contrast to the
Vietnam example, wherein Vietnam's neighbors have been unable, or un-
willing, to prevent Vietnamese aggression).
Secretary of State, George Schultz, in a speech delivered on February
22, 1985, to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, put the essence of
the Administration's concern clearly, cogently, and effectively;
There is a self-evident difference between those fighting to impose
tyranny and these fighting to resist it .... In each situation it must
always be clear whose side we are on-the side of those who want to
see a world based on respect for national independence, for human
rights, for freedom and the rule of law... but where dictatorships use
brute power to oppress their own people and threaten their neighbors,
the forces of freedom cannot place their trust in declarations alone.40
Name-calling and pious platitudes do not clarify issues and rarely
sharpen intellectual debate. International law must be understood before
it can be applied. To confuse victims with victimizers is a dangerous way
of formulating national policies.
40. Schultz, We Must Not Fail the Freedom Fighters, Reader's Digest, June 1985, at
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The Nuclear Collision Course: Can
International Law Be Of Help?
JOHN H.E. FRIED*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the four decades since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the build-up
of nuclear weapons has spiraled beyond the worst fears and most strenu-
ous warnings. Although recent research has revealed that the effects of a
major nuclear war would be even more catastrophic than hitherto ex-
pected (a nuclear night followed by nuclear winter), ever more sophisti-
cated nuclear weapons are being produced and planned. There is the
prospect of a new dimension to the arms race in outer space, competitive
preparations by the superpowers for "star wars." The seemingly axio-
matic conviction that nuclear war is unthinkable has been superceded by
plans for protracted and winnable "limited" nuclear war. The fundamen-
tal question arises: Is the use of nuclear weapons permitted by interna-
tional law?
Self-styled realists consider the question naive; they assert that
states will pay little heed to law when their national interests are at stake.
However, the realists are only able to advocate reliance on intensified
force, and in today's world, intensified force ultimately suggests nuclear
war.
Respect for the rules of international conduct is a basic requirement
for a viable international community.' As Chancellor James Kent said in
1826:
A comprehensive and scientific knowledge of international law is
highly necessary. . .to every gentleman who is animated by liberal
views and a generous ambition to assume stations of high public trust.
It would be exceedingly to the discredit of any person who should be
called to take a share in the councils of the nation, if he should be
found deficient in all the great learning of this law. 2
Without international law (the sum total of treaties, customs and
principles that regulate the mutual conduct of states), the world could
* John H. E. Fried, PH.D., Columbia University; LL.D., Vienna University; Professor
of Political Science, City University of New York (emer.); Member, Committee on the Law
of Armed Conflict, Am. Branch, International Law Assoc.; Consultative Council, Lawyers
Committee on Nuclear Policy; Special Legal Consultant to the Judges, U.S. War Crimes
Tribunals, Nuremberg.
1. For a searching, non-legalistic analysis, see G. CRAIG & A. GEORGE, FORCE AND STATE-
CRAFT: DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS OF OUR TIME (1983).
2. 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 19-20 (1826), cited by W. BISHOP JR.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at 17 (2d ed. 1962).
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not function, just as no society could function without domestic law. As
domestic law deals, in part, with disturbances threatening the domestic
community, so does international law include an elaborate body of rules
concerning war between nations.
For a discussion of the impact which the international law of war 3
must have on governmental policies, some facts should first be recalled:
(1) The international law of war is binding. Governments instruct
their Armed Forces to respect the law of war. As the basic U.S. Army
Field Manual says about the treaties on the law of war which it incorpo-
rates: "the treaty provisions quoted herein must be observed by both mil-
itary and civilian personnel with the same strict regard for both the letter
and the spirit of the law which is required for the Constitution and stat-
utes. . . ." The basic U.S. Air Force Treatise on the conduct of armed
conflict states that:
The law of armed conflict is essentially inspired by the humanitarian
desire of civilized nations to diminish the effects of conflicts .... It
has been said to represent in some measure the minimum standards
of civilization... [Ilts permanence is 'based on a general conscious-
ness of stringent and permanent obligation'. . . .We in the Air Force
constantly benefit from the existence of international law .... I
(2) The international law of war is not imposed either on govern-
ments or on the military. Existing treaty rules were drafted at interna-
tional conferences in collaboration with, and with the approval of, the
military experts of the participating countries. Hence, the rules imply
that the military found it useful to limit the extent of violence permissi-
ble against the enemy, because this equally limits the extent of permissi-
ble violence by the enemy.
(3) History shows that while the destructiveness of military technol-
ogy has increased, so has the condemnation of war. By 1928, the Kellogg-
Briand Pact prohibited war as an instrument of national policy. The U.N.
Charter calls war a scourge. The General Assembly stigmatized a war of
aggression as a "crime against international peace."' The Charter forbids
not only use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State (except in self-defense "if an armed attack occurs")
but forbids even the threat of force." These fundamental rules also pro-
hibit the use or threat of use of any weapons against another country in
3. It is more precisely called "the law of armed conflict" in order to prevent the subter-
fuge that military hostilities, when called "police action" or the like, are not subject to the
rules of war.
4. DEPT.OF THE ARMY, FM27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE art. 7 (1956). [hereinafter
cited as U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL].
5. DEPT OF THE AIR FORCE, AFP 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 6-5 (1976) (Also known as U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE) [herein-
after cited as U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE].
6. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19), U.N. Doc. A/9619 and Corr. 1 (1974).
7. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, para. 4, and 51.
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military actions such as a "surgical strike" on any specific object or area
or group of persons, a "demonstration explosion," or an attack in pursuit
of any political aim. These rules prohibit any pre-emptive or anticipatory
attack. As one commentator stated: "[S]omeday tensions between the So-
viet Union and the United States may be so high that the only security
either nation will have against a war of annihilation will be the clear legal
rule prohibiting anticipatory self-defense."
(4) Society's aversion to the cruelty of war (which is characteristic of
our era) is relevant for the interpretation of rules that become binding
when, despite all prohibitions, war occurs. These rules must be inter-
preted restrictively, insofar as they permit violence, and extensively, inso-
far as they forbid violence.
(5) Grave breaches of the law of war are crimes, regardless of whether
or not those responsible for them are tried.
Keeping these considerations in mind, what are the implications of
international law concerning the use of nuclear weapons?
II. FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. Nuclear Warfare Violates the Fundamental Rules of Combat
It is sometimes asserted that nuclear weapons are "ordinary weapons
just as any other weapons" and, consequently, mankind must live with
them or, as the case may be, die from them. Obviously, they are not "or-
dinary" weapons. Their effects threaten calamities beyond the capacity of
conventional weapons. As has often been asserted, once the threshold be-
tween conventional and nuclear war is crossed, unparalleled catastrophe
is unavoidable.9
Even accepting, arguendo, that nuclear weapons are like other weap-
ons, this assumption does not show that their use is permissible. To the
contrary, the very assumption proves the illegality of nuclear warfare. For
if nuclear weapons are weapons like any other then the rules for non-
nuclear combat must also apply to nuclear combat. Any rule that prohib-
its the use of conventional weapons must also prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons. The difference is that non-nuclear weapons can be used without
violating the rules of combat, whereas nuclear weapons cannot.
This fact becomes apparent by reviewing the basic rules of combat
laid down in the Hague Regulations of 1907 10, which were confirmed and
8. D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 588
(1983).
9. To point out the basic difference between nuclear and conventional warfare is, of
course, not meant as advocacy for conventional war as the smaller evil. The very assumption
that conventional war is "preferable" implies the inevitability of war. And as long as war
plans provide for mixed conventional-nuclear combat from the onset of hostilities, rapid
escalation into full nuclear war is assured.
10. The Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, 1907,
art. 18 (annex), 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
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adapted to modern conditions in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, four
years after the advent of nuclear weapons. Although the Conventions of
1949 make no specific reference to nuclear weapons, it is precisely be-
cause special rules for nuclear weapons were never promulgated that gen-
eral rules which forbid or restrict the use of any weapon must apply to
nuclear weapons.
The ground rule of the entire law of war stipulates that "the right of
belligerents to adopt measures of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.""1
This means that the rules of war, and not the technological possibilities,
determine the limits of permissible violence in war.
Another basic principle of the law of war specifically bans the use of
an entire category of weapons, regardless of whether their use would be
technologically possible or militarily advantageous: "it is especially pro-
hibited to employ arms, projectiles, or materials of a nature to cause un-
necessary suffering." 12
This rule protects not only civilians, but also the military forces
(combatants). The U.S. Air Force Treatise states: "[T]he rule against un-
necessary suffering applies also to the manner of use of a weapon or
method of warfare against combatants or enemy military objectives."' 3
It states further that, "It]he rule prohibiting the use of weapons causing
unncessary suffering or superfluous injury is firmly established in interna-
tional law," going back to the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration which pro-
hibited "the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the suffering
of disabled men or render their death inevitable.
'1 4
Since nuclear arms are unquestionably of a nature to cause unneces-
sary suffering, their use is prohibited by this general rule. The prohibition
applies also to the use of accurate "counterforce" nuclear weapons against
"military objectives" (such as ammunition depots and silos where mili-
tary personnel would be hit by them).
Nuclear warfare would also not respect what the International Red
Cross calls "the very basis of the whole law of war," 15 namely, the distinc-
tion between combatants and civilians. It is true that in every war, civil-
ian casualties will occur although non-combatants are, in principle, im-
mune. As the 1976 U.S. Air Force Treatise states: "This immunity of the
civilian population does not preclude unavoidable and incidental civilian
casualties which may occur during attacks against military objectives and
which are not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
11. Id. art. 22.
12. Id. art. 23(e).
13. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 2.
14. Id.
15. INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, 4 COMMENTARY TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTION 153
(1958)[hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY].
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advantages anticipated." 16
The proposition that "unavoidable and incidental" civilian casualties
may result from otherwise legitimate military action may have to be tol-
erated by the harsh logic of war. But at what point do such incidental
consequences, precisely because they are unavoidable, become so nefari-
ous as to make a military action illegitimate?
The multi-million civilian death toll expected from even a limited
use of tactical nuclear arms cannot be considered "unavoidable and inci-
dental" and hence tolerable. The law of war carefully distinguishes be-
tween permissible destruction and prohibited devastation. It permits the
destruction of military objects, yet it does not permit destruction beyond
the limits it has set. The notions that a purpose of war is destruction for
destruction's sake; that destruction is a success in itself; that the more
desolation caused, the better; that war may aim at preventing the enemy
country's recovery after the war's end - are anathema to the honorable
profession of arms. Three important provisions of the law of war state:
(a) Prohibition of indiscriminate destruction: "it is especially forbid-
den. . .to destroy. . .the enemy's property, unless such destruction. . .be
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."1 "Property" here
means any property movable or immovable, public or private, from a sin-
gle object to an entire city.
(b) Prohibition of attacking or bombarding undefended places: "The
attack or bombardment by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings
or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." 11 Thanks to this rule,
Rome and Paris were saved from destruction in World War II when they
were declared undefended, or open cities. Such cities could not be ex-
empted from radioactive fallout caused by nuclear strategic area bomb-
ings or tactical precision attacks on defended places.
(c) Prohibiton of attacks on civilian hospitals: "Civilian hospi-
tals. . .may in no circumstances be the object of attack, but shall at all
times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict." 19 Obvi-
ously, hospitals could not be protected against radioactive fallout.
B. "Prisoners Will Not Be Taken"
The law of war states that members of the armed forces have the
right to surrender, individually or in units, however large, and become
prisoners of war. Thereupon, the enemy must provide them with shelter,
food, medical care, clothing, etc. "until their final release and repatria-
16. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 6.
17. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 23(g).
18. Id. art. 24.
19. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 18, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. [hereinafter cited
as Civilian Convention].
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tion. ' 'So This safety valve guaranteed by the law of war, which even in the
fury of World War II saved millions of lives, would be closed in nuclear
war. In the U.S.-Indochina war, when the U.S. combined intense conven-
tional air warfare with ground warfare, large numbers of Indochinese
soldiers were still taken prisoner. But, in long-distance nuclear war, the
possiblity to surrender would not exist. The situation would be the same
as that of a declaration that "no quarter will be given." Such a declara-
tion is among the methods of war "especially forbidden" by the Hague
Regulations. 21
C. Nuclear Warfare Would Violate the Immunity of Neutral States
Nuclear warfare would not only transgress the law which regulates
combat between belligerent states, but would also transgress the rules
regulating the behavior of belligerents toward neutral states. The most
sacrosanct of these is the time-honored axiom that "[the territory of
neutral Powers is inviolate." 22 Disregard for this immunity of neutrals is
considered a particularly grave outrage.
The 1976 U.S. Air Force Treatise states that "particular weapons or
methods of warfare may be [considered] prohibited because of their indis-
criminate effects. . .Indiscriminate weapons are those incapable of being
controlled, through design or function. . . . Uncontrollable ef-
fects. . .may include injury to the civilian population of other States as
well as injury to an enemy's civilian population." 23
The Secretary-General's Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons
declares: "In a nuclear war. . .all nations in the world would experience
grave physical consequence from radioactive fallout. . .and during the
decades after a major nuclear war, fallout would take a toll of millions
worldwide in present and future generations." 24
It would be sophistry to assert that the catastrophe predicted for
countries uninvolved in the nuclear conflict would not violate the immu-
nity of their territory guaranteed by Hague Convention V. 25 Even if nu-
clear warfare could be conducted between belligerents in obedience to the
rules of war, the disastrous consequences for the neutrals would prohibit
it.
The situation of certain neutral states, namely those which harbor
nuclear weapons of a belligerent state on their territory, is particularly
20. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
21. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 23(d).
22. Id. art. 1.
23. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 6-3.
24. Comprehensive study on Nuclear Weapons, Report by the Secretary General, para.
495, U.N. Doc. A/35/392 (1980). The study calls nuclear weapons "a perpetual menace to
human society." id. para. 490.
25. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
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serious. They are exposed to unintended radiation effects of nuclear war-
fare between others and risk that the belligerent's opponent will deny
their status as neutrals.
For a state wishing to remain neutral in a war between others, it is
not enough to abstain from fighting on either side. In order to claim the
status of a neutral, the state must fulfill certain obligations. First, it must
not allow "belligerents to use its territory as a base of operations in
war."2 The Hague Convention demands that "[a] neutral Power which
receives on its territory troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall
intern them, as far as possible, at a distance from the theatre of war." 27
Logically, and by universal practice, the arms of the interned foreign
troops must also be seized. As the U.S. Army Field Manual states, these
troops "must be disarmed." 28 Since, as the Manual explains, this refers
to their "munitions, arms, vehicles, and other equipment," 29 nuclear
weapons must also be seized.
These obligations would have to be fulfilled by any European NATO
country which would decide to remain neutral in the event of a U.S.-So-
viet war." However, NATO has systematically combined and interwoven
its members' preparations for instantaneous war, and nuclear weapons
are avaiable to U.S. forces on the soil of several European NATO coun-
tries. At the start of a U.S.-Soviet war, those claiming the status of neu-
trals would therefore have to seize such arms within minutes. This, of
course, would be impossible.
The Soviet Union would have to expect that U.S. nuclear weapons
deployed in NATO countries would be used against it or its allies. Hence,
the Soviet Union could rightly claim that those countries, although they
do not actively participate in the war, do not have neutral status and it
26. 2 L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUDERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 727 (7th ed. 1952).
27. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 11.
28. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 533.
29. Id. art. 536.
30. See NATO Treaty, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1793, TIAS No. 2678. " If an armed
attack on any NATO member occurs, each shall take "such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force." (Art. 5). Hence, each NATO member has the sovereign
right to take no action, military or otherwise. Furthermore, in order to exclude the interpre-
tation that any NATO member must go to war whenever any other NATO member goes to
war, the Treaty underscores the obvious, namely that each NATO member would take the
fatal decision to go to war "in accordance with its constitutional processes." (Art. 11) Evi-
dently, neither the U.S. nor any other country would, without such safeguard, have entered
the NATO alliance.
It should also be noted that the NATO Treaty does not specify the country or countries
against which it is to apply. While having primarily the Soviet Union in mind, the Treaty
applies to an attack by any State against a NATO State in the NATO area. Had the treaty
established an automatic obligation to go to war, this would, in case of an attack by NATO
member A against NATO member B, scurrilously require the other NATO member States
to fight NATO member A. In fact, this could conceivably have occurred already if Turkey's
1974 invasion of Cyprus and subsequent occupation of a large part of the island had led to
war between NATO members Greece and Turkey.
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may therefore destroy those weapons. 3
This principle applies equally to the non-NATO countries of the
world that wish to stay out of a U.S.-Soviet war, but harbor U.S. nuclear
weapons. 32 It also applies to Warsaw-Pact and non-Warsaw-Pact States
in which Soviet nuclear weapons may be located. Thus, a U.S.-Soviet war
in Europe would, from its inception, threaten to assume global dimen-
sions because both sides would feel compelled to eliminate the danger of
weapons available to the opponent in third countries.
D. Fate of Enemy Areas "Won" by Nuclear Attack
It has been necessary to conclude that the law of combat and the law
of neutrality prohibit nuclear warfare. The same is true of the law of bel-
ligerent occupation.
The law of belligerent occupation is based on the proposition that it
is the very aim of war to penetrate and thereupon to occupy parts or even
the whole of the enemy's territory. From the moment of occupation, and
for as long as the occupation lasts, "the authority of the legitimate power
[has] in fact passed into the hands of the occupant.""3 The occupant must
"take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possi-
ble, public order and safety." "To the fullest extent of the means availa-
ble to it, the occupying power has the duty of ensuring the food and med-
ical supplies of the population."3 5 The occupant must "in particular,
bring in [from outside the occupied territory] the necessary foodstuffs,
medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory
are inadequate." 36
31. However, if the U.S. had not used nuclear weapons first (from whatever location) ,
the Soviet Union would by its own no first-use pledge be prevented from using nuclear arms
for the purpose.
32. The situation can be illustrated by referring to the Philippines and Japan. Two of
the most important overseas American installations are in the Philippines. The Subic Naval
Base is the U.S. Navy's largest logistical support base in the Western Pacific, and Clark Air
Base (headquarters of the 13th Air Force) is the largest U.S. airbase in East Asia; the com-
plex of bases is staffed by 15,400 military and Department of Defense personnel. See W.
Bello, Springboards for Intervention, Instruments for Nuclear War, SourrHEAST CHRONICLE,
at 3,5 (Apr. 1983).
In Japan, the U.S. presence consists of some 50,000 troops provided with aircraft, and
major facilities such as naval ports and communications, command and control stations. A
Marine Corps station, some 11,000 strong, is located at Iwakuni, 20 miles from Hiroshima.
See G. Mitchell, Rearming Japan, IN THESE TIMEs, at 12,13 ( Aug. 2, 1985).
The U.S. policy not to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons also applies to
the Philippines and Japan. If none are there, they could in a crisis be brought in quickly,
whereupon the obligation of the host nation, to seize those weapons and 'intern the U.S.
forces ( pursuant to Hague Convention), would apply but could hardly be fulfilled.
33. Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 42.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Civilian Convention, supra note 19, art. 55. "Article 55, Geneva Civilian Con-
vention, confirming extensive responsibility for the welfare of the occupied territory, im-
poses upon the occupying power the duty of ensuring food and medical supplies to the best
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The vast obligations of the occupant (to which numerous others
listed in the law of war would have to be added) apply to "the occupied
territory," and hence also to occupied areas not directly affected by com-
bat but where these supplies are needed.
However, the phrase, "[t]o the fullest extent of the means available
to [the Occupant]" " qualifies the obligation in any occupied area. The
significance of the qualification must be considered. In particular, the In-
ternational Red Cross Committee's Commentary states:
The rule that the Occupying Power is responsible for the provision of
supplies for the population places that Power under a definite obliga-
tion to maintain at a reasonable level the material conditions under
which the population of the occupied territory lives. The inclusion of
the phrase 'to the fullest extent of the means available to it' shows,
however, that the authors of the Convention did not wish to disregard
the material difficulties with which the Occupying Power might be
faced in wartime (financial and transport problems, etc) but the Occu-
pying Power is nevertheless under an obligation to utilize all the
means at its disposal. 8
The Commentary then underscores the extent of the obligation:
"Supplies for the population are not limited to food, but include medical
supplies and any article necessary to support life."39 In addition,
[t]he duty of ensuring supplies is reinforced by an obligation to bring
in the necessary articles when the resources of the occupied territory
are inadequate. . . . The Convention does not lay down the method
by which this is to be done. The occupying authorities retain complete
freedom of action in regard to this, and are thus in a position to take
the circumstances of the moment into account. 40
The Commentary concludes by suggesting some concrete measures
that the occupant should take "in good time" "I to facilitate imports to
the occupied territory, for example, arranging for free transit subject to
the occupant's verification and control.
The significance of the Commentary lies in the emphasis it puts on
the legal obligation of belligerents not to let helpless enemy populations
perish but "to support their life" 42 as well as possible by potentially ma-
jor undertakings. The question arises whether the rules of belligerent oc-
cupation become irrelevant when, under the conditions of nuclear war,
of its capabilities, even if it has to bring these in from outside the territory." U.S. AIR FORCE
TREATISE, supra note 5, at 41.
37. Id.
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they can hardly be obeyed. How could either superpower, upon becoming
the occupant, take "the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary
to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics" ,4 from
thousands of miles away and "to the fullest extent of the means available
to it," 4, as stipulated in the Geneva Civilians Convention? The super-
powers' own medical personnel and medical supplies, decimated by the
war, could not even begin to take care of the casualties at home. A 1984
Report of the World Health Organization estimates that:
[t]he detonation of even a single 1-megaton bomb over a large city
would kill more than 1.5 million people and injure as many. A 'lim-
ited' nuclear war with smaller tactical nuclear weapons totalling 20
megatons, aimed at military targets in a relatively densely populated
area would exact a toll of about 9 million dead and seriously injured,
of whom more than 8 million would be civilians, an all-out nuclear
war... would result in more than 1000 million deaths and 1000 mil-
lion injured people... Therefore, the only approach to the treatment
of health effects of nuclear explosions is primary prevention of such
explosions, that is, the prevention of atomic war.
4
1
This counsel by W.H.O. experts is even more justified by two other
aspects of nuclear war which these experts do not address directly.
First, the primary purpose of occupying enemy territory during war
is to deprive the enemy of the capability of using the territory and its
resources for military purposes; to wage war from it. To achieve this aim,
it is not necessary, and therefore not legitimate under the military con-
cept of "economy of force," 46 always to inflict great damage on that terri-
tory or its population. But a no-occupation strategy could not be carried
out with restraint; it could only make the territory militarily useless to
the enemy by devasting it.
Second, even after the end of nuclear hostilities, the "victor" would
find its own country in a disastrous situation, and be unable to undertake
the massive relief actions desperately needed by the defeated side, such
as those rendered after World War II to the defeated Axis countries by
the Allies - notably by the United States which was unscathed by the
war.
Indeed, the cruelest irony of long-distance nuclear war is that there
would be no occupation of enemy territory. Bombardments by long-range
missles and bombers are capable of destroying their targets (which would
inevitably also produce large-scale lethal radiation beyond their targets)
but are evidently incapable of occupying territory. In short, the enemy
areas subjected to those bombardments would not be occupied because
43. Civilian Convention, supra note 36, art. 56.
44. Id.
45. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS IN MEDICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC HEALTH: EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR
ON HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES 5-6 (1984).
46. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 5-8.
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this is neither intended nor physically possible. The survivors would be
relinquished to their own misery. Anarchy, famine and epidemics would
be left unchecked. This aspect of nuclear war is hardly ever mentioned.
47
No rule of international law obligates a belligerent to occupy enemy
territory which his attacks have "made ripe" for occupation. The law of
war does not prescribe military strategy, but it sets the limits of permissi-
ble strategy. To occupy ("conquer") enemy territory has been the essen-
tial goal in war, the very purpose of strategy, the pride of generals, and
the hoped for justification of the sacrifices imposed by war, from Troy to
Stalingrad, and from Richmond to Hanoi. Yet the question now is
whether nuclear war technology makes occupation of enemy territory un-
feasible, and therefore grants a belligerent the right to devastate enemy
territory and take no responsibility for the fate of the survivors.
In fact, nuclear war would deprive the attacked opponent of the pal-
liative that has made even the worst wars (until now) somehow surviv-
able, namely, the occupation of the enemy territory "won" during the
war, whereupon the occupant has had to provide the survivors with the
essentials of life.
To leave the survivors of nuclear attack to oblivion is both morally
repulsive and legally impermissible. It condemns possibly millions of peo-
ple to horrible suffering subsequent to exposing them, illegally, to the at-
tack itself. Moreover, the law of war (the Preamble to the Hague Regula-
tions IV) 48 generally forbids methods of warfare which, although not
specifically forbidden, are contrary to "the usages established among civi-
lized peoples, the laws of humanity, or the dictates of the public con-
science." 11
F. The Law of Humanity and the Dictates of the Public Conscience
Forbid Nuclear War
We have so far surveyed specific rules of the international law on
armed conflict which make nuclear warfare illegal. In addition, nuclear
warfare is implicitly forbidden by a general rule appearing in the Hague
Regulations of 1907.50 The makers of these Regulations, statesmen, gener-
als and jurists, intended to create a truly comprehensive code of the law
of war. However, knowing that the development of war technology was
unforeseeable, they agreed that the Regulations had to provide for future
developments, so as not to become incomplete and obsolete. Therefore,
they inserted a general clause into the Preamble to the Regulations,
known as the "Martens Clause."'" The Martens Clause stipulates that if
methods of warfare are not foreseen by the Regulations, but are contrary
47. U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ANNUAL REPORT (1980).
48. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
49. Id.
50. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
51. Id.
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to "the usages established among civilized peoples, to the laws of human-
ity, to the dictates of the public conscience,"52 then they are forbidden by
those overriding standards themselves, without the need for any addi-
tional treaty.
This principle, which a U.S. Nuremberg Tribunal called "more than
a pious declaration," namely, "a legal yardstick," " is repeated in all ma-
jor treaties on the law of war concluded since the advent of the nuclear
age.
The urgent warnings by statesmen, religious leaders, medical authori-
ties, physicists, environmentalists, and professionals in many other fields,
including the military, 54 and the intensity and ubiquity of the general
protest movement "dictate" that governments abstain from initiating nu-
clear war.
Considering the obligation to respect the conscience of the world and
remembering the more specific demands of the law of war discussed
above, nuclear warfare is manifestly prohibited by international law.
55
Yet, in spite of all this there exist arguments - and they are widely ac-
cepted - claiming the permissibility of nuclear warfare.
G. Arguments Asserting that Nuclear War is Permissible
The most influential of these arguments is that there exists no treaty
which specifically outlaws the use of nuclear weapons. Hence, it is main-




53. IX TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No.10, , Nuernberg October 1946-April 1949, at 1340 [hereinafter
cited as T.W.C.].
54. See, e.g., the statements of American, British, Dutch, French, Greek, Italian, Portu-
guese and West German retired generals and admirals. GENERALE FOR DEN FRIEDEN (G.
Kade ed. 1982).
55. "It seems inescapable that nuclear warfare is contrary to the core precepts of inter-
national law." B.H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and International Law: Illegality in Con-
text, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 5 (1983). Professor Weston reached the same conclusion in
his longer study: Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: A Contextual Reassessment,
28 McGiLL L.J. 542-590, at 562 (1983).
Professor Wolfgang Daubler points out that the view that existing international law
unambiguously prohibits the first use (unzweideutiges verbot des Ersteinsatzes) of nuclear
weapons is "almost universally shared by the science of international law" (fast einhellige
Auffassung der Volkerrechts-Wissenschaft). W. DAUBLER, STATIONIERING UND GRINDGESETZ
54, 187 (1982). See also, J. Goldblat, Nuclear War Cannot Be Conducted with Obedience to
the Rules of International Law, BULL. OF PEACE PROPOSALS 317 (Apr. 1982); see also papers
presented by members of the American Society of International Law at a Conference on
Nuclear Weapons and Law, 7 NOVA L.J. (1982); Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy,
Statement on the Illegality of Nuclear Weapons (rev. ed. 1984).
56. See, e.g., Almond, Nuclear Weapons are Legal Tools, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIEN-
TISTs 32-35 (May, 1985).
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The official position of the U.S. is expressed in its two most impor-
tant military texts. The U.S. Army Field Manual states: "The use of ex-
plosive 'atomic weapons,' whether by air, sea or land forces, cannot as
such be regarded as violative of international law in the absence of any
customary rule of international law or international convention restricting
their employement. ' 5 7 The words "as such" can only mean that the re-
strictions contained in the law of war, especially those of the Hague Reg-
ulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, apply also to what the
Manual calls "explosive atomic weapons", but which evidently includes
all nuclear weapons. Their employment is not illegal because they are nu-
clear weapons ("as such"). Rather, it is illegal because international law
makes illegal the employment of any weapon that is "of a nature to cause
unnecessary suffering. "58
This is confirmed by the analogous formulation in the U.S. Air Force
Treatise which states: "The use of explosive nuclear weapons, whether by
air, sea or land forces, cannot be regarded as violative of existing interna-
tional law in the absence of any international rule of law restricting their
employment."5 9 Here the words "as such" in the 1956 U.S. Army Field
Manual are replaced by the immediately following sentence: "Nuclear
weapons can be directed against military objectives as can conventional
weapons."6 0
The legal situation described in these statements should be clear:
since no specific ban against nuclear weapons exists, the general rules of
war apply to them. However, the U.S. texts conclude from this premise
that nuclear weapons can be used in obedience to those rules. Such a
conclusion is incorrect, even for limited or tactical warfare.
The unnecessasry suffering of enemy combatants and the risks to ci-
vilians and friendly forces anticipated in even limited nuclear war, can be
seen from a provision in the 1976 U.S. Army Field Manual Operations:
A soldier exposed to 650 rads... can be expected to die in a few
weeks under battlefield conditions. Exposure in the 100 rad region
usually has little effect. Accordingly, in conventional nuclear combat it
would be prudent to subject front line enemy to 3,000-8,000 rads or
more, enemy to the rear to 650-3,000 rads, and avoid subjecting
friendly forces and civilians to an unacceptable dose level (100 or
more rads).6'
Another influential argument for the permissibility of nuclear war is
the "total war" argument. The term "total war" may mean different
things. If it means a total effort to defeat the aggressor (such as, total
mobilization, drastic rationing of consumer goods, severe penalties for ab-
57. U.S. ARMY FMLD MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 35.
58. Hague Convention, supra note 10.
59. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 5.
60. Id.
61. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMy, FM 100-5, OPERATIONS 32 (1976).
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senteeism, prohibition of the use of motorcars for non-war pruposes), it is
an entirely legitimate policy. However, if it means a war of total ferocity,
it is what the Nuremberg International Tribunal condemned as the "Nazi
conception of total war:"
In the Nazi conception of 'total war'. . .the moral ideas underlying
the conventions which seek to make war more humane are no longer
regarded as having force or validity... and so, freed from the re-
straining influence of international law, the aggressive war is con-
ducted by the Nazi leaders in the most barbaric way. Accordingly,
War Crimes were committed when and wherever the Fuhrer and his
close associates thought them to be advantageous.2
The clich6 that "this is an era of total war," has ominous implica-
tions. It fosters a nihilistic contempt of morality and law. It is brutalizing
because it condones and accustoms society to mass atrocities. It is limit-
less: how much license does total war grant? It is unpatriotic because the
claim of one own country's right to behave barbarously against the enemy
authorizes the enemy to behave barbarously in return. Worst of all, it
may nourish the belief that a nuclear holocaust is inevitable.
Finally, there is an argument which claims that "restrained nuclear
warfare" would be rationally justifiable because it would limit the casual-
ties and destruction to "acceptable" dimensions. Apart from the fact that
restrained nuclear war would still be illegal, it cannot be assumed that
such war would remain restrained. The late George B. Kistiakowski, Sci-
ence Advisor to three U.S. Presidents, stated it was "totally unrealistic"
to assume that a superpower nuclear war could be "controlled and lim-
ited," even under the counterforce doctrine, which intends to avoid direct
attacks on population centers. "[Ilt may start that way, but with millions
of compatriots among the casualties from the counterforce strikes, with
much of the military communications and command centers out of con-
trol. . .the launching of warheads will continue and accelerate with less
and less central control. . . . Thus, as an inevitable consequence of a lim-
ited nuclear war between the superpowers, the holocaust would come, the
organized national societies would cease to function. . . . " Kistiakowsky
went on to quote Krushchev's prediction that "the living will envy the
dead," and added that this view is shared "by a large majority of senior
statesmen and military leaders. "64
62. 1 TRIAL OF MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL,
NUREMBERG, November 1945-October 1946, 277.
63. Kistiakowsky, Can a Limited Nuclear War be Won?, THE DEFENSE MONITOR, at 3,4
Oct. 1981).
64. Id. See also ZUCKERMAN, NUCLEAR ILLUSION AND REALITY 67 (1982): "escalation to
all-out nuclear war is all but implicit in the concept of fighting a field war with 'tactical' and
'theatre' nuclear weapons." (quoting B.H. LIDDELL HART, DETERRENT AND DEFENSE 61
(1960)). The use of 'small' nuclear weapons to stop advancing troops would most likely esca-
late into "an illimitable and suicidal H-bomb devastation of countries and cities; the initial
employment of nuclear weapons would rapidly escalate into an all-out nuclear war between
the two alliances." Lodgaard, Nuclear Disengagement in Europe, 14 BULL. OF PEACE PRO-
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III. THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY NECESSITY
Contrary to the concept of "total war," which is unknown to the law
of war, the concept of "military necessity" - it may also be called "mili-
tary emergency" - does exist in the law of war.
The meaning of the concept of military necessity was assiduously de-
bated at the Nuremberg trials. Some defendants admitted that their ac-
tions in World War II violated the rules of war, but were excusable be-
cause these actions had been necessary in the emergency situation in
which Germany found itself. The three U.S. Nuremberg Tribunals that
were faced with this plea answered it unqualifiedly:
(1) Judgment in the Krupp case (31 July 1949):
The contention that the rules and customs of war can be violated if
either party is hard pressed in war must be rejected .... It is an es-
sence of war that one or the other side must lose, and the experienced
generals and statesmen knew this when they drafted the rules and
customs of land warfare. In short, these rules and customs of warfare
are designed specifically for all phases of war .... The claim that
they can be wantonly-and at the sole discretion of any one belliger-
ent-disregarded when he considers his own situation to be critical,
means nothing more or less than to abrogate the laws and customs of
war entirely.65
(2) Judgment in the Fieldmarshal List, et al. (Hostages) case (19
February 1948):
As we have previously stated in this opinion, the rules of international
law must be followed even if it results in the loss of a battle or even a
war. Expediency or necessity cannot warrant their violation."
(3) Judgment in the Fieldmarshal von Leeb, et al. (High Command)
case (27 October 1948):
It has been contended in this case that military necessity includes the
right to do anything that contributes to the winning of a war....
[S]uch a view would eliminate all humanity and decency and all law
from the conduct of war and is a contention which this Tribunal repu-
diates as contrary to the accepted usages of civilized nations.6"
These statements, made in reference to what is now called conventional
PosALs 209 (1983) (quoting General Rogers). There is no "persuasive reason to believe that
any use of nuclear weapons, even on the smallest scale, could reliably be expected to remain
limited . . . even the most restrained battlefield use would be enormously destructive to
civilian life and property .... Any use of nuclear weapons in Europe, by the [NATO] Alli-
ance or against it, carries with it a high and inescapable risk of escalation into the general
nuclear war which would bring ruin to all and victory to none." Bundy, Kennan, McNamara
and Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance, FoREIGN AFFAIRS 9 (Spring 1982).
65. T.W.C., supra note 53, at 1347.
66. Id. at 1272.
67. Id. at 541; Also cited in U.S. ARMY, PUB. No. 27-161-2, U.S. ARMY PUBLICATIONs 248
(Oct. 1962).
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war, are even more valid for the nuclear weapons age.
The instructions of the U.S. military establishment on the concept of
military necessity are clear. The Air Force defines it as "the principle
which justifies measures of regulated force not forbidden by international
law" and warns that it "is not the German doctrine, Kriegsraison, assert-
ing that military necessity could justify any measures-even in violation
of the laws of war-when the necessities of the situation purportedly jus-
tified it."6 The U.S. Army Field Manual also stresses that military ne-
cessity justifies only "measures not forbidden by international law" and
adds that the laws of war "have been developed and framed with consid-
eration for the concept of military necessity," 9 i.e., that these laws have
themselves established which legitimate measures may become necessary
in war.
Our era's aversion to war is so deep that it can engender a desire to
punish the aggressor by all means available. Such emotion overlooks the
truism that the decision to make war is commonly made by a small num-
ber of policy-makers. An American Nuremberg Tribunal, speaking of the
"cataclysmic catastrophe" caused by the Third Reich's aggressive wars,
reasoned:
International law condemns those who, due to their actual power to
shape and influence the policy of their nations, prepare for, or lead
their country into or in an aggressive war... [b]ut those under them
cannot be punished for the crimes of others. The misdeed of the pol-
icy-makers is all the greater in as much as they use the great mass of
the soldiers and officers to carry out an international crime; however,
the individual soldier or officer below the policy level is but the policy
maker's instrument.
7 0
The present conventional weapons arsenals guarantee a more cata-
clysmic catastrophe than World War II. Adding nuclear arms to this
stockpile would not magnify the revenge against the guilty decision-mak-
ers, but instead would victimize the armed forces and the peoples of all
nations.
IV. DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL, UNINTENDED NUCLEAR WAR
The most ominous threat posed to the world is the fact that nuclear
war could be triggered, and was on some occasions almost triggered, be-
cause computers erroneously reported enemy nuclear missiles or bombers
to be on the way, or because human beings misinterperted computer re-
ports and messages from sensors planted in various parts of the earth and
from observation devices in outer space.
If it is pointed out that nuclear war technology leaves no alteration to
68. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 1.
69. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 4, art. 3.
70. T.W.C., supra note 53, at 489.
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reliance on such intrinsically unreliable determinants, the dilemma can be
avoided only by the recognition that such type of warfare is forbidden by
elementary standards of legality and morality.
V. NUCLEAR REPRISAL AGAINST FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Reprisals are actions which are in themselves unlawful, but which be-
come lawful when taken in response to unlawful actions by the other side.
There can be no doubt that "the institutions of the reprisal is one of the
most horrible aspects of the laws of armed combat. But in time of war it
provides for almost the only sanction on violation of the law."'
The rules of the Geneva Civilian Convention of 194972 prohibit repri-
sals against civilians in enemy-occupied territories, but "do not protect
civilians who are under the control of their own countries, '73 i.e., those
rules which do not protect the civilian population in the belligerent coun-
tries. This is also the view of the Red Cross.74 However, the radiation
caused by nuclear weapons used in reprisal would have the same effect on
the civilian population of either side. A tragic dilemma exists in that
there is no military method, except nuclear response, to force the first
user (who by his first-use has shown his disregard of the law) to discon-
tinue his nuclear attack. All plans for nuclear war take for granted the
right of nuclear response to first-use, because proportionate reprisal is re-
quired by elementary military logic and legitimized by the law of war.
Without the right of nuclear counter-attack, there would be unilateral nu-
clear war; the opponent who has built up his nuclear deterrence capacity
for self-defense would be virtually defenseless.
7"
On the other hand, it is questionable whether nuclear reprisal could
achieve the very purpose of reprisal, namely, to induce the opponent to
discontinue its illegal behavior. Instead, nuclear reprisal might induce the
71. STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST. [SIPRI], THE LAW OF WAR AND DUBIOUS
WEAPONS 47 (1976). "Reprisals serve as an ultimate legal sanction or law enforcement mech-
anism... to force an adversary to stop its extra-legal activity." See also U.S. Am FoRcE
TREATISE, supra note 5.
72. Civilian Convention, supra note 19.
73. U.S. AIR FORCE TREATISE, supra note 5, at 4.
74. See COMMENTARY, supra note 15, at 45-47, 228 (1958). See also Diplomatic Confer-
ence on the Reaffirmation & Devel. of Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict
Protocol I [1977] U.N. JUsID. Y.B. 95, U.N. Doc ST/LEG/SER.C/15. This protocol extends
the prohibitions of reprisals against civilians in enemy-occupied countries to the civilian
population in the belligerents' own countries. However, except for China (which acceded to
Protocol I on Sept. 14, 1983, with effect as of March 14, 1984), the nuclear-weapon states
have not yet become parties to the treaty. (Information Service of the U.N. Treaty Section,
Sept. 4, 1985).
75. An examination by a Finnish scholar of over a dozen authoritative studies showed
that only two denied the right of nuclear reprisal: Charlier, Questions Juridiques Soulevees
Par l'evolution de la Science Atomique, 91 RECUFJL DE COURs 357 (1957); Brownlie, Some
Legal Aspects of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 445 (1965); Rosas,
International Law and the Use of Nuclear Weapons, in EssAYs IN HONOUR OF ERIK CAS-
TREN 77 (1979).
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first user to intensify and accelerate its nuclear attacks, although the law
of war forbids counter-reprisal. Yet it remains true that if the victim of
the first-use of nuclear weapons were deprived of the right to respond in
kind, it would also be deprived of the right of response to consecutive
nuclear attack. Ultimately, the country might have to accept the ever
greater destruction of its territory with passivity.
The only way to solve the tragic dilemma is to prevent the first-use
of nuclear arms. Without first-use, there can be no subsequent use, and
the question about the legality of nuclear reprisal becomes moot.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF No FIRST-USE PLEDGE
There exists a remedy for the fear of first-use of nuclear weapons. It
obviates the need for the time consuming and laborious negotiation and
subsequent ratifications of a treaty. The goal is obtainable by formal dec-
larations which governments can make unilaterally at any time, and
which, if they wish, become binding at once.
The legally binding character of states' unilateral declarations, if
given publicly and with an intent to be bound, was reasserted by the In-
ternational Court of Justice in 1974, in a case that involved the testing of
nuclear weapons:
Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it
is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should be-
come bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the dec-
laration the character of a legal undertaking .... Any undertaking of
this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding.7
So far, two nuclear-weapon states have made such declarations;
China in 1965 and the Soviet Union in 1982. The Soviet Union declared




76. Nuclear Tests(Aust. & N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 ICJ 253, 257. The Court stated this in its
judgment in the Nuclear Tests case in which Australia and New Zealand contended that
French nuclear tests in the Pacific were illegal because France had publicly declared not to
make them. For a critique of the Court's stand as being too absolute, see Rubin, The Inter-
national Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM J. INT'L L. 1 (1977). For a reply to
this critique see Sicault, Du Charactere Obligatoire des Engagements Unilateraux en Droit
Internaitonal Publique 83 REVUE GENERALE DE DRoIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 3 (1979).
77. The full text of Foreign Minister Gromyko's announcement at the 2nd U.N. Special
Session on Disarmament on June 7, 1982 reads: "Guided by the desire to do all in its power
to deliver the people from the threat of nuclear devastation and ultimately to exclude its
very possibility from the life of mankind, the Soviet Union solemnly declares: The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics assumes an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
This obligation shall become effective immediately from the rostrum of the U.N. General
Assembly." U.N. Doc. PUR/A/S-12, PV 12, 21-52, reprinted in, H.JAcK, DISARM-OR DIE 43
(1983).
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The objection that such a pledge is unenforceable is meaningless, for
enforcement, in the sense of "punishment," is relevant only after an obli-
gation is broken. If the no first-use pledge were broken by a first-use
against a nuclear-weapons state, enforcement would, with virtual cer-
tainty, come in the form of nuclear response. If the pledge (which is ad-
dressed to all states) was broken by a first-use against a non-nuclear-
weapons state, any nuclear-weapons state would have the right of nuclear
response under the principle of collective self-defense. A treaty could
threaten no more compelling enforcement.
If, in contrast, the term "enforcement" is used to denote the intent to
assure observance of an obligation before it is broken, by threatening
"punishment" in case of non-observance, then again the pledge neither
adds to nor detracts from the threat. The Soviet, as well as the Chinese,
no first-use pledge neither promises nor expects any renunciation of the
right to nuclear reprisal (second-use).
These considerations address the objection that the Soviet Union
could benefit from breaking or withdrawing its no first-use pledge. There
have been assertions that the pledge is a ruse to lull the West into a false
sense of security, in order to improve the chances for a Soviet first strike.
But, the pledge need not and certainly does not diminish the vigilance of
the Soviet Union's potential adversaries, nor does the pledge in the pre-
sent climate of deep mutual distrust influence the preparations of either
side for nuclear war. In short, if the pledge were broken or rescinded, the
legal and factual situation would be the same as if no pledge had been
made.
This, however, does not mean that the pledge is useless. Whereas the
deliberate unleashing of superpower nuclear war is altogether improbable,
the possibility of accidental first-use has become even more threatening
by the systematic preparations for instantaneous nuclear response. Con-
sequently, the time for reasoned reflection and response is being extin-
guished, when the aim should be to expand that precious time. The sig-
nificant benefit of a mutual no first-use pledge would be the psychological
readiness to see the approach - and even the detonation - of a nuclear
weapon as the result of human or machine failure, or as the work of ter-
rorists or unauthorized subalterns. That readiness, and the resulting con-
clusion that a nuclear "counter" attack under such circumstances would
be an irremediable mistake, might save the world from a nuclear
holocaust.
The NATO refusal to reciprocate the Soviet's no first-use pledge does
not imply the intention to start nuclear or conventional war. But as long
as NATO insists on preserving the option of a first-use, the Soviet Union
will have less reason to assume that a first nuclear strike against it was
unintended, and might consider it necessary to act on the assumption
that the strike was intended. A mutual no first-use pledge can, as much as
humanly possible, guarantee the prevention of the ultimate blasphemy -
an unintended end of civilization.
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VII. CAN THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE DIVERT THE NUCLEAR
COLLISION COURSE?
The Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.), emphasizing the unaccept-
able risks posed by offensive nuclear weapons, calls for a huge endeavor
to eliminate this danger through an arms system that would destroy nu-
clear weapons in outer space, before they can hit the earth. Announcing
the scheme in his television speech on March 23, 1983, President Reagan
expressed the expectation that this would make nuclear weapons "impo-
tent" and "obsolete" and free the American people of the fear of nuclear
war. To accomplish this would, indeed, be a historic breakthrough.
The project raises fundamental questions. First, if S.D.I. is techno-
logically feasible (which critics deny), would it really protect the Ameri-
can people against Soviet nuclear weapons? The S.D.I. does not make
such a claim. It is directed solely against nuclear weapons coming from
outer space; but those arriving from air, land or sea might still destroy
the United States as a functioning society. Second, could the S.D.I. create
an American monopoly of protection against space-delivered weapons?
Hardly, since the Soviet Union would develop its own S.D.I., and both
sides would develop weapons for the destruction of each other's "star
wars" potential. Thirdly, would the scheme reduce the risk of unintended
nuclear war? Since S.D.I. requires staggeringly complex new computer
technology it would virtually exclude human decision-making and detec-
tion of computer errors. Moreover, S.D.I. could not guarantee against a
deliberate first nuclear strike. In a major crisis, S.D.I. could conceivably
induce either side to make a pre-emptive nuclear attack, in the knowledge
that the attacked side's capacity to respond with space-delivered nuclear
weapons would be destroyed.
7 8
It is in the context of these considerations that the S.D.I.'s compati-
bility with existing treaty law, the ABM Treaty,79 must be examined. The
ABM Treaty of 1972 is the most important arms control agreement con-
cluded since World War II."0 "ABM remains the only weapons system of
78. For various positions on the S.D.I., see also UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, AP-
PEAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO BAN SPACE WEAPONS (May, 1985),
(signed by 54 Nobel laureates, a majority of members of the National Academy of Sciences,
and many other scientists) ; Ball, The War for Star Wars, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, April 11,
1985; Bethe, Garwin, Gottfried, Kendall, Space-based Ballistic Missile Defense, 194 SCIEN-
TIFIC AMERICAN 39-49 (1949); Boyle, Star Wars vs. International Law: The Force Will Be
Against Us 6 ACDIS BULL. 2 (1985).
79. ABM Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No.
7503.
80. For the texts and histories of negotiations of the agreements aiming at arms control
and disarmament, concluded since 1945 and in force for the United States, see U.S. ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, (1980).
For an insider's analysis "of the initiatives and actions taken within the United Nations on
the question of non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war" from 1946 to
the 1982 General Assembly 2nd Special Session on Disarmament (which also shows the ob-
stacles the United Nations has been facing due to attitudes of Member States) see Cor-
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significance to be effectively limited in the arms-control negotiations."'"
The U.S - U.S.S.R. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as the prefix "Anti"
shows, is opposed to weapons designed to protect either nation's territory
against attack. Its philosophy is based on the lessons of the 1960's, which
indicate that such defense cannot be truly effective, but that their build-
up nevertheless nourishes the suspicion of an intention to start a war.
Instead, consonant with the deterrence doctrine, the Treaty expresses the
philosophy that strategic stability requires an equal vulnerability; neither
would attack the other, as the consequences would be unacceptable to
both.
The key stipulation of the ABM Treaty reads: "Each party under-
takes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which
are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based." 2 Thus the
Treaty prohibits not only the deployment and, implicitly, the use of ABM
weapons, but also their development and testing.
The Treaty proves the parties' earnest intent to prevent its demise.
Thus, it shows a calm attitude toward potential infractions. For instance,
the treaty states that "ABM systems or their components prohibited by
this Treaty shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures
within the shortest possible agreed period of time." 3 In other words, such
matters are to be disposed of amicably. Also, in contrast to the time-re-
stricted validity of other arms control agreements, such as SALT I and II,
the ABM Treaty stipulates that it "shall be of unlimited duration." 4
Nevertheless, the Treaty provides for emergency situations: "Each
Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to with-
draw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme inter-
ests."8' 5 The prerogative to withdraw from the Treaty, then, depends on
three conditions: (a) events must have occurred which, in the withdrawing
Party's judgment, were "extraordinary"; (b) the extraordinary events
must, in the withdrawing Party's judgment, have been so grave to have
"jeopardized its supreme interests," and (c) these events must be related
to antiballistic missile matters. This third condition excludes the right to
radini, Prevention of Nuclear War: The Multilateral Approach, DISARMAMENT, A PERIODIC
REVIEW BY THE UNITED NATIONS 32,52 (Summ. 1983).
81. Krell, On the theory of Armaments Dynamics, in ARMAMENTS, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT 117 (M. Thee ed. 1981).
82. The treaty permitted two carefully restricted types of non-mobile land-based ABM
installations (hense its title as "limitation" instead of "prohibition" of ABM systems): the
deployment of specified numbers of ABM launchers, ABM missiles and ABM radar com-
plexes within a specified radius around Washington, D.C. and Moscow, and analogous by
specified ABM installations in one additional area of each country (art. III). A 1974 Per-
otocol to the Treaty reduced the number of those areas from two to one in each country.
ABM Treaty, supra note 79.
83. Id. art. VIII.
84. Id. art XV, para. 1.
85.- Id. art XV, para 2.
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base the withdrawal on any other grounds. Linkage to extraordinary
events unconnected with anti-ballistic weapons matters may not be
invoked.
Furthermore, the withdrawal must not be abrupt. Notice of the deci-
sion to withdraw has to be given "six months prior to withdrawal from
the Treaty"."6 The cooling-off period could permit bilateral negotiations,
as well as third-party efforts (e.g., by the parties' allies and/or the United
Nations), to prevent the withdrawal and thus avoid a serious deteriora-
tion of the international climate and a new arms race.
Finally, "[s]uch notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme in-
terests. '1 7 The notice of withdrawal must make a convincing case that can
stand outside scrutiny. Withdrawal from a bilateral treaty by either Party
terminates the treaty, which is the reason why the ABM Treaty sur-
rounds the right of withdrawal with strict conditions. The pursuit of the
S.D.I. without a formal withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may indicate
the wish of the United States not to be considered as causing the Treaty's
dissolution. But, since it conflicts with the essence of the Treaty, the
S.D.I. entitles the Soviets to terminate the Treaty themselves.8 In any
case, the ABM Treaty, as it stands, cannot survive the S.D.I., nor does
any prospect exist for a U.S.-Soviet agreement to amend the Treaty.
Indeed, the fact that the S.D.I. does not expect to make nuclear
weapons obsolete, but that it is to be combined with preparations for
their offensive use, came to public knowledge in May of 1985. Reporting
on Washington's "most extensive review of the nuclear policy in ten
years", a New York Times dispatch stated:
The Defense Department is devising a nuclear war plan and command
structure that would integrate offensive nuclear weapons with the pro-
jected anti-missile shield .... Until now, the United States has relied
solely on offensive weapons such as missiles, as a nuclear deterrence.
It is the prospect of the shield and the preconceived need to coordi-
nate these two elements that has prompted the current review....
In addition, the United States has begun to field an array of new nu-
clear weapons, including the B-1 bomber, Trident submarines armed
with ballistic missiles, the Pershing-2 medium range ballistic missile,
and cruise missiles based on land, sea and air.... [Tihe new plan is
intended to coordinate the potential use of these weapons, plus others
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states: "A material breach of a
bilateral treaty by one of the Parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for
terminating the treaty or suspending its operations in whole or in part."(art. 60, para. 1) A
material breach of a treaty, for the purposes of this article, consists in... (b) the violation of
a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."(art. 60,
para. 3) Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 3 9/27 (1969).
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still being developed, with the shield ... "
Three months later, "[t]he White House announced that, despite So-
viet objections, the U.S. would proceed with the first American test of an
anti-satellite weapon against an object in space." 90
The large numbers of orbiting satellites are the superpowers' indis-
pensable eyes and ears for their command and control of communication
and intelligence networks. The side deprived of its satellites would be in a
disastrously inferior situation. Were both sides deprived of them, com-
plete chaos would result.
Since "satellite-killers" are not anti-ballistic missiles, neither their
development nor their testing or deployment is prohibited by the ABM
Treaty. However, the technology of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons is so
much identical with that of anti-ballistic missiles that tests of ASAT
weapons would simultaneously test anti-ballistic missiles, and must there-
fore also be considered forbidden. All in all, the pursuit of the S.D.I.
scheme not only violates the ABM Treaty, but erects no barrier against
nuclear war.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The collision course toward nuclear war can only be diverted by re-
membering and following the reasonable and rational rules of conduct set
by international law. If the evil threatened by nuclear war is laid side by
side with these legal norms it is hard to see how they could permit nu-
clear war.
Respect for law is more important for human survival and well-being
than is the perfection of technology. If the human mind was able to split
the atom, it must be able to concentrate efforts to split the fascination
with the pernicious offspring of that feat - the path toward nuclear catas-
trophe. Practicable, carefully designed proposals for reversing the trend
exist. Based on years of study and thorough discussion, the most compre-
hensive list of the measures available and in principle agreeable to all
Members of the United Nations is contained in the "Program of Action"
enunciated by consensus in the Final Document of the 1978 General As-
sembly Special Session on Disarmament.- Various additional construc-
tive proposals are to be found in other General Assembly resolutions, in
formal statements by groups of World leaders, and in the conclusions
reached by highly respected personalities such as those of the Pugwash
89. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1985, at A-8.
90. N.Y. Times, Aug 21, 1985, at 1, 8. Concerning some planned future tests of S.D.I.
Weapons, see, J. Smith. 'Star Wars' Tests and the ABM Treaty, 229 SCIENCE, July 5, 1985,
at 29.
91. The Consensus Declaration of the Special Session states: "Mankind is confronted
with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."
U.N. Department of Public Information, Final Document of the Special Session of the
General Assembly on Disarmament (May-July 1978) at 10-19.
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group. Yet, who will be left to be blamed, and by whom, if the counsel of
reason is disregarded?
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
One of the major issues facing the international community today is
how to deal with the rising threat of terrorism. The use of terrorism as a
political weapon has expanded to virtually every geographic and political
area of the world. The past year offers an example of the extent and fre-
quency of the terrorist problem. In September 1984, the American em-
bassy annex in East Beruit was virtually destroyed by a terrorist truck
bomb.' In October 1984, an assassination attempt was made on Britain's
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, between September 1 and
October 19, 1984, 41 acts of terrorism were perpetrated by no fewer than
14 terrorist groups against the people and property of 21 countries.'
This recent rise in the phenomenon of the use of terrorism as a polit-
ical weapon can be attributed to two factors. First, new developments in
technology, such as the increased sophistication of the mass media, now
permit the terrorist's message to be disseminated throughout the world
virtually minutes after a terrorist operation is undertaken. New develop-
ments in technology have provided the terrorist with powerful new weap-
ons and more reliable means from which to escape. Thus, by using terror-
ist tactics, an individual or group can now obtain concessions from the
nations of the world which in the past were more difficult to gain.3
* Mr. Intoccia is now an Air Force captain assigned to the Staff Judge Advocate's Of-
fice, Bergstrom A.F.B., Texas. B.S. 1978, U.S. Air Force Academy; M.A. 1981, Wichita State
University; J.D. 1985, University of Denver. Mr. Intoccia wrote this article while a student
at the University of Denver. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force Institute of Technology, the Air University,
the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense.
1. This was the third major attack on American interests in Lebanon in the past three
years.
2. 84 DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 2093, Dec., 1984, at 86.
3. Sloan and Wise, Countering Terrorism: The U.S. and Israeli Approach, 9:3 MIDDLE
E. REV. 55 (1977).
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A second factor contributing to the growth in terrorism is that the
cost in employing such tactics is rather minimal. Terrorist acts can be
executed by a small number of persons. By aiming primarily at civilians,
the potential list of unprotected targets is endless and such targets are
readily available. Where the terrorist operation takes place in a country
that is not concerned with the political goal to which the terrorist aspires,
there tends to be a limited reaction from that country to the terrorist
attack.' In short, because new developments in technology lend them-
selves favorably to terrorist methods, and because of the low cost in-
volved in using such methods, terrorism has become a useful device for
achieving even the most minor political benefits.
Recognizing that terrorism is an increasingly dangerous phenomenon,
the United States government is actively searching for an adequate re-
sponse to terrorism. To date, American policy has assumed a defensive
posture, yet its underlying philosophy is based on unyielding firmness in
dealing with terrorists. For instance, the United States believes that
yielding to terrorist demands only increases and encourages subsequent
acts of terrorism. The government will not pay ransom nor will it yield
concessions to terrorists.5
Despite this policy, it has become increasingly apparent to American
decision-makers that the present policy is inadequate. This growing reali-
zation has led to a search for more effective methods of dealing with the
terrorist problem. Perhaps no clearer reflection of this new attitude can
be found than in the recent speech given by United States Secretary of
State George Shultz before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City
on October 25, 1984. Because of the sharp new policy direction the Secre-
tary proposed, that speech will be used in this article as a vehicle to ex-
plore the international legal implications of an active counter-terrorist
policy. It is the contention of this writer that such a national approach to
the problem of terrorism contains, at least in part, serious legal and policy
problems. As such, modifications should be made to the approach pro-
posed. The purpose of this article is to examine those international prin-
ciples and policies concerning the use of unilateral economic and military
measures as they are applied to the specific problems in American efforts
to control international terrorism. The article addresses the extent to
which the United States may, consistent with principles of international
law, or should, consistent with the best interests of nations, engage in
self-help' activities against states that support acts of international
terrorism.
In order to address these questions, this article will first highlight the
major aspects of the speech given by Secretary Shultz. The article will
4. Id. at 56.
5. Id. at 57-58.
6. "Self-help" is used here to describe the situation where an injured state unilaterally
takes measures to protect itself and its nationals.
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then attempt to explain why Shultz and others feel a unilateral approach
toward solving the terrorist problem should be taken. Then, the discus-
sion will turn to a legal analysis of the approach proposed by the Shultz
speech. The last part of the discussion will analyze the policy implications
of adopting the proposed counter-terrorist strategy.
A. The Shultz Speech on Terrorism
Recognizing the inadequacy of existing U.S. policy in dealing with
the problem of international terrorism, Secretary Shultz's speech of Octo-
ber 25, 1984 called for more active counter-measures in dealing with the
terrorist problem, and asked for a broad national commitment to counter
the threat of terrorism. 7 The "essence of our response," Shultz stated, "is
simple to state: violence and aggression must be met with firm resis-
tance."8 The best deterrent to terrorism, he stated, is the "certainty that
swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it."9
In order to understand what Shultz meant by a "firm resistance" pol-
icy, a closer examination of the speech is necessary. The speech embraces
a policy that contains several elements. (A) Israel as an Example. The
speech urges that the methods used by the state of Israel in dealing with
terrorism should be followed. Pointing out that "no nation has had more
experience with terrorism than Israel,"' 0 and that "Israel has won major
battles in the war against terrorism,"' Shultz asserted that "nations of
the world would do well to follow Israel's example [of how to deal with
terrorism]."" (B) Broader International Effort. The speech calls for a
broader international effort, and pledges that the United States "will
work whenever possible in close cooperation with our friends in the de-
mocracies."'" (C) Economic Sanctions. The speech calls for sanctions, im-
plicitly economic in nature, to "isolate, weaken, or punish states that
sponsor terrorism against [the United States]."' 4 (D) Armed Reprisal.
The speech calls for the use of Shultz urges that preemptive action be
employed to "stop terrorists before they commit some hideous act."'" His
speech indicates that unpredictability and surprise are elements that a
counter-terrorist policy should incorporate. The speech specifically calls
for retaliation where there is "an attack on our people.'" The speech ad-
vocates flexibility in response at the "times and places of our own choos-
ing.' 7 (E) Non-Courtroom Evidence. The speech asserts that there may
7. Shultz, Terrorism and the Modern World, 84 DEP'T STATE BULL., supra note 2, at 15.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 16.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 17.
14. Id.
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exist the need to respond militarily though U.S. officials may not have the
"kind of evidence [of terrorist activity] that can stand up in an American
court of law.""8
B. The Desire for Unilateral Action Against Terrorism
Secretary Shultz's call for a more active unilateral policy in dealing
with the terrorist problem reflects a growing attitude among policy-mak-
ers that international agreements do not have the capability to effectively
deal with these matters. Despite adoption of rules by the United Na-
tions1 ' and other bodies20 which clearly outlaw international terrorism,
18. Id. One final element in the proposed policy was an increased American intelligence
capability. Because of the breadth of that subject, it will not be addressed in this article.
19. For instance, several conventions have been adopted regarding aviation hijacking.
The 1963 Tokyo Convention requires parties to the convention to return any hijacked plane
and passengers. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963 f1969] 3 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768. The 1970 Hague Convention
contains language that states parties must either extradite or prosecute hijackers. Conven-
tion for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970 [1971] 22 U.S.T.
1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192. The 1971 Montreal Convention contains the same provisions with
respect to individuals who engage in any kind of sabotage of aviation. Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570.
The General Assembly has addressed the problem of terrorism directed against diplo-
mats. In 1974, it adopted, by consensus, the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents. This con-
vention provides for international cooperation in preventing and punishing attacks against
diplomats and other persons enjoying special status under international law. G.A. Res. 3166,
28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
The General Assembly has also condemned hostage-taking. In 1979, it adopted, without
objection, the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. International Con-
vention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.S. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979). The object of the convention is to ensure that those who take
hostages will be subject to punishment if they are apprehended within any state's jurisdic-
tion that is a party to the Convention. States that are parties to the Convention must coop-
erate in the prevention of acts of terrorism. The Convention rejects the concept that pursuit
of equal rights and self-determination can justify terrorist acts. Parties must prosecute or
extradite hostage-takers under the Convention, unless bound to do so under the 1949 Ge-
neva Convention on the Law of Armed Conflict and the 1977 Additional Protocols.
20. The United States is a signatory to the regional agreement of the Convention to
Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and
Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413.
Other signatories are: Costa Rico, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. Among the most significant obligations, members pledge in Article 8 to take
all measures to prevent the preparation of terrorist acts in their territories, to exchange
information on terrorism, to endeavor to have acts of terrorism outlawed in their own crimi-
nal laws, and to comply with extradition requests by signatories for terrorists.
The United States has also arrived at a common understanding with other industrial-
ized nations regarding the terrorist problem. On June 9, 1984, during the London Economic
Summit, the United States joined with Great Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy,
and Japan in making a Declaration on International Terrorism. Among the most significant
items agreed upon, they pledged: closer cooperation among their security forces in combat-
ting terrorism, a review of their own domestic laws so as to better counter terrorism, review
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the frequency of terrorist acts continues to increase unabated. Moreover,
the United Nations Security Council's record of dealing with specific inci-
dents of terrorism could be characterized as an abysmal failure. Agree-
ment amongst member states are rare regarding the degree to which they
feel that international terrorism poses a threat. Worse still, there is little
evidence that parties to anti-terrorist conventions are engaging in cooper-
ative efforts on any systematic basis.
1. Economic Factors
Economic factors explain, in part, why international bodies have
been unable to come to terms with the terrorist problem. Potential dis-
ruption of trade weakens the willingness of nations to condemn acts of
terrorism. For instance, there is strong evidence of Libyan involvement in
supporting assassinations and other terrorist activity. Yet, the United Na-
tions has not adequately addressed that problem because Libya is an im-
portant trading partner to Western Europe. The potential cost to West-
ern European countries of condemning Libyan acts-denial of large
amounts of trade-is greater than the Europeans are willing to pay.
2. Political Factors
Political factors also explain why international bodies have been una-
ble to come to terms with the terrorist problem. In the United Nations,
the United States has clashed with certain Communist countries who
have been disturbed over American initiatives against terrorism. These
countries feel that a U.S. plan of action, if adopted by the United Na-
tions, would hamper so called "Wars of National Liberation."'" For in-
stance, other Communist nations might feel that any condemnation of
Bulgaria or other Eastern Bloc countries for engaging in terrorism would
be an indictment of Communism as a system, therefore, they should not
support any such condemnation efforts.
3. Legal Factors
Legal factors also explain why international bodies have been unable
to come to terms with the terrorist problem. The prevalent view of the
restrictive nature of the United Nations Charter"2 restrains nations that
would otherwise respond to aggressive acts. The United Nations Security
Council considers a nation's use of force without taking into account any
justification based upon broader political or security contexts.2" This view
clearly limits the occasions on which the use of force is deemed permissi-
ble. The approach rejects, ab initio, any argument based upon the
of weapons sales policies, and consultation with each other regarding known terrorists. 84
DEP'T STATE BULL., No. 2089, Aug., 1984, at 4-5.
21. Sloan and Wise, supra note 3, at 57.
22. See infra notes 64, 92, 93, and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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broader context of an "accumulation" of terrorist attacks.24 Further, the
Security Council has adopted a restrictive view of what kind of action is
deemed proportional to a prior illegal act. In determining if a response is
proportional, only events immediately preceding a response are
examined.2
4. United Nations Record
Aside from the economic, political, and legal factors, the United Na-
tion's dismal record in reacting to specific terrorist acts has made policy-
makers more determined than ever to solve the terrorist problem outside
the United Nations framework, and more willing to employ forceful, uni-
lateral acts. Indecisive United Nations responses, such as those following
the hijacking to Entebbe 6 and the militant takeover of the American em-
bassy in Tehran,2 7 are cited as reasons for the growing frustration. More-
over, United Nations inaction despite Israeli requests for Security Coun-
cil condemnation of terrorist Fedayeen activity also has left American




25. Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Repri-
sal Under Modern International Law, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 19 (1982).
26. On June 27, 1976, four Arab terrorists hijacked an Air Force jet just after take-off
from Athens. The plane was carrying 250 passengers, including 96 Israeli citizens. The hi-
jackers had the pilot fly the airplane to Entebbe, Uganda. There, the passengers were held
hostage in the airport terminal. Non-Israelis were released. After much evidence showed
that the President of Uganda was supporting the hijack operation, and after hopes to solve
the matter appeared futile, Israeli commandos flew to the airport and rescued the hostages.
After the raid, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) submitted a complaint to the
Security Council. The OAU complaint condemned the Israeli rescue attempt to save hos-
tages as an "act of aggression."
Despite strong evidence that the Ugandan government assisted in the hostage-taking
operation, Uganda escaped formal action from the Security Council. The Security Council
would not support a United States/United Kingdom resolution which did not condemn
Uganda, but only the hijacking itself.
See J. MURPHY, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF VIOLENCE, A LEGAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 186-87, 190 (1982).
27. In January, 1979, the Shah of Iran was deposed and left Iran, replaced by the
Ayatollah Khomeini. The United States permitted the Shah entry into the United States for
medical treatment. In protest of his entry, Iranian militants, with the tacit approval of the
Iranian government, seized the American embassy in Iran, taking 66 Americans hostage, and
demanding that the United States return the Shah and his wealth to Iran. The United
States brought the case to the Security Council and before the International Court of Jus-
tice. However, Iran did not comply with the Security Council's resolution calling for the
release of the hostages nor did it recognize the jurisdiction of the court. After American
diplomatic efforts failed to obtain the release of the hostages, the United States launched a
military rescue, which aborted due to helicopter equipment failure.
Though, concededly, United Nations reaction to the incident created an atmosphere
which enabled the adoption of the International Convention Against Hostage-Taking, in the
final analysis, the United Nations proved largely irrelevant to the resolution of the crisis.
Id. at 191-93.
28. See generally Y. TEKOAH, IN THE FACE OF THE NATIONS: ISRAEL'S STRUGGLE FOR
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Thus, it is not surprising that American policy-makers have grown
increasingly disillusioned over the capacity of international bodies to deal
with terrorism. To protect American interests against the threat of terror-
ism, American leadership now ponders new options of self-help in order
to counter terrorist activity. The fact that international terrorism is not
often susceptible to peaceful controls is not a new realization; but this
realization, coupled with a greater willingness to use unilateral action, in-
cluding military action, adds a special exigency to the international
horizon.29
II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED POLICY
A. State Responsibility for Terrorist Acts
To determine the legality of any American action against a state that
supports terrorism, the first question that must be asked is whether that
state is internationally liable for the terrorist activity. If the terrorist act
did not originate directly from the government, but instead originated
from independent acts, the question arises whether responsibility for the
terrorist act can be imputed to the government. This issue is central to an
analysis of the international legal implications of the Shultz speech since
that speech urges military and economic sanctions against nations which
engage in, or at least acquiesce to, terrorism.
Under principles of international law, a state bears responsibility
where it permits its territory to be used for terrorist activity; arguably it
is also responsible where such acts are allowed to exist without state
knowledge. Under the principle of external responsibility, one state's vio-
lation of another state's external political or territorial sovereignty is a
delinquency which imposes liability on the offending state.30 All states
have an internationally imposed obligation to refrain from the threat or
use of force (excluding self-defense) against the territorial sovereignty of
another state. This international prohibition also extends to private indi-
viduals acting either independently or on behalf of a state in which they
are located. Two theories exist which impute responsibility to a state for
a violation of an internationally imposed duty: direct liability, and vicari-
ous liability.
PEACE (1976).
However, it may be argued that in view of Israeli occupation of Arab lands, the Council
has chosen to characterize Fedayeen violence as permissible guerilla activity, not terrorist
activity, and therefore has refused to condemn the violence.
29. Pedersen, Controlling International Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force
and Proposals For Multilateral Cooperation, 8 TOLEDO L. REV. 209, 210 (1976).
30. The concept of sovereignty encompasses two aspects of independence. First, under
the principle of "internal independence," the manner in which a state uses its territory is
generally not the subject of international law, provided such use does not endanger other
states. Second, under the principle of "external independence," a state may not unilaterally
alter that external, or internationally imposed responsibility that each state owes to every
other state. I. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 254-56 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1948).
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1. Direct Liability
The notion of direct responsibility holds a nation liable for acts of
organs of its government." Because (at least publicly) no nations of the
world openly subscribe to the use of "terrorism" as a legitimate tool per
se, this concept is not very helpful in determining state responsibility for
terrorist acts.
2. Vicarious Liability
Under the principle of vicarious liability, a state would be held liable
where it knowingly allows private persons to operate terrorist operations
within its borders. Arguably, a state would also be internationally liable
even where it has no such knowledge. This theory focuses on those pri-
vate acts which may be imputed to the state. The vicarious liability of the
state flows from the recognized duty of a state to exercise reasonable care
to prevent illegal acts which may originate in its territory. Where such
acts occur, the state has a responsibility to either punish wrongdoers or to
compel them to make retribution.
32
If a state is found delinquent by not controlling private individuals in
its territory, vicarious liability may be imputed to the state-based one of
three theories: fault liability, acts on behalf of a state, or absolute
liability.
a. Fault Doctrine
Under the fault doctrine, a state will incur responsibility for hostile
acts committed from its territory, unless the state was unaware of such
conduct, or knew but was unable to prevent the hostile activity.3 This
doctrine has enjoyed enormous support as a legal principle over the years.
This view is implicit in the Corfu Channel case. There, the court con-
cluded that a state's mere control over its territory does not necessarily
establish state responsibility. " The court underscored the principle that a
state is liable if it knowingly permits its territory "to be used for acts
31. Part I of Draft Articles on State Responsibility [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles],
[19801 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N art. 5, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2).
Under this theory, officials of a government who, while acting in their official capacity, en-
gage in acts of terrorism, act on behalf of the state, therefore, their state is internationally
liable.
32. Gross, The Legal Implications of Israel's 1982 Invasion into Lebanon, 13 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 458, 468-70 (1983).
This principle is stated in The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations. [Hereinafter cited as Declaration of Principles of International Law]. That
pronouncement forbids a state's acquiescence of activity within its territory that aims at
fomenting civil war on committing terrorist acts in another state. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
33. W. LEvI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 242-43
(1979).
34. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
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contrary to the rights of other States. 3 5 Application of this principle to
the control of terrorism indicates that although a state is aware of the
presence of terrorist groups in its territory, it will nonetheless escape vi-
carious responsibility if it has no power to prevent hostile acts by that
group or state.
b. Acts on Behalf of the State
Under a second theory, a state will incur responsibility for the of-
fending conduct of persons that act on behalf of the state.3 " Rather than
focusing upon the stated or formal relationship between such persons to
determine whether the state somehow consented, even tacitly, to the of-
fending behavior. The implication of adopting such an approach is that if
a state accepts the benefits derived from actions of persons it knows have
perpetrated an act of terrorism, even after the fact, it may ratify the act
and be held liable.
c. Absolute Liability Doctrine
A broader doctrine which holds the state strictly accountable for acts
within its borders is the doctrine of absolute vicarious liability. According
to this doctrine, a state's mere toleration of the use of its territory as
either a point of departure for incursion into the territory of another state
or as a base of operation is a violation for which a state will be held abso-
lutely liable.3 7 Thus, where private individuals violate international law,
liability will attach to the state from whose territory the individuals per-
petrated the act, regardless of the state's actual complicity or failure to
prevent those same acts. 8 Due to the harshness that this principle works
on a nonaccomplice "innocent" state, this principle has not received wide-
spread acceptance.
3. Application of Principles
The principles of direct liability and vicarious liability, as applied to
American measures against terrorism, may be summarized in the follow-
ing manner. Consistent with customary international law, the use of any
measure is valid only if directed against an entity responsible for the
breach of international law. If the offending conduct is directly attributa-
ble to the government because the country's officials in their official ca-
pacity support terrorism, such as where high government officials actually
engage in a terrorist act, then the government is legally responsible and
may be the object of appropriate economic and military response. With-
35. Id.
36. Draft Articles, supra note 31, art. 8.
37. See Declaration of Principles of International Law, supra note 32.
38. W. Levi, supra note 33, at 235. Due to this principle, it is in a state's best interest
to monitor its territory for terrorist activity, and, if such activity is found, to take measures
to prevent further activity.
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out further inquiry, the government is deemed liable.3 9 The difficult ques-
tion arises when persons engaging in terrorism act independently from
the state in which they operate. In order to take economic or military
action against that state, there must initially exist a nexus between the
government and the group engaging in the terrorist action."0 The thresh-
old nexus is established where nationals commit a breach of international
law, such as conducting terrorist operations, and the government has
failed to act to prevent the deliquency.
A prerequisite to the use of economic or military force against a state
for alleged support of terrorist operations is that that state must be
shown to have a level of active complicity with the terrorist activity that
would deem the connection "substantial." Where evidence exists indicat-
ing such complicity, a state contemplating action against the terrorist-
associated state may infer that the associated state is violating interna-
tional law and so take direct action against that state.41 Given this stan-
dard, were Secretary Shultz's policy adopted which accepts, in some situ-
ations, the use of military force even where evidence of terrorist activity
may not "stand up in an American court of law,' "2 such a policy would
inevitably run into legal difficulties by failing to first establish a requisite
"substantial" connection. It appears evident that a policy that would
stand up in an American court of law is precisely what is necessary to
establish a "substantial" connection.
B. Legal Limits of State Self-Help Measures Involving Economic
Sanctions
Assuming a nation is liable for a given terrorist operation within its
territory, s the next issue is whether economic actions are legally permit-
ted against such subversive centers.
A certain degree of coercion is inevitable in a state's day-to-day in-
teraction with other states." Recognizing this fact, international rules
permit economic reprisals against states found to be violating interna-
tional law.45 Hence, economic sanctions would be legally permissible
39. Salpeter, Armed Reprisals During Intermediacy-A New Framework for Analysis
in International Law, 17 Vt.L. L. REV. 270, 303 (1971).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 304.
42. See supra text accompanying note 18.
43. Some commentators refer to such nations as "subversive centers." Hereinafter, this
writer shall use "subversive center" to label those nations deemed so internationally liable.
44. Dempsey, Economic Aggression and Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab
Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253,
269 (1977).
45. See Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 245, 252
(1976).
The most significant multilateral convention on international trade and economics is
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 4 U.S.T. 6391, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. GATT attempts to insure access to international markets and to
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against states found to be liable for terrorist activity. However, before
such economic reprisals are permissible as a form of self-help, several
conditions must exist: first, there must exist a prior international delin-
quency; second, other means of redress must have been either exhausted
or unavailable; and third, economic measures taken must be limited to
the necessities of the case and proportionate to the wrong done.4
C. Legal Limits of State Self-Help Measures Involving Military Action
Since the United States has enunciated that it is willing to consider
measures of unilateral military action against terrorism (as indicated in
the Shultz speech), another issue which must be addressed is the extent
to which the United States may, if at all, resort on its own to the use of
armed force against states which support terrorism.
Simply because a state supports terrorist activity is not reason
enough to allow other states to employ armed force in response to that
international offense. Other values, such as the maintenance of overall
world order, must be considered. Thus, the kind of armed force employed
against the state, the manner and timing in which it is employed, and the
aim at which the policy is directed, all have a bearing on the ultimate
legality of the measure.
In determining the legality of a nation's use of force, it is paramount
that a sound analysis recognize the signing of the United Nations Charter
as a legal event of profound importance. Since World War II, the vast
majority of nations have become United Nations members. Hence, any
voluntary agreement by those nations may significantly alter customary
international law concerning the agreed subject. Under customary inter-
national principles, much flexibility is given to a state which attempts to
repel violence.47 Generally, those principles view a state's use of force as
permissible in two cases: first, when acting in self-defense;4 8 and second,
to retaliate for past wrongs perpetrated. Therefore, it is important to de-
termine whether the United Nations Charter has in any way limited, ex-
prevent discriminatory tariffs. A member is generally prohibited from imposing export re-
strictions. However, each contracting party may "take any action which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other
emergency international relation."
46. Dempsey, supra note 44, at 298-99.
47. Those circumstances which allowed a state to use force were construed so broadly
that up until the early part of the Twentieth Century, a state could wage war for virtually
any reason without violating international law. In 1928, the use of past precedent concerning
the use of force was cast into a state of ambiguity when the Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced
war as an instrument of national policy. Nonetheless, since 1928, customary international
principles governing the use of force have been repeatedly invoked by states in order to
justify their actions.
48. Here, "self-defense" is used in the broad sense to include the use of armed force to
ensure the protection of a nation's nationals abroad, and where conditions justifying human-
itarian intervention are met.
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panded, or rejected the doctrines of self-defense or retaliation.4 9
1. Doctrine of Self-Defense
a. Customary International Law and Self-Defense
Since customary international law permits the use of force in self-
defense, it follows that customary principles would permit the use of force
to counter-terrorist activity if such measures could be characterized as
necessitated by "self-defense." Whether such force can be characterized
as "self-defense" becomes a definitional issue.
(i) Anticipatory Self-Defense
International law's customary definition of "self-defense" includes
not only those actions in response to actual attack, but also preemptory
response in anticipation of impending attack.5 0 Under customary princi-
ples, a state need not wait for any armed attack to occur, whether con-
ventional or unconventional." Use of force in the name of self-defense is
permitted where a state reasonably apprehends that it will be the object
of an attack by another entity.5 By examining the practice of states, pub-
licists have been able to identify four preconditions to the permissible use
of force in self-defense. First, there must be an impending threat;53 sec-
ond, there must exist compelling necessity to act in response to coer-
cion;54 third, all practical peaceful procedures have been exhausted; and
fourth, force must be proportionate to the threat and cannot exceed mea-
sures strictly necessary for self-defense.
55
This traditional formulation of the principle of self-defense, incorpo-
rating anticipatory self-defense, is found in the oft-quoted words of
49. Reference to the word "retaliation" in this article is intended to be synonomous
with "armed reprisal."
50. See infra text accompanying note 58.
From its customary origins, the right of anticipatory self-defense was viewed as an inte-
gral part of the right of self-defense. Plato justified the forceful preemption of an immenent
threat in the name of self-preservation. THE LAWS OF PLATO 5 (A. Taylor trans. 1934).
Cisero, Gentilli, and Grotus recognized the right to act against a potential assailant when
faced with immediate and certain danger. See Note, National Self-Defense in International
Law: An Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U.L. REV., 187, 189-90 (1984). So
deeply rooted was this concept, that assurance of its continued vitality as a principle was
made a condition precedent to the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Dempsey, supra note
44, at 310.
51. Gross, supra note 32, at 479.
52. Id. at 483.
53. See infra text accompanying note 58.
54. This element distinguishes the doctrine of self-defense from the doctrine of armed
reprisal. While the latter concept is retributive and past-oriented, the former is forward-
looking and addresses an immediate threat of injury.
55. This element distinguishes the doctrine of self-defense from the doctrine of self-
preservation. Whereas the concept of self-defense justifies only enough action to remove the
pressure of a present threat, the now rejected doctrine of self-preservation would permit
action beyond removal of imminent threat to include more speculative threats.
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American Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case of
1842. 56 Caroline is generally recognized by commentators as authoritative
precedent that self-defense, including the concept anticipatory self-de-
fense, is legal doctrine.57 In Caroline, Secretary Webster formulated spe-
cific standards for the use of self-defense. In correspondence with Lord
Ashburton, Webster wrote that in order for an act to qualify as an exer-
cise of valid self-defense, a state must show that necessity of self-defense
is "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no mo-
ment for deliberation." 8 Further, he stated that a state "must establish
that it did nothing unreasonable or excessive, and that admonition or re-
monstrance to the aggressor was impracticable.3 9
Thus, according to customary international law, preemptive action
urged by Secretary Shultz against terrorist activity is legally permissible
if such preemptive action meets the traditional standard of anticipatory
self-defense.
b. United Nations and Self-Defense
The next issue which must be addressed is whether adoption of the
United Nations Charter has changed the customary international law of
self-defense. Despite the clear customary right that would exist for a state
to engage in anticipatory acts when reacting to terrorist activities, the in-
ternational community today remains substantially divided over whether
the United Nations Charter has outlawed anticipatory measures. Under
the Charter, recourse to use of force by self-help is permitted where the
use of force could be justified as a measure of self-defense under Article
51 of the Charter. Article 51 states that the self-defense may be exercised
"until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security."60
As a modern principle of international law, the right of self-defense
has never been seriously disputed. However, heated debate remains,
largely over definitional problems of interpreting the United Nations
Charter. In particular, debate exists over whether a particular act should
be characterized as "in self-defense" or "aggressive," ' what kind of at-
56. 61 Parliamentary Papers (1843), reprinted in Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod
Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L. L. 82 (1938). That case involved the burning in American territory of
an American steamer named "Caroline" by Canadian troops. During that time, Americans
were giving military supplies to Canadian rebels in Canada. The American government was
either unwilling or unable to prevent the flow of these supplies. When it appeared to the
Canadians that assistance would continue and that the Caroline posed a threat to Canadian
authority, the steamer was burned.
57. Id. at 82.
58. Id. at 89.
59. Id.
60. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
61. Debate exists over whether to characterize an act as anticipatory self-defense, and
hence lawful, or as aggressive, and hence unlawful. Regarding the concept of aggression,
Article 2(3) paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter declares that: "[members shall refrain in their
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tack constitutes sufficient provocation to invoke a self-defense response, 2
and whether the United Nations Article 51 is a principle of limitation or
illustration.
6 3
The view that the Charter only allows for a restrictive right of self-
defense has substantial scholarly support and has apparently been
adopted by the Security Council. Under this "narrow" view of interpret-
ing the term "self-defense," the legitimate unilateral use of force has been
severely limited by the United Nations Charter."' Those scholars argue
that the United Nations Charter prohibits all forms of self-defense with
the exception of Article 51 self-defense. The effect of following this view
is that even a clear breach of international law, such as where a state
openly participates in terrorist activity, does not give rise, by itself, to a
unilateral right of armed response by a state against the terrorism-sup-
porting state.
(i) Criticism of the Narrow View of Self-Defense
Those scholars who argue that the United Nations Charter prohibits
all forms of self-defense other than Article 51 self-defense would be en-
tirely justified in their interpretation if the United Nations security or-
gans had either established the collective machinery to oppose aggression,
or could and would respond quickly on an ad hoc basis.' 5 However, for
the most part, this machinery does not exist. War between nations did
international relations from the threat or use of force against the international integrity or
political independence of any state, or on any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations." "Aggression" is defined in Article 2(4) as the "use of armed force by a
state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another
state .. "
62. Article 51 states that self-defense may be lawfully exercised against an "armed at-
tack." Debate exists today over the definition of what constitutes an "armed attack." One
view is that even a small isolated incident is sufficient to justify a self-defense response. A
second view looks to the totality of acts to determine whether a systematic campaign exists,
hence constituting "armed attack." A third view requires a government-initiated invasion by
a large organized force in order to constitute an armed attack. A fourth view requires at
least some type of negligence by a state by not restraining the aggressive acts of armed
bands. Pedersen, supra note 29, at 215-16.
63. This final area of dispute is perhaps more of a problem of construction than defini-
tion. One view asserts that Article 51 restricts self-defense only to the occasion when
"armed attack" occurs. A second view is that Article 51 specifically guarantees a right of
self-defense where there is an "attack", but does not enunciate other lawful situations where
self-defense action may be taken.
64. Scholars supporting this view argue that the United Nations Charter expressly lim-
its the use of force to situations of self-defense, or implementation of a decision by a compe-
tent international organization; a state may not be justified in using force in any other situa-
tion. They further argue that given the language of Article 2(4), the international legal order
has expressed its desire to limit self-defense actions to very narrow circumstances. They
argue that Article 51 explicitly condones only one type of legitimate self-defense: the repul-
sion of actual armed attack. The combined effect of Articles 2(4) and 51, they argue, is to
restrict the right of self-defense to the precise wording of Article 51, making that Article the
exclusive source of authority of legitimate recourse to war. Pedersen, supra note 29, at 213.
65. Dempsey, supra note 44, at 309.
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not end with the signing of the United Nations Charter.6" Furthermore,
Article 51 envisions self-defense as an interim right, to be exercised only
when the Security Council assumes responsibility for resolving the dis-
pute and restoring peace. Experience has shown that the Security Council
is incapable of maintaining peace and security because of political bias
wrought by paralysis in the face of Superpower disputes.6 " Lastly, this
"narrow" interpretation ignores the special problems inherent in combat-
ing terrorist actions. For example, states confronting terrorist bombings
often have limited options due to the covert and often fleeting nature of
terrorist activity. In short, the fundamental flaw of the "narrow" view of
self-defense is that by being so restrictive, it allows for and contributes to
situations where justice cannot prevail.68
(ii) Case for a Broad View of Self-Defense
Under a "broad" interpretation of the United Nations Charter, the
use of anticipatory types of counter-measures against terrorist activity
would be permitted. Under this view, the state is left to take such mea-
sures as it feels are necessary to ensure its defense.6 ' Consequently, the
endangered state is not obligated to first seek peaceful resolution if it
reasonably believes that self-defense action is a pressing necessity.70 The
rationale for this view was perhaps best stated by Sir Humphrey Waldoch
when he said ". . . it would be a travesty of the purposes of the Charter
to compel a defending state to allow an assailant to deliver the first and
perhaps fatal blow . . . [T]o read Article 51 otherwise is to protect the
aggressor's right to the first strike.
71
A "broad" view of self-defense leaves intact the right of self-defense
as it existed before the United Nations Charter. Legal justification for
leaving customary international law intact is that the phrase in Article 51
states: "[niothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of self-
defense."7 The United Nations Charter neither expressly prohibits nor
allows anticipatory self-defense; therefore, all relevant rules of treaty con-
struction must be considered in its interpretation. Further, it is axiomatic
that treaties only limit the rights of nations to the extent that those na-
tions have explicitly agreed to be so limited. Since the United Nations
Charter does not create new rights, a state's right to engage in those acts
which ensures its own survival is preserved under the United Nations
Charter.
66. Id.
67. Levenfeld, supra note 25, at 20.
68. Id.
69. Gross, supra note 32, at 485.
70. Id.
71. Quoted in Mallison and Mallison, The Israeli Aerial Attack of June 7, 1981 Upon
the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor: Aggression or Self-Defense?, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 417, 440
(1982).
72. Id. at 420.
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The "legislative history" of the United Nations Charter appears to be
consistent with this "broad" view. The travaux prepatories, to which one
may turn in the case of documentary ambiguity, suggest only that Article
51 should safeguard the existing right of self-defense and not restrict it."3
While the Spanish and English translations of Article 51 use the phrase
"armed attack," three other official languages, including the French ver-
sion, use a broader term, "aggression armee. ' 7' The French version is
generally considered to be the most accurate version of the Article's nego-
tiating history,7 5 and, therefore, Article 51 should be read as authorizing
the use of force in response to any armed aggression, including the threat
of the use of force under Article 2(4). Moreover, in the process of formu-
lating the prohibition of unilateral coercion contained in Article 2(4),
drafters indicated that the traditional permissibility of self-defense was
not intended to be abridged or attenuated; to the contrary, it was to be
preserved and maintained.
7
This interpretation of Article 2(4) is further strengthened by several
post-United Nations Charter events. In the 1949 Corfu Channel case, de-
cided by the International Court of Justice, the Court permitted the use
of force in the face of a strong probability of armed attack. 77 It found that
a defensive use of force intended to affirm rights illegally denied is not
consistent with 2(4).78 Aside from this case, there are other examples in
which the use of preemptive methods were accepted by the international
community as legitimate situations requiring self-defense. They include
the 1962 American naval "quarantine" of Cuba to prevent supplies from
arriving in Cuba that would aid in the arming of Soviet nuclear missiles
on Cuban soil,7 9 and the 1967 Israeli airstrike against Egypt when Israeli
intelligence evidence gave clear indication that an Egyptian attack was
impending."s
c. Degree of Response Permitted: Proportionality
Assuming that the customary right of anticipatory self-defense is
preserved under the United Nations Charter, the next issue which must
be addressed is what degree of response is permissible under the stan-
dards required by the self-defense doctrine? Although no precise formula-
tion exists for determining the permissible amount of violence in response
to an illegal act, it is well settled that the doctrine of self-defense does
permit a use of force necessary to remove any danger which initially war-
73. Gross, supra note 32, at 480.
74. Mallison and Mallison, supra note 71, at 420-21.
75. Id.
76. Dempsey, supra note 44, at 310.
77. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
78. Id.
79. Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine Interdiction: National or Collec-
tive Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335 (1962).




rants the self-defensive action."1 Despite this standard, disagreement ex-
ists over whether measurement of the danger is limited to immediately
preceeding illegal acts, or can include an "aggregation" of past illegal acts
or an "accumulation of events" to reflect long-term threats. Otherwise
stated, disagreement exists over whether the legality of a response is to be
determined by reference to the prior illegal act which brought it about, or
whether the legality of the response is to be determined by reference to
the whole context of the relationship between involved parties.8 2 Notwith-
standing the wide differences of opinion on this issue, the Security Coun-
cil's position on this matter is clear. The Security Council has formally
condemned as an illegal reprisal any attempt to justify totality of violence
based upon an "accumulation of events." 3 Therefore, regardless of the
outcome of the ongoing debate over permissible levels of violence under-
taken in self-defense, it may be concluded that any American military
response which employs a level of violence which even appears to be
greater than is necessary to counter any immediate terrorist threat is
bound to be met with stiff criticism from the world community.
2. Doctrine of Armed Reprisal
So consistent has been the Security Council's rejection of the "ac-
cumulation of events" theory,"' that recent practice suggests Israel, the
United States, and the United Kingdom are placing less reliance on the
theory, and are now exploring other legal doctrines to provide legal justi-
fication for policies aimed against continued low-level international vio-
lence. Quite striking is the development that Israel has relied less and less
on a self-defense argument and has taken counter-terrorist action which
it openly justifies on the theory of reprisal8 5 Following Israel's lead in
this area, United States policy-makers, as evidenced by the Shultz
speech, are now contemplating employing an armed retaliatory strategy
against terrorism.
Under existing international law, any American policy that would re-
spond to terrorism by using armed reprisal"6 would be illegal since a re-
prisal is not a means of sovereign self-protection; reprisals merely intend
81. Gross, supra note 32, at 487.
82. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4
(1972).
83. Id. at 6-7.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Id.
86. Generally, "armed reprisals" are acts of retaliation for violations of law which cause
injury to the a state exercising the reprisal.
By use of the word "armed reprisal" in this article, this writer refers to that which
much of the literature refers to as "peacetime armed reprisal", not "wartime armed repri-
sal." Because the primary purpose of this article is to examine acts of terrorism within the
context of states that are not at war with one another, wartime armed reprisal will not be
discussed.
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to inflict injury for past harm done.8 7 However, new evidence suggests
increased approval by the international community of selective types of
reprisals.
a. Customary International Law
Customary international law permitted armed reprisal as a matter of
self-help within the limits set forth by the Naulilaa case."' The Naulilaa
court framed the essential requirements for legitimate armed reprisal.
These requirements are essentially the same requirements as those re-
quired to justify self-defense. First, in order for the injured state to make
a legitimate reprisal, there must have been a prior illegal act."9 Second,
the injured state must also have attempted to obtain redress from the
offending state for the alleged violation. 90 Lastly, implementation of the
reprisals must not be patently offensive, that is, disproportionate to the
wrong done.
b. Reprisals and the United Nations
In addressing whether forceful reprisals are legally recognized today,
we must again address the issue: to what extent has the United Nations
Charter changed, if at all, the customary international law on this
subject?
Given the prevalent view of interpreting the United Nations Charter,
any armed reprisal by a modern state in response to terrorist activity
would be deemed a forbidden act.9 This view places great reliance on
Article 2 of the Charter which states in pertinent part:
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated
in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following principles ...
3. All Members shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political inde-
87. Other purposes of reprisals are: first, to enforce obedience to international law by
discouraging other illegal conduct; second, to compel a change in policy of a delinquent
state; third, to force a settlement to a dispute which resulted from a breach of international
law by a delinquent state; and fourth, to compel the delinquent state to make reparation for
the harm done. Salpeter, supra note 39, at 277-78.
88. 2 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1012. In that case, three German soldiers were killed by
Portugese soldiers at a Portugese post. The attack was largely the result of misunderstand-
ings between the same German and Portugese soldiers. In response, German forces attacked
Portugese outposts in Angola, a Portugese colony.
89. A prior illegal act may exist where there has been a violation of a decision by an
international tribunal with proper jurisdiction, a violation of an international convention
recognized by opposing states, a violation of a bilateral treaty, or a violation of a customary
rule of international law.
90. Examples of attempted redress would include good faith arbitration or negotiation.
91. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 30, at 156.
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pendence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations."
The above view was reaffirmed in the U.N. Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations in Cooperation
Among States, adopted by General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) Oc-
tober 24, 1970. The Declaration maintains that "[s]tates have a duty to
refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force."93 In view of the
strong language in these documents, and because the aim of reprisals has
traditionally been solely to punish, there is widespread support for the
proposition that the United Nations Charter has outlawed armed reprisal.
As such, any American military action undertaken against a terrorist sub-
versive center merely to punish the state for supporting terrorist activity
would constitute illegal armed reprisal.
(i) Case for a Broad View of Armed Reprisal and Reinterpretation of
the United Nations Charter
Despite a well settled de jure rejection of the use of armed reprisal as
a legitimate act of state, the use of reprisals as a legitimate state tool is
gaining renewed international support.94 Under an increasingly popular
revisionary interpretation of the United Nations Charter, armed reprisals
taken by nations in response to certain acts of violence appear to have the
approval of the international community, at least in the de facto form.
95
It may be argued that conduct of the United Nations Security Council in
its refusal to condemn what under customary international law would be
"reasonable" reprisals, constitutes a recognition, at least in defacto form,
of the continued vitality of the concept reprisal." This Security Council
practice, however, must be viewed with caution since the Security Coun-
cil's stated position is condemnation of armed reprisal.9 7 Nonetheless, the
emergent position, given the Security Council's failure to condemn "rea-
sonable" reprisals, is that such reprisals hold at least a tacit form of legit-
imacy. One writer has said that among the factors which may affect the
Security Council's acquiescence to a "reasonable" reprisal is the timing of
the reprisal in relation to efforts of peaceful settlement, and how far the
state taking the reprisal has, by its own conduct, provoked the act against
which it subsequently takes reprisal action.98 Recognition of this pattern
of behavior and the clear rejection by the Security Council of the "ac-
cumulation of events" doctrine accounts for the increased readiness of
nations to justify military action in terms of retaliation rather than in
terms of self-defense. It appears that those reprisals undertaken to "pre-
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3, 4.
93. M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-74 (1971).
94. See Bowett, supra note 82, at 26-27.
95. Id. at 10-11.
96. Levenfeld, supra note 25, at 35.
97. Bowett, supra note 82, at 21.
98. Id. at 15-16.
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vent" acts of warfare will likely avoid condemnation.
Within the context of customary international law, several reasons
exist why "reasonable" reprisals should be legally permitted. First, the
United Nations Charter does not rule out armed reprisal as a measure of
self-help. The Charter makes no mention of the words "armed reprisal"
or "retaliation." Second, later authoritative interpretation does not rule
out armed reprisal as a measure of self-help. The Corfu Channel case
indicates that a residual right of reprisal remains in modern international
law since that case apparently ratified a resort to forceful self-help by
allowing a battleship to traverse legally disputed waters. 9 Third, while
the United Nations Charter is essential to the understanding of the right
to implement forceful actions, the Charter should not function as a
straight-jacket to analysis. 100 Interpreting the United Nations Charter as
outlawing all forms of reprisals ignores the realities of a vast array of con-
duct short of war. For instance, a state facing incessant threat of terrorist
attack has no alternative but to use force to protect its territorial integ-
rity and nationals. Despite this reality of the world condition, it is prefer-
able to maintain legal standards to govern the use of armed coercion
short of war, rather than to condemn the use of all kinds of force.10'
Fourth, forbidding all types of reprisal creates a split between the norm
of international law and the actual practice of states. In the long-run, by
creating this divergence, civilized society runs the risk that the substance
of international law will become little more than aspirational slogans. In
the short-run, subscribing to a view of international law which does not
conform to the reality of the practice of states places international law in
the position of acquiring its own "credibility gap."'
0 2
III. POLIcY ANALYSIS
Since terrorism can strike in countless forms, any successful policy
addressing the problem must include a coherent, comprehensive plan, en-
compassing a wide range of responses so as to ensure effective, appropri-
ate levels of response. Therefore, a successful policy must include an as-
sessment of the degree to which a state is involved in a terrorist act, and
suggest useful diplomatic, legal, ideological, economic, and military re-
sponses to acts of terrorism. Furthermore, that policy should make full
use of existing international processes, and urge reform in those interna-
tional processes and laws where appropriate.
A. Policy on Substantial Complicity
As stated previously, sanctions may be made against a state which
has, to a substantial degree, participated in a breach of international
99. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
100. Salpeter, supra note 39, at 288.




law. '3 In determining an appropriate policy toward a state deemed liable
for terrorist activity, other important values must be weighed besides the
importance of countering a terrorist threat. The international commit-
ment to uphold the principle of territorial integrity and the risk that vio-
lence might escalate into wider conflict must be balanced against holding
a state accountable for terrorist activity."0 4 Balancing these concerns, the
United States should not regard a state's toleration nor negligent over-
sight of terrorist activity, as "substantial complicity.' ' 05 However, with
the same concerns in mind, a state's activity should be deemed "substan-
tial complicity" and appropriate sanctions should be levied against it
where it clearly incites, foments, or supports terrorist activity.
0 6
Where a nation fails to control terrorist activity because of the in-
ability of its government to function, 0 7 the greatest amount of care must
be exercised by American leadership to ascertain the precise situation
before weighing the above mentioned concerns. No coercive measures
should be taken by the United States against targets within a state where
terrorists operate when it appears that the state's government is making
an attempt to control terrorist activity, and (assuming American nation-
als are the terrorist victims) either: (1) those prospects of control are not
significantly less than could be accomplished by the United States, or (2)
vital national security interests of the United States are not at stake. In
such cases, the aims of avoiding the escalation of violence and of observ-
ing a state's political independence would outweigh the importance of
holding such a state accountable for any terrorist act. However, the
United States should take action against targets within a state where ter-
rorists operate when it appears that a government's inability to function
has created a political vacuum, enabling a terrorist group to operate, and
(still assuming American nationals are the terrorists-victims) either (1)
prospects of control by the government of the state out of which the ter-
rorists operate are significantly less than could be accomplished by the
United States, or (2) vital national security interests of the United States
are at stake. In such situations, the importance of controlling terrorism
would outweigh the aims of avoiding the escalation of violence and of
observing a state's political independence.
B. Diplomacy, Ideology, and International Claims
In keeping with the general proposition that the United States
should use only the amount of coercive pressure that is necessary to
achieve policy objectives, policy-makers should consider diplomatic, ideo-
logical, and legal options to resolve a crisis precipitated by state sup-
103. Salpeter, supra notes 40, 41, and accompanying text.
104. Pedersen, supra note 29, at 220.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. This was the case of the government of Lebanon in 1982 before the Israeli armed
invasion into that country in that same year.
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ported terrorism. The United States should always make vigorous diplo-
matic protest against states that support terrorism, even if U.S. nationals
are not victims."'0 The United States has an interest in inducing other
states to refrain from engaging in international terrorism, therefore it
should always express privately, through diplomatic channels, its concern
to a state that encourages international terrorism. Ideological public pres-
sure should be brought against the political leadership of a state that sup-
ports terrorist activity. This pressure must be made in such a way that
the same leadership would find it in its best interest not to engage in such
activity in the future. Public pressure and dissemination of information
regarding terrorism acts perpetrated by an elected government should be
directed to that government's nationals, the same perpetrated by a
nonelected government should be directed to the offending state's ideo-
logical allies, with the aim to ideologically isolate the terrorist-supporting
state from the world community. The United States should consider mak-
ing international claims against states that support terrorism. The work
of Richard B. Lillich has concluded that the law of state responsibility
would support, at least in situations where evidence would indicate
"fault" on the part of the respondent state, claims against states for fail-
ure to prevent injuries caused by terrorism, or for a state's failure to ap-
prehend, punish, or extradite terrorists. 0 9 Lillich's study notes that the
most significant problem in asserting such a claim would be the great un-
likelihood that respondent state would acknowledge international respon-
sibility for its actions."0 Nevertheless, the act of formally asserting an
international claim would raise the consciousness of the international
community by focusing on the illegal acts of the respondent state."'
C. Policy on Economic Sanctions
As discussed previously, international law permits unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions by nations which deem the sanctioning appropriate and
in accordance with its vital interests. Thus, the issue of whether to im-
pose unilateral economic sanctions on subversive centers becomes an is-
sue of policy rather than law." 2
For two reasons, the general use of unilateral economic action against
108. J. MURPHY & A. EVANS, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 569 (1978).
109. Lillich and Paxman, State Responsibility for Inquiries to Aliens Occasioned by
Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217 (1977).
110. Id. at 312.
111. Id.
112. It should be noted that U.S. municipal law allows for sanctioning by the United
States against states which support terrorism. The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974 authorizes
the President to suspend air traffic with any nation which aids terrorist groups or a nation
that continues air service to a nation encouraging hijacking. 49 U.S.C. para. 1514 (Supp.
1976). The International Security Assistance and Arms Control Act stops military and eco-
nomic assistance to any nation giving sanctuary to international terrorists, unless the Presi-
dent determines that National Security justifies the continuance of such assistance. 22
U.S.C. para. 2371 (Supp. 1976).
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subversive centers should be discouraged. First, diplomatic problems may
be created with United States allies who have strong historical, economic,
or security relationships with a sanctioned state. Second, an economically
sanctioned country could probably find alternative sources of trade
outside the United States."'3 Thus, for economic sanctions to be success-
ful in altering policies of nations supporting subversive centers, such
sanctions must be multilateral.
Unfortunately, multilateral economic sanctions as presently used are
not influential in shaping the policy of a state that has violated interna-
tional law. The primary reason multilateral economic sanctions are not
influential is because of ineffective use by the Security Council." 4 Several
recent sanctioning experiences show that a nation can ignore Security
Council sanctions without it experiencing an adverse impact on its poli-
cies. When the United States sought United Nations imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions on Iran for actively supporting Iran militants who took
hostage American embassy officials in that country," 5 Iran was able to
formally ignore the United Nations call without impunity. Available data
leads to the conclusion that economic sanctions instituted by the United
Nations against Rhodesia were not the impetus behind the creation of a
new state of Zimbabwe."" Security Council sanctioning and weak enforce-
ment by member states has in practice rendered the use of United Na-
tions economic sanctions useless.1 17 In the Rhodesian sanctioning effort,
United Nations sanctions came too later, and were applied too gradually
in order to operate as a tool to force Rhodesia to comply with interna-
tional law. The Security Council did eventually initiate a full compliment
of mandatory economic sanctions against Rhodesia, but this came over six
years after the United Nations first took cognizance of the situation.'18
Taking into account the interdependent and competitive environ-
ment in which international economic sanctions must operate, any reform
to improve the effectiveness of these sanctions must come from a more
sophisticated use of multilateral sanctions. Once an international delin-
113. Here, a lessen should be taken from the American response to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979. In response to that invasion, the United States suspended exports of
agricultural goods and items of high technology to the Soviet Union. At least with respect to
agricultural goods, the Soviets were able to find alternative sources. Since the American
farmers' enormous grain market with the Soviets was eliminated, those farmers alone were
made to bear the brunt of American economic sanctioning.
114. United Nations Article 41 provides the Security Council with the authority to use
economic sanctions; the Security Council may decide what measures are to be employed to
give affect to its decisions, and it may call upon United Nations members to apply such
measures. The Security Council's Article 41 decisions are binding on members, but are not
self-executing. Actual legal obligations that arise depend upon each member state's own
legislation. Polakas, Economic Sanctions: An Effective Alternative to Military Coercion?, 6
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289, 305 (1980).
115. See supra note 27.
116. Polakas, supra note 114, at 316.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 312.
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quency is found, a decision as to whether to impose Article 1 sanctions
should be made forthwith. In making that decision, net costs to the inter-
national community, and costs to individual states, should be weighed
against net benefits derived by the international community as a whole. If
a decision is made to employ Article 1 sanctions, those sanctions must be
imposed quickly and decisively. Since economic sanctioning pressure is
slow to affect a targeted territory, such pressure should not be hampered
further by slow implementation. The target's trading partners must be
monitored in order to ensure compliance with multilaterally imposed
sanctions. Where violations of such sanctions are found, they must be met
with a firm response. In every case where implementation of multilateral
economic sanctions is considered, the cost of enforcement must be added
to the costs incurred due to the loss of the market.'
D. Policy on Military Measures
Because diplomatic, ideological, legal, and economic measures may
fail to bring sufficient coercive pressure against a state that supports ter-
rorism, the United States must explore the use of military measures in
applying pressure against such states. The Shultz speech urges the adop-
tion of a more active strategy to counter terrorism fashioned after the
policy adopted by the Israeli government.' From the context of the
speech, it may be inferred that Shultz supports an American policy simi-
lar to Israeli military policy against terrorism. While both the United
States and Israel have policies that do not yield to terrorist demands, a
fundamental difference has existed between their respective policies.
While the U.S. policy to date has been largely a defensive response to
terrorist activity, Israeli policy assumes an offensive stance. U.S. policy
has been to punish specifically those individuals who actually carry out
an overt terrorist attack. The U.S. response is not brought to bear until
specific acts of terrorism are under way. As opposed to this American pat-
tern of behavior, Israeli policy concentrates on the source; thus terrorist
leadership and supporters are not immune from counter-strikes. 2 1
Arguably, legal precedent exists for the notion that the doctrine of
armed reprisal is available to all nations.1 2 2 Sound policy reasons may
even exist for some nations to make use of armed reprisal. It is arguable
that an Israeli policy of armed reprisal has deterred many terrorist acts
that would have otherwise have occurred. Even were such an assertion is
shown to be true, American policy-makers should not conclude on that
basis alone that it is in the United States's best interest to adopt such a
policy. The United States, in its own national interest, should not use
force against subversive centers where reprisal is the only basis for its
action. The United States is a superpower, and with that status is carried
119. Id. at 317-18.
120. See Shultz, supra notes 10-12.
121. Sloan and Wise, supra note 3.
122. See the Nautilaa Case, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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a great deal of influence. Because of that status, any armed reprisal by
the United States against subversive centers would be more apt to result
in response by the Warsaw Pact'2 3 than were a reprisal undertaken by a
nonsuperpower nation, such as Israel. Given this status, an American pol-
icy of armed reprisal against subversive centers may do more to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security than the initial ter-
rorist activity. 24 The values that would lead to a sounder policy of Amer-
ican nonreprisal against terrorist centers are the same ones that led Presi-
dent John Kennedy to a successful, peaceful resolution of the Cuban
missile crisis. One incident resulting in death is not sufficient reason to
catapult a nation of superpower status into war.'2"
Given the great confusion that exists over whether the concept of
self-defense includes the customary form of anticipatory self-defense,12
the United States should urge the clear recognition of the anticipatory
doctrine, since to take the contrary position would protect an aggressor's
first strike.1 2 7 In an era of sophisticated terrorist methods 28 and long
range nuclear ballistic missiles, it is unrealistic for an endangered state in
all circumstances to wait until devastation before a response is taken.
Further, it is notoriously difficult to maintain an adequate defense system
which relies upon meeting attacks incident by incident, as in the case of
continued harassment by terrorists. Since legal precedent does exist to
support the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, 129 the United States
should leave open the option of engaging in preemptive action where es-
sential to national security. However, the United States should take pre-
emptive action against a terrorist-supporting state only where conditions
are such that a state is deemed from legal' 30 and policy' viewpoints to
have participated to a substantial degree'3 2 in a terrorist act, conditions
meet the requirements for customary anticipatory self-defense3 3 and con-
ditions are such that the prospective benefits of engaging in the self-de-
fensive action outweigh the prospective costs wrought by escalation in
123. The Warsaw Pact has sometimes been described as the Eastern Block's counter-
part to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It is the military alliance among
Soviet Satellite countries and the Soviet Union.
124. J. MURPHY & A. EVANS, supra note 108, at 556.
125. During the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, one United States Air Force officer,
Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed by a surface-to-air missile while flying a reconnaissance
mission over Cuba. R. KENNEDY, THIRTEEN DAYS, A MEMOIR OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
97-98 (1968).
126. See notes 60-80 and accompanying text.
127. See Mallison and Mallison, supra note 71 and accompanying text.
128. See Sloan and Wise, supra notes 3 and 4.
129. See notes 51-59, 77-80, and accompanying text.
130. See note 41 and accompanying text.
131. See notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
132. Where legal and policy aspects of "substantial complicity" are met, not only is a
terrorist-supporting nation deemed accountable under international law, but it is in Ameri-
can best interest that enforcement measures be levied against such a nation.
133. See notes 53, 54, 55, and accompanying text.
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violence.
The United States should urge the adoption of more flexible stan-
dards in measuring the amount of force permissible under the doctrine of
self-defense. Presently, the Security Council measures the legality of such
force by strict reference to a prior illegal act." 4 The artificiality of such a
measurement does not permit a clear reflection of the traditionally hostile
parties. Indeed, it favors the party which engages in a "continuous war"
consisting of "isolated" terrorist acts. Such a measurement of response
places at a decisive disadvantages any party which first chooses to use
violence. The responding party is left only to treat the symptoms of the
illegality and not to cure the illness. The better view, allowing for a mea-
surement of threat based upon an "accumulation of events,"' 135 would be a
highly probative approach in ascertaining the reasonableness by which a
responding state perceived that a danger was imminent. In the meantime,
given the stated position of the Security Council, any decision to utilize
an American counter-strike would be wise to limit the level of counter-
terrorist violence to an amount corresponding to the immediately prior
terrorist act.
IV. CONCLUSION
In view of the mounting number of terrorist acts perpetrated against
American citizenry, it is altogether natural that American policy-makers
should feel perplexed by their inability to control international terrorism.
Nonetheless, in their desire to counter the threat of terrorism, policy-
makers must be cautious not to translate their frustrations into policies
which though in the short-term might remove an immediate terrorist
threat, violate cherished international principles of law, or are in the
long-term counter-productive to either better national security or a more
peaceful world order. Since the Shultz strategy of more active counter-
terrorist actions potentially suffers in part from these deficiencies, that
proposed policy must be reconsidered. In the short-term, it aims to re-
move a terrorist threat by asserting a more active use of economic and
military measures, but in the long-term it may prove counter-productive
by holding nations accountable for terrorist acts without regard to any
high level of complicity. By not giving full consideration to the uniquely
powerful position of the United States in the world community, and by
advocating an active use of military measures that have as their tradi-
tional purpose the intent to punish, rather than to deter, the United
States stands to lose more than it could ever gain. A sounder approach to
the terrorist problem would recognize the international legal constraints
to unilateral national action and see the advantages of self-restraint, but
where necessary, bring the appropriate level of coercion to bear on those
which support terrorist activity.
134. See note 83 and accompanying text.
135. See notes 82, 83, and accompanying text.
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